fH^D 



yo 



THE NEW FAR EAST 



THE NEW FAR EAST 



AN EXAMINATION INTO THE NEW POSITION 
OF JAPAN AND HER INFLUENCE UPON 
THE SOLUTION OF THE FAR EASTERN 
QUESTION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
THE INTERESTS OF AMERICA AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 



BY 

THOMAS F. MILLARD 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1906 



ivN 



LIBRARY of COISGSESS 
Two CoDies Received 
MAh 24 i90fi 

pyrlght Entry 
cuss Ct XXc. No. 
COPY B. 



DS845 
Ms 



Copyright, 1905, 1906, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 

Published, March, 1906 



INTRODUCTION 

The design of this work is to give a condensed 
exposition of certain significant phases of the Far 
Eastern question since it assumed its present 
shape and tendency, especially in its relations to 
Western civilization and the interests of the 
United States of America. 

The material was gathered in the course of sev- 
eral sojourns in the Far East, made during the 
last six years, when I visited all the localities 
chiefly affected by recent great events, and was at 
times an observer of and participant in those 
events. While I have exercised the privilege of 
using my own judgment in determining facts and 
weighing policies and conditions, and have en- 
deavored to write without animus, I have, in sub- 
mitting them to the test of analysis, not hesitated 
to face the logic of my conclusions. 

To the extent that the inherent importance of 
its subject, rather than any merit it may have, 
draws attention to the book, I will be content if it 
shall aid in restoring, in America and elsewhere. 



vi INTRODUCTION 

a critical instinct in respect to matters of great 
moment to the whole world. 

I beg to acknowledge my indebtedness to the 
publishers of Scribner's Magazine for permission 
to reproduce here, in part, matter which has previ- 
ously appeared in its columns. 

Thomas F. Millabd. 

New York, February 15, 1906. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 

A STARTING POINT 

Some Premises of the New Far Eastern Question — Nothing 
Fundamental Settled by the Russo-Japanese War — In- 

J'ection of a New Element — Relation of Publicity to 
'revalent Western Opinion — The British and Japanese 
Propagandas — Their Method and Results Analyzed — 
Attitude of the American Press — Real Issues of the Late 
War — Importance to the Western World of a Clear 
Knowledge of the Facts and Understanding of the Issues 
— An Effort Toward Sanity Page 



CHAPTER II 

THE TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 

Popular Opinion in Japan — Sentimental Impulses of the 
People — Government by an Oligarchy — Elements in 
Political Life — Foundation of Prevailing Misconceptions 

— Manufacture of Public Opinion — Popular Enthusiasm 
for the War — Japan's Real Position Among the Nations 

— StiU an Oriental Power — The National Ambition — 
The Military Programme — Possible Future Opponents. 

Page 23 



CHAPTER III 

THE TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN {Concluded) 

Foundations of National Wealth — Situation of Japanese Agri- 
culture — Only Half the National Domain Now Cultivated 
— Mineral Resources of the Country — The Fishing Indus- 
try — Industrial Japan — Subsidized Industries — Condi- 
tion of Japanese Labor — Foreign Commerce of the 
Country — Estimate of the National Wealth — Effects of 
the War — The Financial Situation — Future Possibil- 
ities Page 33 

vii 



viii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 

THE SEIZURE OF KOREA 

The Political Struggle Between Japan and Russia in Korea — 
Antecedents to the Late War — Japanese and Russian 
Diplomatic Methods Compared — The Ante-Bellum Ne- 
gotiations — Advantage of the Japanese — Control of 
Communications — Interruption of Telegraph Service — 
Mr. Pavloff's Obtuseness — The Breaking off of Diplo- 
matic Relations — The Situation in Seoul — Landing of 
Japanese Troops — The Situation at Chemul-po — Dip- 
lomatic Dinners at Seoul — The Critical Moment . Page 50 



CHAPTER V 

A QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY 

Arrival at Chemul-po of the Japanese Fleet — Admiral Uriu's 
Ultimatum — Action of Foreign Naval Commanders — 
The "Vicksburg" Incident — Conduct of the Russian 
Naval Commander — Failure of the Neutral Intervention 
— Opening of the Fight — Destruction of the Russian 
Ships — International Aspects of the Incident — Diplo- 
matic Correspondence — The Russian Charges — The Jap- 
anese Reply — The Truth About the Matter . . Page 65 



CHAPTER VI 

JAPAN IN KOREA 

Assurances of Japan Respecting Her Intentions in Korea — 
Ante-Bellum Statements — The First Protocol — This Re- 
markable Instrument Examined — Usurpation of Korean 
Autonomy — Coercion of the Korean Emperor and Cabinet 
— Resort to Intimidation — The Emperor's Vain Appeals 
to the Foreign Ministers — Construction of Railways — 
The Second Protocol — Further Abolition of Korean Au- 
tonomy — Effects of the Japanese Occupation — Attempt 
at Financial Reform Page 80 



CHAPTER VII 

JAPAN IN KOREA ^Continued) 

Effects of the Japanese Occupation upon Foreign Interests in 
Korea — Predominance of American Interests — Prosper- 
ity During the War — Japanese Removal of Foreign Ad- 
visers — Political Pressure upon Commercial and Indus- 



CONTENTS ix 

trial Affairs — The Su-An Syndicate — Feeling of For- 
eigners in the Country — Diplomatic Position of Foreign 
Powers — Dr. Allen's Removal — Political Future of iS)- 
rea — The Suzerainty Agreement — Japanese Military 
Coercion — Suicide of Korean Ministers — Korean Em- 
peror's Vain Appeal to America — Political Significance 
of Korea Page 94 



CHAPTER VIII 

JAPAN IN KOREA ^Concluded) 

Effects of the Japanese Occupation upon the Koreans — Ko- 
rean Hatred of the Japanese — Reasons for this Hatred 
— National Sentiments Involved — Japanese Abuse of 
Koreans — Character of Japanese Immigrants — A Per- 
sonal Experience — Koreans Treated as a Conquered 
People — The "Nagamori Land Scheme" — The "Kong- 
chin-hoi" Society — The "Il-chin-hoi" — Pathetic Situa- 
tion of the Emperor — Japan's Intentions in Korea — 
Agricultural and Commercial Possibilities of the Country. 

Page 109 



CHAPTER IX 

MANCHURIA 

Relations of Manchuria to the Far Eastern Question — Japan 
Rebuffed — The Russian Aggression — Recent Events 
and Their Significance — Enormous Russian Expenditures 
— Count Witte's Policy — Admiral Aliexieff 's Failure — 
The Beginning of the War — Prosperity of the Chinese 
Population — Later Developments — The Japanese Ad- 
vance — Changes in Conditions — Sufferings of the Chi- 
nese — Results of the Japanese Administration — Some 
Effects of Martial Law upon Non-combatants . . Page 124 



CHAPTER X 

THE JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 

Second Year of the War — The Japanese Administration — 
Insecurity of Life Among the Chinese Population — Sum- 
mary Executions — "Ex post facto" Regulations — Ef- 
fects of the Advance of the Japanese Armies — Work of 
Spies and Informers — Military Regulations for the Con- 
duct of Non-combatants — Japanese Camp-followers — 
Hardships of the Chinese — Chinese Financial Losses — 
Confiscation of Chinese Property Page 142 



X CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XI 

THE JAPANESE IN IHANCHURIA {Conduded) 

Effects of the Japanese Occupation of Manchuria upon Foreign 
Interests — Military Control of Ports of Entry — Some 
Effects upon American Trade — Disreputable Methods of 
Competition — Military Blockade upon Commerce — Jap- 
anese Colonization of Manchuria — Japanese Judicial 
Jurisdiction — Judicial Discrimination Against Foreigners 
— Japanese Judicial Supervision over the Chinese — The 
" Hung-hutzes" — The Neutral Border — Russian and 
Japanese Military Use of "Hung-hutzes" — General Nogi's 
Flank Movement — China's Neutrality — Old "Fakes" 
Revived Page 155 

CHAPTER XII 

FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 

Unreliability of Diplomatic Utterances as a Basis for Sound 
Opinion — Basic Motive of Most Foreign Policies in the 
Far East — The British Policy -^ Birth of the "Open 
Door" Doctrine — England's Motive in Advancing It — 
Securing Support for the New Doctrine — Progress of the 
Forces for Dismemberment — The "Sphere of Influence" 
Doctrine — Proposed Division of China — The Anglo- 
German Agreement — The "Yiang-tse VaUey" Agree- 
ment — The Hay Agreement — Lesson of the "Boxer" 
Troubles Page 176 



CHAPTER XIII 

FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA (Continued) 

The New Anglo-Japanese Alliance — Real Intent of this In- 
strument — The Turning Over of Korea to Japan — Eng- 
land's Reason for this Action — "Special Interests" of 
England and Japan in Eastern Asia — "Territorial Rights" 
of England and Japan — The Japan-China Manchurian 
Agreement — Destruction of Chinese Autonomy in Man- 
churia Page 190 

CHAPTER XIV 

FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA {Concluded) 

The Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty — The Agreement Respect- 
ing Manchuria — Analysis of These Clauses — The Matter 
of "Railway Guards" — China's Unavailing Protests — 



CONTENTS xi 

Period of Evacuation — A New Military Frontier — Ja- 
pan's Occupation of Port Arthur — Revival of the " Sphere 
of Influence" Doctrme — The German, Russian and 
French Policies — The German-Russian Entente — Coin- 
cidence Between the Designs of Japan and Russia — Eng- 
land's Equivocal Position . Page 202 



, /CHAPTER XV 

THE NEW CHINA 

The Awakening of China — Forces Within the Empire — Ex- 
ternal Elements — The Balance of Power — Foreign Com- 
mercial Exploitation — Relation of Diplomacy to Com- 
mercial and Industrial Enterprises — Foreign Concessions 

— Growth and Development of Railways in China — 
Conquest by Railway — Russia's Daring Scheme — The 
American Railway Concession — The Belgian Stalking 
Horse — Beneficial Forces — The Imperial Railways of 
North China — Influence of General Foreign Commerce 

— Great_Opportunities Page 217 

V^HAPTER XVI 

THE NEW CHINA {Continued) 

Quasi-foreign Forces Within the Empire — The Japanese In- 
fluence — Growth of the Native Press — Peculiar Condi- 
tions — Extra-territoriality — Growing Force of Publicity 
in China — Japanese Use of this Force — Anti-foreign 
Propaganda — Subtle Methods Employed — The Boycott 
of American Goods — Origin of the Movement — Miscon- 
ceptions Regarding It — The Real Forces at Work — 
Footprints of the Agitation — Injury to Chinese Merchants 

— Methods of Intimidation — Progress of the Movement 

— A Warning to the West Page 236 



\ CHAPTER XVII 
THE NEW CHINA {Concluded) 

Internal Forces of the Empire — Evidences of _ an Awakening 

— Errors in Western Conceptions of the Chinese — Liberal 
Patronage of Railroads — Modem Industrial Development 

— Profits of Railway Lines — Political Forces — The 
Chinese National Spirit — Some Confusions of Thought 
Among Westerners — The Ambitions of Old China — 
Influence of Chinese Educated Abroad — The "Japanese 
Students" — The Reform Movement — Birth of a New 
Doctrine — Characteristics of the People — Ambitions of 
the New China Page 256 



xii CONTENTS 

f CHAPTER XVIII 

JAPAN, CHINA AND THE WEST 

The "Yellow Peril" Possibility — Japan's Relation to the 
Question — China the Determining Factor — Creation of 
the New Chinese Army — Use of Japanese Military In- 
structors — Possible Restrictions upon China's Militaiy 
Development — Progress of Education in China — Ori- 
ental Industrial Possibilities — Some Food for Reflection 
— Influence of Japan upon the Future of Commerce and 
Industry in the East — Logic of Japan's Position . Page 270 



CHAPTER XIX 

AMERICA'S POSITION AND POLICY 

Coming Realignment of Policies in Asia — Foundations for 
Existing Impressions in America — Examination of Basic 
Propositions Involved — Foreigners and Foreign Commerce 
in Japan — Japanese Attitude Toward Foreign Enter- 
prises — Effects upon American Interests — Attitude of 
American Manufacturers Toward Japan — Japanese Feel- 
ing Toward America — Japanese Moral Standards — Has 
England Thrown America Over? — Problems for Ameri- 
can Diplomacy Page 283 



APPENDIX A 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance Pa^e 309 

APPENDIX B 
The Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty Page 312 

APPENDIX 
The Japan-Korea Agreement Page 318 



THE NEW EAR EAST 



THE NEW FAR EAST 

CHAPTEE I 
A STARTING POINT 

Some Premises of the New Far Eastern Question — 
Nothing Fundamental Settled by the Russo-Jap- 
anese War — Injection of a New Element — Rela- 
tion of Publicity to Prevalent Western Opinion — 
The British and Japanese Propagandas — Their 
Method and Results Analyzed — Attitude of the 
American Press — Real Issues of the Late War — 
Importance to the Western World of a Clear Knowl- 
edge of the Facts and Understanding of the Issues 
— An Effort Toward Sanity. 

The apparent disposition of the Western press 
and peoples to regard the making of peace be- 
tween Russia and Japan as having considerably 
advanced the Far Eastern question toward a sat- 
isfactory settlement must have impressed even 
the casual observer. 

One needs, then, a strong conviction and a fairly 
well fortified opinion to advance the suggestion 
that, far from settling the Far Eastern question, 
the peace leaves it in almost as unsettled a state 
as before hostilities began. This should not be 
construed as meaning that nothing has been ac- 

1 



2 THE NEW FAE EAST 

complished by the war. Mucli lias been accom- 
plished. A new and potent element has been in- 
jected into the situation ; an element by many long 
deemed visionary in prospect, and much scoffed 
at — a waking and capable Orient. All the old ele- 
ments, with all the old cross-purposes and hostili- 
ties, still remain, and are now confronted with the 
problem of assimilating or being assimilated by 
this new force. The settlement is still a matter 
for the future. 

It is clear that the practical details of the settle- 
ment that is to come must be worked out mainly in 
the future of the Chinese Empire and, incident- 
ally, of Korea ; and there are indications that the 
existing situation in these countries is not fully 
understood in the West, and particularly in Amer- 
ica. Korea has not consented to be transferred 
to Japan; on the contrary, she objects as strenu- 
ously as she may. Besides Eussia, none of the 
great powers that are interested, politically and 
commercially, in the future of Korea have for- 
mally recognized Japan's preponderating influ- 
ence except England. Theoretically, the status of 
Korea remains unchanged. Instead of Eussia 
being in Manchuria, both Eussia and Japan are 
there. Both have agreed to evacuate, it is true, 
but then Eussia has always agreed to evacuate. 

Taking the situation as the peace between Eus- 
sia and Japan finds it, there is not the slightest 
alteration of the political status of Manchuria as 
a result of the war, and the general interests there 
remain the same as they were before. Manchuria 
is to be given back to China **as soon as is prac- 



A STAETING POINT 3 

ticable"; but the same has been said ever since 
Eussia took advantage of the ''boxer" trouble to 
occupy the country. If diplomatic assurances 
could have settled these important issues, they 
would have been settled before the late war began, 
for the terms of the peace treaty might have been 
copied, in so far as they apply to Eussia, from past 
official announcements of her intention. 

Is it not plain that, while great changes have 
taken place, nothing vital to the question has 
really been settled? The actual results of the 
war have been a decided shifting of the balance 
of power in the Far East and the establishment 
of Japanese military authority in Korea and the 
substitution of it for Eussian authority in the 
southern part of Manchuria. The various policies 
of the various powers, generally suspended or 
only surreptitiously urged during the progress of 
the war, are now seeking to adjust themselves to 
the altered situation, with the object, as always, of 
devising ways and means to gain their several 
ends. Thus the future is full of uncertainty, for 
desires differ, and in the counter-pressure of com- 
plex and opposing forces there is almost infinite 
opportunity for international friction. 

Since the tendencies of Japanese energies and 
ambitions and the political questions involved in 
the settlement seriously affect the desires and in- 
terests of a number of the great Western powers, 
particularly America, they are worthy of some- 
thing more than passing consideration. Indeed, 
it is not too much to say that some of the gravest 
problems influencing the destiny of the human 



4 THE NEW FAR EAST 

race are included within the scope of events now 
so rapidly culminating in that part of the world, 
and it would be a blind public opinion or states- 
manship that would regard them with indiffer- 
ence. 

However, in discussing these matters in so far 
as they are influenced by Japanese ambitions and 
tendencies, one encounters a serious difl&culty at 
the very outset. This has its roots in the immense 
amount of misinformation which has in the last 
year or two, under various disguises, been dis- 
seminated concerning Japan, her policy and peo- 
ple, and the popular misconceptions based thereon 
now prevalent among Westerners. So, in order 
to give any adequate portrayal of the elements 
and issues involved, it seems necessary to first 
clear away this mass of rubbish. 

The chief agency in creating this misconception 
has been, naturally, the press ; and to make clear 
the method by which this extraordinary result was 
accomplished some elucidation is required, the 
pertinency of which will appear. It has long been 
the boast of American journalism that our press 
is to a great degree free, in the delineation and 
discussion of foreign news, from the prejudices 
and influences which so often mar the efforts of 
our British and Continental contemporaries ; and 
it must be with a feeling of mortification that it 
now begins to realize how all these years it has in 
many things been led by a string held in London. 
And yet the explanation of this seemingly singular 
condition is simple enough. During the first cen- 
tury of American national existence the chief con- 



A STAETING POINT 5 

cem of the people was about internal affairs, and 
they were quite content to take ordinary news 
about events transpiring outside the national 
boundaries from outside sources, since the effect 
upon internal progress was so slight as to seem 
insignificant. 

The causes which made London the news clear- 
ing house of the world are obvious. Before the 
day of the telegraph British ships sailed all the 
seas and penetrated to the remotest parts of 
the earth. British interests grew up everywhere, 
making communication frequent and easy. Then 
came the telegraph, and the laying of marine 
cables. Here England was again the pioneer, and 
for many years cables controlled by British inter- 
ests were almost the only avenues of news trans- 
mission between Europe and America and re- 
moter regions, while chartered concessions for a 
long time did, and in many instances still forestall 
competition. So far as America was concerned, 
practically all of the foreign news which reached 
the press came through London, and still does, 
although the laying of a Pacific cable now gives 
the "Western hemisphere ready and direct access 
to the Orient. Other practical reasons applicable 
to journalistic conditions, such as the differences 
in time caused by the rotation of the earth, added 
to the forces which established the route of the 
world's news movement from east to west. Thus 
London became the news centre of the world, and 
the American press found it not only convenient, 
but practically necessary to depend upon the Lon- 
don press for the great bulk of its foreign news. 



6 THE NEW FAR EAST 

It is only in late years, since my work has taken 
me to various parts of the world and brought me 
face to face with the actual method used in the 
gathering and transmission of such news services, 
that I have come to realize what an immense 
power they have exercised in enabling England to 
advance her policies and interests, and my annoy- 
ance at the discovery is lost in admiration of the 
results achieved. That historians of the rise of 
the British Empire should have, in their analyses 
of the forces which have produced the result, 
ignored this corner on information of a certain 
class and what it has involved shows that appre- 
ciation of the function of publicity in civilization 
is still in a nebulous state. 

Interesting as this question is, and well worthy 
of exhaustive elucidation, I only refer to it here 
because it affords the principal clue to matters 
directly pertinent to a discussion of Japanese 
ambitions and designs in the Orient. The reader 
need not expect to be able to reach any intelligent 
understanding of the great Far Eastern question 
without an investigation that must at least con- 
sider the fundamental propositions involved. The 
ingenious and pithy epigram may dazzle, but it 
leaves the mind ignorant and unconvinced. And 
the relations of publicity to the present situation 
and its results cannot be ignored, since it has been, 
and is being utilized to call into play and influence 
forces directly bearing upon the settlement. Ee- 
cently, in discussing the present situation in the 
Orient with a foreigner long distinguished by his 
association with events in that part of the world, I 



A STARTING POINT 7 

asked him what, in his opinion, is the greatest 
force applicable in the readjustment which must 
follow the war between Russia and Japan. 

"Public opinion in America and England," he 
replied without hesitation. 

Striking as this statement may seem at first 
thought, it is essentially true in the last analysis, 
and in his reply I found a long-growing convic- 
tion of my own somewhat unexpectedly confirmed. 
But to say that the greatest force applicable to the 
forthcoming problems is public opinion in Amer- 
ica and England is not to say that such opinion 
will necessarily dictate their settlement. It 
merely indicates that it may do so. I venture to 
go further, and assert that it should do so. 
"Whether it will or not depends upon what that 
public opinion is and how it is exercised in influ- 
encing the actions of the American and British 
governments. 

In this connection it is worth while to review, 
briefly, the manner in which this public opinion 
has been shaped into its existing state, and the 
underlying motives which have given it direction. 
For, as any observant person must have noticed, 
there is at present a truly remarkable coincidence 
in the general trend of British and American 
popular opinion about certain policies and meth- 
ods in the Far East. When previous divergence 
of national thought and prejudices is remembered, 
the present agreement can scarcely be set down 
as the result of merely incidental forces. It is, in 
fact, the result of manipulation, aided by certain 
incidental forces tending to bring English and 



8 THE NEW FAE EAST 

American national policies and interests into har- 
mony. This result, extremely desirable in itself, 
and founded upon just grounds, already shows 
signs of creating a counterbalancing force which 
may conceivably be used to defeat the objects 
the Anglo-American harmony was designed to 
secure. With such a possibility inherent in it, the 
subject, in all its details, cannot be regarded as 
other than very important. 

British antipathy to Eussia is a matter of such 
common knowledge that it is unnecessary to re- 
view its causes and growth. One of its results 
has been to assist materially in bringing about the 
late war and the critical situation consequent upon 
it. It created the first Anglo- Japanese alliance, and 
that alliance was the immediate forerunner of the 
Eusso-Japanese war. From the moment it was 
concluded the war was a foregone conclusion, fully 
determined upon by Japan, no matter what may 
be asserted to the contrary, and any opinions 
formed out of other views lead up a blind trail. 
This statement is fully borne out by a close study 
of the facts, and does not necessarily bear upon 
the right or wrong of the dispute between Japan 
and Eussia. To say that Eussia was wrong does 
not mean that Japan was right, and arguments 
based on this assumption are destined to come 
some severe croppers in the near future. 

From the moment that England determined 
upon an alliance with Japan as the most promis- 
ing means of checking Eussian ambitions on the 
Pacific, there began a propaganda through the 
press to create a sympathy with the purpose of 



A STAETING POINT 9 

the alliance in the two countries where it was abso- 
lutely necessary to secure support — England and 
America. The time was peculiarly favorable for 
carrying out this project. It required, of course, 
little effort to set the tide of English opinion 
flowing strongly against Eussia, but in America 
more delicate manipulation was needed. How- 
ever, it chanced that public opinion in America, 
just awakened to a new discovery of Asia by the 
unexpected acquisition of the Philippines, was be- 
ginning to feel aggrieved at Eussia owing to her 
aggressive policy in Manchuria, which was con- 
sidered to be detrimental, in prospect, to American 
interests. Moreover, there had been a decided 
renewal of American friendly interest in Japan, 
through a variety of causes. So the field was ripe 
for the reaping. 

At that time the gathering and distribution of 
news from the Far East was almost entirely in the 
hands of a British news agency, long dependent in 
a measure upon governmental favors, and whose 
policy was and is, consequently, amenable to re- 
served governmental suggestion. The Pacific cable 
was not laid, and all news that reached America 
from the Orient, except that from the Philippines, 
came via London with the usual British coloring. 
There has always been, and justly, I think, 
latent in the breast of the average American a 
feeling of hostility toward the anachronisms of 
the Eussian Government, even while feeling the 
most lively liking for the Eussian people, which 
gave to clever adverse pictures of Eussia 's Far 
Eastern policy a ready acceptance. And, indeed. 



10 THE NEW FAE EAST 

this view is in my opinion entirely justified by the 
facts. The cleverness of the manipulation con- 
sisted in that the adverse delineation of Eussian 
doings in the Orient was made to also serve to 
represent Japan's aims and acts in a favorable 
light, and the two impressions thus became co- 
existent in the popular mind. 

British manipulation of the Oriental news ser- 
vice during this period did not confine itself to 
openly or insidiously attacking Eussia. It dealt 
blows also at France and Germany whenever op- 
portunity offered. This led, naturally, to the es- 
tablishment of news bureaus conducted in the Ger- 
man and French interests, but little from these 
sources reaches America. The foreign press pub- 
lished in China and Japan has, until very recently, 
been almost exclusively in British hands, which 
was also a great advantage to the favorable pres- 
entation of the British point of view. As a rule, 
editors and reporters on these papers are em- 
ployed as correspondents for the English and 
American press, and their correspondence natu- 
rally has reflected the interests in which their re- 
spective papers are published. Mind, I do not 
wish to convey the impression that any great pre- 
ponderance of news forwarded from these sources 
is false, or even improperly colored ; but I do think 
that the general result has been, in matters that 
could be given a political hearing, calculated to 
represent England and Japan, so far as Far East- 
ern events are concerned, in a generally favorable 
light, and Eussia, France and Germany in a gen- 
erally unfavorable light. 



A STARTING POINT 11 

During this period, wMch may be said to 
embrace the interval between the "boxer" dis- 
turbances in China and the negotiations which 
precipitated the late war, the principal Oriental 
news service distributed to papers published in 
America came from the Associated Press, by vir- 
tue of an arrangement between it and the leading 
British agency ; so that while the service was out- 
wardly American, it was in reality British in its 
essential aspects, subject to a process of "strain- 
ing" in the offices of the American organization. 
This is no reflection upon either the enterprise or 
integrity of the Associated Press. I have reason 
to think that its managers have long realized the 
desirability of maintaining its own correspondents 
abroad, and decided steps in that direction have 
been made in quite recent times. But financial 
and other practical reasons have made the process 
a gradual one, which still probably falls short of 
what the management wishes and hopes to accom- 
plish. The press of America gets no financial 
assistance, either direct or indirect, from the Gov- 
ernment, as is common elsewhere; which, while 
being one of its greatest sources of strength and 
value, sometimes puts it at a temporary disad- 
vantage and prevents it for a time from doing 
what it would like to do. Most governments not 
only subsidize news agencies permanently or upon 
occasion, but go so far as to purchase or establish 
newspapers outright for the purpose of carrying 
forward a propaganda in support of their policies. 
It is to call attention to these methods, particu- 
larly to their past and present influence upon the 



12 THE NEW FAE EAST 

future of the nations in the Orient, and not to 
reflect upon the fundamental excellence of the 
press, that I discuss the subject here. 

When the recent war began the Associated 
Press at once realized the importance of having 
its own representatives on the scene, and a num- 
ber of experienced and capable men were sent. A 
large number of special correspondents also has- 
tened to the Far East, although the American 
press was generally disposed to depend for its 
special service upon its English contemporaries. 
As a consequence, by far the larger proportion of 
the special correspondents were of British nation- 
ality or employed by British publications. Owing 
to the impression that correspondents would be 
more welcome with the Japanese, and the founda- 
tion of interest and sympathy for them which had 
already been laid, a great majority went to Japan, 
where, in the beginning, they received every atten- 
tion calculated to confirm their friendly predis- 
position. Many were seeing Japan for the first 
time, and for the moment its peculiar glamour fell 
upon them. Moreover, there is no doubt that 
many of the correspondents for London news- 
papers had explicit instructions to adopt a pro- 
Japanese attitude. A few of them, men of suffi- 
cient reputation to have some weight, went even 
so far as to advise with Japanese officials and 
offer suggestions with a view to disseminating 
the pro-Japanese propaganda. Thus for several 
months a large number of correspondents re- 
mained in Japan, royally entertained by the 
Japanese, and writing articles of fulsome praise 



A STARTING POINT 13 

about the country and people, which were eagerly 
printed by Western newspapers and periodicals. 

Taking a leaf out of England's book, perhaps 
acting upon friendly suggestion, the Japanese 
Government set to work to organize a definite plan 
to hold what it had gained — popular sympathy in 
America and England. There is no doubt that the 
more astute Japanese statesmen fully realized that 
useful as this sympathy was for the moment, par- 
ticularly in bolstering the nation 's somewhat weak 
finances, it would become of far greater impor- 
tance after the war had been fought and the day 
for the settlement came. Japan had carefully cal- 
culated the chances of the war and expected to be 
successful, else she would not have entered upon 
it. But military success did not necessarily mean 
the full accomplishment of her political policy. 
This policy was destined, as her leaders well knew, 
to bring her into contact, even friction, with West- 
ern powers other than Russia. There loomed 
ahead a possible congress of the powers, in which 
Japan would be unable to accomplish her desires 
without powerful allies, or at least a passive sym- 
pathy which would give her a free hand in certain 
directions. 

So a Japanese press bureau was established in 
London, with branches in Europe and indirect 
connections in America, for the purpose of keep- 
ing the Japanese point of view conspicuously to 
the fore. This bureau supplies special articles for 
publication to various news-distributing concerns 
which operate in England, Europe, and America. 
It also supplies a special telegraph news service 



14 THE NEW FAR EAST 

to newspapers published in the Orient that will 
print it, and most of them do. A number of news- 
papers and publications are directly, though sur- 
reptitiously, subsidized, especially papers printed 
in the Far East. Practically the whole of the 
British press in the Far East continues to be 
rabidly pro-Japanese, although there is a decided 
drift of contrary sentiment already noticeable 
among Britishers residing in the Orient. The resi- 
dent Japan correspondent for a prominent Lon- 
don newspaper, whose special service is widely 
used and opinion much quoted in America, is the 
publisher of a paper subsidized by the Japanese 
Government. 

Naturally, Russia made some effort to counter- 
act this carefully planned propaganda. Two news- 
papers were established in the Far East by the 
Russian Government, printed in English, which 
are supplied with a telegraphic service and are 
edited in the Russian interest. But no attempt is 
made to conceal the fact that these publications 
are subsidized, with the consequence that their 
utterances are discounted in advance. Besides, 
their tone is, on the whole, very mild and reason- 
able compared to the pro-Japanese publications, 
and they are in hopeless minority. 

It may be that these methods are in a way 
legitimate under certain circumstances. But I 
think that the British and American people have 
an interest in knowing the facts. And the Amer- 
ican press, also, which is undoubtedly disposed to 
be fair in its presentation of and judgment upon 
events in the Far East, should scrutinize its news 



A STARTING POINT 15 

sources more closely. Much that is printed in the 
pro-Japanese Far Eastern press is reproduced in 
American newspapers, and often editorial com- 
ment is based upon it, though I think that this is 
decreasing. Although the scene of hostilities was 
far away from Japan, a strict censorship was 
maintained during and even after the war on press 
despatches sent out of the country, and this cen- 
sorship was by no means confined to purely mili- 
tary matters. Yet so prejudiced is a very large sec- 
tion of the English press that it was not uncommon 
to see the Eussian censorship bitterly condemned 
and the Japanese censorship praised in the same 
column. It should be clear to even commonplace 
intelligence that both censorships were maintained 
for the same purpose, and with the same justifica- 
tion (or lack of it), and my knowledge of both 
leads me to believe that the Russian was the more 
liberal, notwithstanding strong reasons why the 
opposite should be true. As the war dragged on 
its weary way, the pressure of enormous expense, 
together with causes tending to destroy much of 
their utihty, led to the withdrawal of a majority 
of special correspondents. This again left the 
news services largely in the hands of the regular 
agencies. Even the Associated Press withdrew 
all its special correspondents upon the conclusion 
of peace, under a reciprocal division of the field 
with its British contemporary. 

Thus it occurs that, with the war ended and the 
settlement which is to be its tangible result rapidly 
formulating, conditions attending publicity con- 
cerning matters pertaining thereto have reverted 



16 THE NEW FAE EAST 

to the situation I have outlined; a situation in 
every way most favorable for keeping to the front 
the Japanese and British point of view, and most 
unfavorable for the dissemination of information 
likely to show the contrary side. 

If, then, the average person in America and 
England now finds himself imbued with an im- 
pression that Japan is a miracle among the na- 
tions; that her national purposes and ambitions 
point straight along the path of universal altru- 
ism; that she generously sacrificed the blood and 
substance of her people in the cause of right and 
the broad interests of hmnanity and civilization, 
in a war unjustly and unexpectedly forced upon 
her ; that the Japanese people are the most patri- 
otic, the most agreeable and the *' cutest" ever 
known; that the Japanese soldier and sailor are 
the bravest the world has ever seen, and their 
standard of excellence unattainable by Western- 
ers ; if he has somehow gathered all this, and much 
more of the same sort, it is not at all surprising. 

This is the rubbish pile which must be cleared 
away before any intelligent grasp of the imme- 
diate issues of the Far Eastern question may be 
had. It is none the less a mass of rubbish though 
much of its fundamental structure consists of in- 
congruous and unrelated facts, with no real bear- 
ing upon the larger propositions involved In 
fact, there is probably no parallel (although I am 
familiar with the methods and success of the Brit- 
ish Government in its manipulation of news from 
South Africa prior to and during the Boer war), 
in the absence of direct use of mone^ or applica- 



A STAETINa POINT 17 

tion of special and pressing interest, to the manner 
by which the press of America (I assume that a 
majority of the British press was complaisant) 
has been "worked" by the Japanese Government 
in regard to the late war and its issues. However, 
its effects need not necessarily be bad for Western 
civilization and interests, since it has given ns 
much that is true and illuminating about Japan, 
unless it should result in mistaken action or no 
action at all by Western governments in the crisis 
that is coming. And it should be remembered that 
in this crisis inaction on the part of England and 
America will be positive in its effects. 

I shall, in reporting and discussing matters con- 
cerning the relation of Japanese ambitions and 
policy, past and present, to the broader proposi- 
tions of the Far Eastern question, attempt the 
somewhat difficult feat of treating Japan and her 
people in a rational manner ; which is to say, that 
I will examine their actions and motives just as I 
would those of any other nationality, in the light 
of the facts. 

I heartily disdain the assumption which is the 
motif of so much that is written about Japan, that 
there is something mysterious, unfathomable to 
the Western intellect in the national character and 
motives ; and in this I pretend to no superior per- 
ception, but only to ordinary common sense. Had 
America or England to-day a conflict of interest 
or opinion with another nation, creating serious 
international friction, what would be the stand- 
ards applied to any reasonable discussion of the 
matter? Was it Germany, for instance, would we 



18 %HE NEW FAE EAST 

permit the fact that her peasantry still wear pic- 
turesque mediaeval costumes and cling to many 
ancient customs and ideas to obscure the circum- 
stances involved? Was it France,., would the 
habitual politeness of French waiters .and poli^- 
men, and the chic characteristics of Fr«^ch wpm«eh 
blind us to sterner issues ? Does the i&ct that the 
Turk is a Mahometan and calls his prayers 'J©-^ 
Allah from a minaret prevent him from haf^irfg 
his national entity weighed in the balance of prac- 
tical international politics ? 

How much, I wonder, of geisha girls, of cherry 
blossoms, of politeness of servants and 'ricksha 
coolies anxious for a tip or desirous of smoothly 
covering a pecuniary exaction, of lotus blooms, of 
old palaces and temples, of crude surprise and 
astonishment at commonplace facts and circum- 
stances of Oriental life, of the beauty of a scenic- 
ally delightful land, is included in the present 
Western conception of Japan and her policy? Too 
much ; entirely too much, I think. These facts are 
very interesting ; as is the fact that Japan is rap- 
idly adopting many Western methods, is improv- 
ing her educational system, and so on. But what 
have these ordinary matters of social life, common 
to nearly all countries in some degree, to do with 
great questions of international policy, dependent 
upon calculated human volition, and expressed in 
broad political action? Very little; and, having 
long ago been emancipated from my first impres- 
sions of the Orient, I intend to cut such trivialities 
out. Let us, then, inquire into these matters, so 
far as Japan is concerned, just as we should if the 



A STARTING POINT 19 

nation in question was England, Germany, Aus- 
tria, France or — may I say? — Russia. 

Much lias been written about the causes of the 
late war; so much that there is now danger that 
the real causes will be entirely lost sight of in a 
chaos of comment and advocacy. We heard much 
of the rights of Japan on one hand, and the rights 
of Russia on the other. As a matter of fact, 
neither belligerent had any rights involved. Both 
had interests, but no rights. This constitutes a 
difference as well as a distinction. The chief 
bones of contention were Korea and Manchuria, 
and neither Japan nor Russia had any more rights 
in these countries than the United States, France, 
or Germany. Manchuria is a part of China, and 
Korea is, or was when the war began, an inde- 
pendent kingdom. Any rights foreign nations 
have are under treaties, which may be modified or 
rescinded at any time. This distinction should be 
kept clear, for it is vital to any intelligent discus- 
sion of the issues of the war and their settlement. 

Since it is only by comparison with the causes 
of the war that its results can be judged, it seems 
necessary here briefly, even at the cost of appear- 
ing to rehash old matter, to recall some of the 
main propositions. Stripped of diplomatic verbi- 
age and the pretences of special advocacy, the 
positions of the opposing powers amounted to 
about this: Russia, desiring to extend her influ- 
ence in the Orient and secure an open port on the 
Pacific, and finding in her path territories belong- 
ing to nations too feeble to protect them, under 
various pretexts had occupied Manchuria and was 



20 THE NEW FAE EAST 

making tentative encroacliments upon Korea, in 
both cases in disregard of the wishes of the polit- 
ical sovereigns of the countries and the treaty 
rights therein of other nations. Japan, newly 
awakened to a great ambition to extend her pres- 
tige and territory, and seeing in the success of 
Eussia's policy the final closing of her only avenue 
to expansion, coveting for herself the disputed 
territories, and despairing of being able to check 
by diplomatic means the Eussian advance, re- 
solved upon war rather than abandon her own 
projects. 

The fact that Eussia had actually usurped au- 
thority in Manchuria, which it was occupying con- 
trary to the wishes of China and a majority of the 
powers which had treaty rights and commercial 
interests there, enabled Japan to assume the pose 
of a liberator fighting the battle of China, Korea, 
and the Western nations, and so posed she still 
stands in the limelight of propaganda. The for- 
getful world does not remember that only ten 
years ago a combination of the powers, headed by 
Eussia, prevented Japan from doing exactly what 
Eussia has, in a measure, since done. Most refer- 
ences to the settlement of the China- Japan war are 
based on indignant allusions to how Japan was 
"robbed of the legitimate fruits of her victory," 
purposely oblivious to the fact that the fruits of 
Japan's military victory over China were almost 
identical with the fruits of Eussia's diplomatic 
victory since, to which such strenuous opposition, 
and justly I think, has arisen. Is there some moral 
law in international affairs which makes a thing 



A STARTING POINT 21 

right when gained by military force and wrong 
when it is accomplished by diplomacy? 

That there be no misunderstanding, it may be 
well to say here that I consider Russia's past 
policy in respect to Manchuria and, incidentally, 
Korea, to have been in its main political aims 
highly objectionable from the standpoint of not 
only China and Korea, but also when the interests 
of other nations are considered. The Western 
world is now little concerned, except academically, 
as to the merits of the quarrel between Russia and 
Japan. The quarrel occurred, the war was fought 
and is finished. 

What now? 

The interests of China, of Korea, of the United 
States, England, Germany, and France remain the 
same as before the war. The rights of all, since 
no fundamental rights were at issue in the conflict 
or could be determined by it, also remain the same. 
Nothing is changed except the situation in the re- 
gions affected by the war. What will be the 
results upon the various interests and rights in- 
volved? This depends upon the eventual settle- 
ment; and the settlement will depend upon its 
issues and the forces brought into play in shaping 
them. 

The main things to be considered, then, are 
the questions implicated and the forces already 
being applied and applicable to the situation. 
This will require close examination of many mat- 
ters. It is now of minor importance what Russia *s 
conduct in the past has been, since her potency for 
aggression has been crippled for years to come. 



22 THE NEW FAR EAST 

So for the time Eussia may be discarded from 
the discussion. This helps much; for it at once 
delivers us from past controversies and bitter- 
nesses and enables us to look more clearly at the 
present and future. And to get a reliable clew 
to Japan's ambitions and intentions, and their 
effect upon Western interests in the Orient, it will 
not do to depend upon the pronouncements of her 
diplomats or the representations of a favorable 
propaganda. I shall therefore attempt a solution 
of Japan's aims and the effects of her policy, if 
it succeeds, by examining not so much what she 
says as what she has done and is actually doing. 



CHAPTER II 

THE TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 

Popular Opinion in Japan — Sentimental Impulses of 
the People — Government by an Oligarchy — Ele- 
ments in Political Life — Foundation of Prevailing 
Misconceptions — Manufacture of Public Opinion — 
Popular Enthusiasm for the War — Japan's Real 
Position among the Nations — Still an Oriental 
Power — The National Ambition — The Military 
Programme — Possible Future Opponents. 

Since popular opinion in Japan is believed by 
many to be an element that will exert an influence 
upon the eventual settlement of the Far Eastern 
question, it deserves some consideration. The 
propaganda has dealt profusely with this subject. 
The West was deluged with accounts of the na- 
tional enthusiasm which greeted the opening of 
hostilities with Russia, manifested in many strik- 
ing ways; such as parental and filial homicide 
where domestic responsibilities hampered re- 
sponses to the call to arms ; popular confidence in 
the government, shown by subscriptions to the 
domestic loans, and illustrated by pathetic exam- 
ples of self-sacrifice; and the alleged determina- 
tion of the people to fight to ultimate exhaustion 
rather than permit the nation to recede a step 
from the position assumed. All this rests upon 

23 



24 THE NEW FAE EAST 

a foundation of truth, but it is nevertheless true 
that the narration and discussion of such incidents 
in the press of the world created, in the main, a 
false impression. It is true, for instance, that 
popular enthusiasm greeted the outbreak of the 
war. But this by no means implies that a majority 
of the, people approved, or even understood the 
reasons and objects involved. 

Japan is at present, and will be for many years 
to come ruled by an oligarchy, which, while ani- 
mated by a more intelligent and progressive spirit 
than that which governs Eussia, differs from it in 
no essential aspect. The masses of the Japanese 
people have no better knowledge of public and 
foreign affairs than do the masses of people in 
Eussia, or than did the peasantry of Europe in the 
time when it spilled its blood upon battle-fields in 
obedience to the whims of kings. Under the 
ruling oligarchy, which includes some very bril- 
liant and a large number of able men, is a stratum 
of people engaged in professional, industrial, and 
commercial pursuits comparable to intelligent 
middle classes in Western countries. These 
elements only have the capacity for any real un- 
derstanding of broader political questions, and 
measured by the whole population of Japan their 
number is utterly insignificant. If an impression 
to the contrary has gone abroad, it is due to 
the direct and indirect operation of the propa- 
ganda. Within the last year or two Japan has 
been flooded with promiscuous writers, who have, 
as a rule, hovered about the capital and treaty 
ports, where the most progressive side of the 



TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 25 

country is on exhibition. They have been taken 
in hand by the Japanese, shown the best schools, 
the best hospitals and factories, the best of every- 
thing ancient and modern the country has to show, 
and the result has been a lot of very ridiculous 
comment. Set a tide like this running and it is 
hard to check, and it is not the less misleading be- 
cause it is founded upon fact. 

The Japanese oligarchy rules Japan just as the 
Eussian oligarchy rules Russia, by seeking the 
approval of the people only when it is compelled 
to, and no oftener. The people have really almost 
no voice in the government, and that there are 
fewer manifestations of popular discontent than in 
Russia is because the people are more indifferent 
to a direct influence in public affairs and they are 
better governed. But in a great war, with its 
consequent human and other sacrifices, it was 
prudent to secure popular approval, which the 
Government set to work to gain. One of the 
strongest evidences that Japanese statesmen have 
long been preparing for the war with Russia is the 
manner by which public opinion was shaped to 
meet the emergency; while Russia's unprepared- 
ness and lack of political unanimity show that 
however her Far Eastern policy may have led 
toward it she failed to realize that the war was at 
hand. To say that she intentionally brought it on 
is sheer nonsense. 

The facilities at hand for the manufacture of 
public opinion are practically the same in both 
countries, with a censored press as the convenient 
and natural medium. During the last few years 



26 THE NEW FAR EAST 

I have visited the Far East several times, and 
have kept close touch with the progress of events, 
particularly those bearing upon the policies of 
Eussia and Japan. Having predicted that the 
war was inevitable three years before it began, 
and guessed at the time when it would break (as 
events have shown, I hit it almost to the month), 
I watched the drift of things more carefully, even 
when not in that part of the world, than I would 
have otherwise done. So I was able to keep pace 
with the method by which the Japanese people 
were primed by the Government for the war, and 
also observed the beginning and progress of the 
pro-Japanese propaganda in the West, which was 
designed to bring to the islanders allies and sym- 
pathizers where most needed. 

When the moment arrived and the war-cloud 
burst I was quite prepared to see the Japanese 
people rush to arms with enthusiasm. For years 
their minds had been adroitly played upon, and 
they threw themselves into the struggle with whole 
hearts. But the impulse that swayed them was 
sentiment, not opinion. They had nothing that 
can rightly be called opinion, for opinion implies 
consideration of both sides of a proposition, and 
they had little or no impartial knowledge of the 
facts. That there was a wide difference of opinion 
concerning the war among Japanese statesmen is 
true, but the masses of the people knew little 
of the doings of the council chamber, for they 
never read the foreign press. Even dissenters 
from the war policy, realizing that the nation 
would need a unified popular sentiment hostile to 



TEUE POSITION OF JAPAN 27 

Eussia if it came to war, did not think it wise to 
disturb existing popular impressions. As to the 
Japanese army, it was all for war. I heard Japan- 
ese officers of high rank speak of the war six years 
ago as a certainty of the near future. And the 
military party was even then in control of the 
Government. 

So much for the foundation of popular opinion 
in Japan. And it is not a fact to be lightly dis- 
missed by the Western world, that here is a people 
formidable in arms and of ambitious temperament, 
so constituted in their present political and social 
development as to be tools in the hands of a few 
clever and aspiring men, whose use of the force at 
their command may be limited only by pressure 
from without. There does not to-day lie in Japan, 
in international affairs, any appeal to the good 
sense or right thinking of the people at large, as 
in England, America, or the greater part of 
Europe, from the designs or decision of the ruling 
class ; and in my opinion persons who disseminate 
throughout the West the contrary view, even in- 
directly, are either mistakenly ignorant or false 
to the fundamental standards of Western civiliza- 
tion. We seem in danger of going widely astray 
in certain directions. There is nothing that I can 
see in the act of a father murdering his children in 
order to go to war, or a mother entering the Yoshi- 
wara that her husband may fight for his country 
except a somewhat revolting reversion to a bar- 
barism still latent in the race. Acts of similar 
self-sacrifice, differently expressed, are common 
to all nationalities in similar times. 



28 THE NEW FAR EAST 

The plain truth is that the time is still far off 
when Japan can be regarded except as an Oriental 
nation, and diplomatic intercourse or policy that 
does not keep this in view runs the risk of commit- 
ting an error that may be very grave in its conse- 
quences. 

All persons who have made a study of the pres- 
ent situation in the Far East will agree, I think, 
that there is a possibility that the future may 
bring Japan into a conflict of interests and opin- 
ions with some of the more prominent Western 
powers. Eightly or wrongly, the average Jap- 
anese has not the slightest doubt just now of his 
nation 's ability to whip any country in the world. 
Of course, no considerable number of Japanese 
leaders entertain this view, but the leaders encour- 
age the people to think so. Thus popular senti- 
ment will probably support the Government in any 
attitude it may elect to adopt toward the questions 
involved in the settlement, even if such a policy 
should threaten to lead to hostilities. This popu- 
lar belief gives the ruling oligarchy practically a 
free hand in its direction of events, and adds a 
seemingly weighty backing to any aggressive 
policy. So in order to be able correctly to esti- 
mate, should friction arise, just how far the posi- 
tion assumed by the oligarchy is genuine and to be 
seriously regarded, and how much is based on 
what Americans call ''bluffing," an examination 
of certain conditions bearing on the matter be- 
comes pertinent. 

This requires, at the beginning, a brief consid- 
eration of Japan's somewhat peculiar national 



TEUE POSITION OF JAPAN 29 

situation. She finds herself with an expansive 
national ambition geographically circumscribed 
by insular limitation. She finds herself with a 
rapidly accumulating population, which threatens 
to become numerically burdensome to the present 
national domain; and she finds, in common with 
other Oriental nations, large sections of the world 
likely to be barred to settlement by her people. 
This reason, as well as the natural advantages of 
contiguity, make the continent of Asia apparently 
the most suitable if not the only place to which her 
population may emigrate. Eecognition of these 
facts has given to her desire for at least equal in- 
fluence in disposing of the future of China a large 
sympathy among Western peoples. It should be 
remembered, however, that there has been and is 
no great obstacle in the way of Japanese emigra- 
tion to China or Korea, or any part of the Orient ; 
in fact, many thousands have already migrated. 

But this is not satisfactory to Japanese national 
ambitions, no matter how the emigres may prosper 
in their new homes. The mother country not only 
wishes to secure a continental outlet for the emi- 
gration of her presumably surplus population, but 
she apparently wishes to retain her sovereignty 
over them after they leave their native land. Much 
significance is attached in Japan to the continual 
comparisons of Japan with England. There is 
not the slightest doubt that Japan wishes to ex- 
tend her political sovereignty over at least some, 
perhaps all, of the territories to which she sends 
emigrants. And thus at a glance the inconsist- 
ency of her announced intentions and purposes in 



30 THE NEW FAR EAST 

undertaking a war against Russia with her real 
desires and oft-declared necessities appears. How 
is she to retain political touch with her emigrating 
subjects unless she acquires territory for them to 
settle in? Is it not clear that should Japan be 
content with her expressed intention to acquire 
no territory by the war, she would have fought 
Russia to no practical purpose? And does any 
one think she deliberately undertook that exhaust- 
ing war for nothing? 

Passing by for the time discussion of the ques- 
tions involved in certain aspects of Japan's ambi- 
tions, let us examine her internal situation and the 
matters directly affecting her ability to carry out 
a policy of expansion in the face of opposition, and 
what it entails. One of the effects of such a pol- 
icy, undoubtedly, is the continuation of an active 
military status. Large numbers of troops will be 
needed to occupy the acquired territories, and con- 
fronted with the possibility of strong opposition 
which may assume tangible shape at any moment, 
the Government will be unable to make great re- 
ductions in the now existing military personnel. 
This personnel includes the flower of the nation, 
and its long withdrawal from accustomed pursuits 
will affect the industrial activities of the nation, 
besides its initial expense. Since control of the 
sea is absolutely essential to the security of an 
aggressive continental policy, she must not only 
maintain her navy at its present efficiency, but 
must considerably increase it. It will be necessary 
largely to re-arm the Japanese navy, and many of 
the ships will have to be practically rebuilt. With 



TEUE POSITION OF JAPAN 31 

the addition of new ships (two battleships are now 
building in England and two large and several 
smaller cruisers in Japan) the personnel will have 
to be enlarged, and the cost of maintenance will 
correspondingly increase. In order to keep on a 
high plane of modern efficiency, the army will have 
to be almost entirely re-armed. A new and im- 
proved field-piece is needed, and the close of the 
war found a majority of the rifles and artillery in 
use ready for the junk heap. So instead of the 
country being freed from the financial burdens 
which the preparation for and conduct of the late 
war imposed, it may have to assume new and addi- 
tional burdens. Such a programme requires an 
immense sum to carry it out. Can the nation 
stand the pressure? 

It is clear that the answer to this question 
must be sought in an examination into the mate- 
rial wealth and present liabilities of the country. 
For no nation can go to war nowadays, no 
matter how brave and skilful her soldiers and 
sailors, without the means to pay the piper. 
Japan fought the war with Eussia on money 
largely secured in England and America, and 
her ability to fight any other war in the next 
generation depends on her ability to borrow 
money abroad. Her ability to borrow abroad 
hinges on two main considerations — her credit and 
the disposition of foreign investors toward her 
and her policy. It is most probable that, even if 
she should be able to offer reasonable security for 
interest and principal of a loan, the response 
abroad would be influenced to a great degree by 



32 THE NEW FAR EAST 

whether her policy was harmonious or inharmoni- 
ous with the views of the nationality of investors. 
For instance, if Japan's policy should bring her 
into collision with the interests of the United 
States, and hostilities threaten as a result, it is 
most unlikely that there would be any great dispo- 
sition among Americans to invest in Japanese 
debentures, to say nothing of the effect a pros- 
pective collision with a powerful opponent would 
have upon the general credit of a nation already 
hard hit by war. 

But, assuming for the time that Japan is un- 
likely to be called upon to fight another war in the 
near future, upon what is her national credit 
abroad to be based? Undoubtedly upon her 
ability to pay; and that leads to a consideration 
of the national wealth of the country. 



CHAPTER m 

THE TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 
CONCLUDED 

Foundations of National Wealth — Situation of Jap- 
anese Agriculture — Only Half the National Domain 
Now Cultivated — Mineral Resources of the Coun- 
try — The Fishing Industry — Industrial Japan — 
Subsidized Industries — Condition of Japanese Labor 
— Foreign Commerce of the Country — Estimate of 
the National Wealth — Effects of the War — The 
Financial Situation — Future Possibilities. 

Bboadly speaking, the national wealth of any 
nation may be said to rest upon two things — the 
natural resources of the land, and the conditions 
under which human industry may be applied to 
their development. In attempting to arrive at a 
just appreciation of these matters, I sought in- 
formation from authoritative and unprejudiced 
sources in Japan, and was compelled to wade 
through a great mass of statistics bearing upon 
them, whose reproduction would only confuse the 
reader. The facts and conclusions here presented 
represent a digest of an accumulation of material 
and opinion, supplemented by a flavoring of my 
own views. And I may say that I have not, to any 
great extent, yielded to the influence of the care- 
fully prepared statements which, with a view to 
strengthening the national credit abroad, the Jap- 

33 



34 THE NEW FAR EAST 

anese Government has of late caused to be com- 
piled and circulated through the operation of its 
press propaganda. 

First among the natural resources of the coun- 
try are its agricultural products. An impression 
has gone abroad that the Japanese are remark- 
ably skilful agriculturists, who cultivate to its ut- 
most productivity the arable land of their national 
domain ; and not a little of the present sympathy 
"Western peoples feel for the Japanese desire to 
acquire new territories is based upon the prevail- 
ing notion that the country cannot support its 
present population. It will probably surprise 
many people to learn that there is now only about 
one-half the arable land of Japan in cultivation. 
Some time before the war the Japanese Govern- 
ment appointed a commission to inquire into the 
state of agriculture in the realm, which in due time 
reported certain facts bearing thereon. Com- 
menting upon the findings of this commission, one 
of the leading and more conservative native jour- 
nals had this to say : 

"According to the latest statistics compiled by the Geological 
Investigation Bureau of the Department of Agriculture and Com- 
merce, the present total area of cultivated fields in Japan forms only 
13f per cent, of her total area. Comparing this with the ratios of 
cultivated land in foreign countries it will be seen that the land 
cultivated by countries in Europe covers from one-third to one-half 
of the total land area. . . . From the above [figures] it will be 
seen that Japan still has 48 per cent, of the total land area which 
can be turned into cultivated land. There is at present about five 
million cho [a cho is equal to 2.45 acres] of cultivated land in the 
country, leaving some four and a half million cho to be still culti- 
vated. Should efforts be made to turn this arable land to advantage, 
the increase of population is little to be feared." 



TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 35 

Not only is it true that half the land in Japan 
which might be made productive is now producing 
nothing, but even that which is in cultivation does 
not produce what it should. The average tourist 
in Japan, observing the tiny fields and generally 
neat aspect of agricultural conditions, jumps at 
once to the conclusion that the Japanese are ex- 
pert farmers. So little does the Japanese Gov- 
ernment subscribe to this view that it has in late 
years taken steps to improve agricultural methods 
throughout the country by the establishment of 
bureaus for investigation and study, and model 
farms for the demonstration of and dissemination 
of knowledge. The Government has also endeav- 
ored to stimulate agriculture by a system of loans 
to the farmers, to be applied only to specific agri- 
cultural purposes. Lecturers on the science of 
agriculture are employed by the Government to 
instruct the people in better methods, and strong 
efforts are being made to introduce new crops and 
to extend the cultivated area. The truth is that 
Japanese agricultural methods are, in the main, 
antiquated and wasteful ; which is to say that the 
national traits and conditions which hamper Jap- 
anese industry in all forms apply also to this. 
The value of annual agricultural products per 
capita of total population is only about twenty 
yen (ten dollars), or less than the value, I believe, 
of the American annual egg crop. Figures bear- 
ing upon the amount of human labor applied to 
agricultural production in Japan show that one 
person cares for less than one acre. 

Next to be considered are the mineral resources 



36 THE NEW FAR EAST 

of the country. There are a number of coal-fields 
in Japan, several of which are at present profit- 
ably operated. Precious metals are also found 
in small and uncertain quantities, but coal re- 
mains the principal product from underneath the 
ground. Japan does not produce in quantities 
worth mentioning gold or silver, lead or iron, and 
other valuable minerals; nor is there any fair 
prospect that she ever will. Some attempts have 
been made to develop oil-fields, but up to the pres- 
ent time more money has been sunk in this enter- 
prise than has been taken out. To sum up briefly, 
the annual value of the mineral products in Japan 
is under 50,000,000 yen ($25,000,000), and the 
industry affords employment to only 120,000 per- 
sons. Laws which operate against the introduc- 
tion of foreign capital have so far hampered the 
development of the mining industry, since there is 
little native capital available for this purpose. 
The fisheries of the island are an important source 
of natural wealth, yielding altogether about 80,- 
000,000 yen ($40,000,000) per annum. This about 
disposes of what may properly be called natural 
resources, as commercial and industrial matters 
belong in another category. 

Much has been published recently by the Western 
press about the new Japan of industry and com- 
merce, and matters set forth have been the basis 
of widespread optimistic comment, calculated, in- 
cidentally, to help the prospects of Japanese for- 
eign loans. Vague yet impressive allusions are 
made to the forest of factory stacks at Osaka and 
the growing fleets of Japan's merchant marine. 



TEUE POSITION OF JAPAN 37 

Here speaks the spirit of car-window observation, 
either too careless or lacking disposition to probe 
for the industrial reality underlying the obvious 
facts. Before the war the total tonnage of ships 
flying the Japanese flag was about 600,000 tons 
gross, a majority of which is included in the hold- 
ings of the three great steamship companies — the 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, 
and the Toyo Kisen Kaisha. The larger part of 
this tonnage is in small boats engaged in local 
inter-island commerce, or plying between Japan 
and continental Asiatic ports. It exists and is able 
to operate by virtue of Government subsidies, be- 
tween eight and ten million yen being annually 
applied to the stimulation of Japanese sea-going 
trade, or a fair profit on about 120,000,000 yen of 
capital. Not only could this respectable shipping 
industry never have had a beginning without Gov- 
ernment support, but it would probably now col- 
lapse should the subsidies, for any reason, be 
withdrawn. Manufacturing, also stimulated by 
Government favors, out of the money secured by 
the Chinese indemnity (although to what extent it 
is difficult to ascertain, since it is mostly by indirect 
methods hard to trace), is making a somewhat 
impressive beginning. But the reality is not so 
impressive under close inspection. In an ante- 
bellum estimate of the national wealth by the 
Bank of Japan (Nippon Ginko), the net annual 
value of manufactured products is given at 300,- 
000,000 yen ($150,000,000); or about six yen 
(three dollars) per capita to the whole population. 
The fundamental basis upon which Japanese 



38 THE NEW FAR EAST 

industry must rest is the efficiency of the labor it 
can command and the availability of raw products. 
The limited character and amount of raw products 
places a primary restriction upon the development 
of manufactures, only to be overcome by the im- 
portation of such material. As to labor, many 
false conclusions about the future of manufactur- 
ing in Japan are based upon the fact that manual 
labor is very cheap, as expressed in the daily wage 
of the individual. But whether labor is cheap or 
dear depends not upon the wage standard, but the 
cost of production. There is no doubt that indus- 
try in Japan to-day, as applied to the manufacture 
of a majority of products staple in the world's 
markets, is severely handicapped by expensive 
labor conditions; which is to say that the ineffi- 
ciency of Japanese labor, compared to manufac- 
turing countries where the rate of wages is much 
higher, now often makes it, especially when driven 
along unfamiliar paths, among the most costly, 
not the cheapest labor in the world. To put into 
a sentence what I have gathered from a mmaber 
of men who have made a study of industrial con- 
ditions in Japan, Japanese labor is often both in- 
competent and wasteful. This is a matter of 
common knowledge to persons who have had occa- 
sion to do business in Japan, or to purchase with 
utilitarian purport many of the articles displayed 
in the shops. 

Recently a commission appointed to determine 
upon ways and means to improve industrial con- 
ditions in the country reported that what seemed 
to be most needed was enactment of legislation 



TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 39 

providing for the proper and systematic training 
of apprentices on the English and European 
method. There is not in Japan to-day anything 
that approximates the skilled labor of other coun- 
tries, although the minute perfection of certain 
artistic products conveys a superficial impression 
to the contrary. The average Japanese is not only 
a rather poor workman, indifferent to his own in- 
competence and destitute of ambition to remedy 
it, but he has little notion of the value of time — a 
vital deficiency in the modern struggle for suprem- 
acy. A Japanese economic authority has esti- 
mated that as compared to American skilled work- 
men the ratio of Japanese efficiency in labor is 
about one to four. Such are the conditions under 
which manufacturing is struggling for a foothold 
in Japan — a by no means roseate prospect even 
if the national resources were being husbanded 
and applied to internal development, instead of 
being sapped by an aggressive military policy. 

The one remaining chief foundation for national 
wealth is commerce. While individual wealth may 
be acquired through internal commerce, only for- 
eign commerce can add to the national wealth ; and 
then only if the nation receive more than it gives. 
So the fact that there is a large and active com- 
mercial class in Japan does not necessarily imply 
existence of a national asset. To the extent that a 
nation is compelled to purchase abroad articles 
necessary to its national existence in excess of 
articles produced in the country and exported to 
pay for them it loses commercially by the transac- 
tion, although such imports may be turned into 



40 THE NEW FAR EAST 

profit through industrial uses. This difference, 
where it occurs, is usually called the balance of 
trade. Without attempting to discuss the eco- 
nomic principles involved, it suffices here to say 
that at present Japan's purely commercial activi- 
ties do not constitute a national asset, for the bal- 
ance of foreign trade is against the country. This 
condition has existed for twenty years now, and 
the only prospect of a change lies in the hope of 
the Government that it will be able to push Japan- 
ese export commerce in China. Consequently, 
Japan's foreign commerce must now be figured 
as a national liability. 

In a recent study of the foreign commerce of 
Japan, a local resident long familiar with condi- 
tions in the country and with easy access to official 
sources of information, pointed out the difficulties 
in the way of altering the present unfavorable bal- 
ance of trade. He thinks it cannot be done without 
a revolution of existing industrial and economic 
methods, and sees no immediate prospect of this. 
In 1903 (it is hardly fair to quote in this connec- 
tion the immense imports caused by the war) the 
imports exceeded exports by 28,000,000 yen, about 
ten per cent, of the total exports. The imports for 
that year consisted mainly of the following prin- 
cipal items: foodstuffs, raw materials used in 
manufacturing, etc., amounting to 200,000,000 
yen; leaving imports of about 80,000,000 yen of 
such articles as sugar, kerosene, wool, etc., which 
might be dispensed with without seriously affect- 
ing the daily life of the people. But it is not pos- 
sible to reduce these imports without materially 



TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 41 

influencing various forms of industry. Besides, 
the matter of any possible reduction of imports 
has another bearing. There is a duty on most of 
these articles, and as the customs receipts are 
already pledged to pay the interest on one of the 
foreign loans, there might be strong international 
objection to any alteration of the fiscal system 
calculated to render this collateral insufficient or 
valueless. 

In 1903 the Bank of Japan estimated the na- 
tional wealth, in a tabulated statement too long 
to be reproduced, to be 11,690,000,000 yen. Elimi- 
nating certain items which cannot be taken as 
bearing interest, a leading financial paper in 
Japan estimated, on a basis of twelve per cent., a 
yearly income of 1,400,000,000 yen ($700,000,000). 
I think that twelve per cent, is more than most 
capital in Japan earns, but even that estimate 
gives an annual income per capita of only thirty 
yen (fifteen dollars). Other estimates reached by 
a different process of figuring place the monthly 
income of the whole population per capita at about 
two yen (one dollar), or about twelve dollars a 
year in United States money. 

This brief review will afford some idea of the na- 
tional resources of Japan under normal conditions. 
But now, owing to the war, many special taxes 
have been added to the burden upon a people 
already taxed almost to the limit. The domestic 
loans have drawn large sums out of ordinary 
paths of commerce and industry. The interest 
upon the new foreign loans must be exported, thus 
increasing the adverse balance of trade. Assum- 



42 THE NEW FAR EAST 

ing that most of the money raised by domestic 
loans is spent in the country, thus preventing for 
the time the pressure of the war from being felt 
by the poorer and commercial classes, it is adding 
nothing to the real wealth of the country, while 
piling up a new taxation upon the industry of the 
future. A war consumption tax of fifteen per cent, 
imposed upon manufactured articles will not tend 
to stimulate manufactures. The partial failure of 
the 1905 rice crop further crippled the internal 
resources of the country. Without entering into 
details, general prosperity in Japan is just now 
upon a downward course, if Westerners can con- 
ceive a point below an average monthly income 
of one dollar. With a population rapidly increas- 
ing, the importation of food products is increasing 
still more rapidly, while the present tendency of 
industry is to languish in most lines. The quo- 
tations on leading Japanese industrial and bank- 
ing stocks have declined steadily for the last ten 
years. Other matters are affecting the internal 
condition of the country. Extraordinary expenses 
attendant upon the war forced the Government 
to abandon many projected public improvements, 
such as new schools, railways, roads, and bridges. 
The effects of the war will be felt upon almost 
every feature of Japan's intellectual, social and 
industrial life for many years. 

There remains to be examined the financial situ- 
ation of Japan. According to statistics which I 
regard as reliable, the total capital of all banking, 
commercial, industrial, mining, shipping and agri- 
cultural undertakings was at the beginning of the 



TEUE POSITION OF JAPAN 43 

war 878,762,000 yen (about $440,000,000) . A com- 
parison shows that the deposits in the banks of the 
city of New York would more than pay for all the 
capitalized wealth of Japan, including bank de- 
posits. It is true that, in a statement recently 
issued, this figure was greatly increased ; but it is 
not easy to see how the national wealth of a coun- 
try, upon which its capitalized industries largely 
rest, can have been immediately augmented by a 
long and very expensive war. The figures given 
were compiled before the necessity for represent- 
ing the national assets in the most favorable light, 
in order to facilitate the acceptance of foreign 
loans, was quite so urgent as it is now. 

In the recent refunding and conversion of some 
of the Japanese foreign loans confusion has 
arisen, which has made it somewhat difficult for 
one not in the confidence of their financiers to 
follow the exact drift of all of the transactions. 
But I think I am approximately correct in stating 
that the national debt of Japan is now about 
2,200,000,000 yen, of which about three-fifths is 
owed abroad, an increase of 1,700,000,000 yen as a 
result of the war ; and it has been announced that 
a new domestic loan will soon be issued. As 
security for the foreign loans the Government has 
hypothecated about everything in the country that 
would be accepted for the purpose, including the 
customs, the tobacco monopoly (mortgaged to 
secure the payment of interest amounting to con- 
siderably more than the present or prospective 
earnings of the monopoly), the Government rail- 
ways and some other minor resources. With an 



44 THE NEW FAR EAST 

annual revenue of only 230,000,000 yen ($115,000,- 
000) in ordinary times, and that barely equal to 
the usual budget, it is difficult to see how any part 
of the principal of the present debt is ever to be 
paid. Since the war began special taxes have been 
levied, which netted in 1905 about 120,000,000 yen. 
From this, however, must be deducted the customs 
receipts and other sources of revenue hypothe- 
cated to pay interest on the foreign war loans. 
Then the interest on the war domestic loans, which 
is payable in gold, will eat up part of the revenue 
brought by the war taxes. It seems probable, 
therefore, that the Government will not be able, 
for perhaps an indefinite time, to remove the war 
taxes, which must be regarded as a possibly per- 
manent burden upon the country. In a statement 
given out by the Government at the beginning of 
the year 1906 the per capita taxation entailed by 
the new programme is a little over four yen a 
year; or, under existing conditions, about one- 
sixth of the annual production of wealth, based 
upon estimates made before the war with Eussia. 
This is, in modern times, an unprecedented burden 
to impose upon the wealth producing capacity of 
a nation. 

Judging by the optimistic reports continually 
emanating from Tokyo and, upon occasion, from 
London, Japanese financiers regard the finances 
of their country to be in a solvent, even easy 
condition, and anticipate no difficulty in keeping 
the interest on the national debt promptly paid, 
or in taking up the bonds,^ by refunding, as they 
fall due. It is perhaps worth while to briefly 



TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 45 

examine some of the aspects of this matter. It is, 
in my opinion, highly probable that before much 
time has elapsed Japan's position in the Far East 
will be fomid to be such as to alienate from her 
much popular sympathy in America ; and perhaps 
also, to some extent, in England, notwithstanding 
the hard and fast character of the new Anglo- 
Japanese alliance. By that time the propaganda 
will have, in a measure, run its course and lost 
momentum and acceptance through the very en- 
ergy of its exertions, and Westerners may see 
Japan and her policy in a clearer light. This may 
operate, should it come about, against the favor- 
able placing of Japanese loans in America and 
Europe. 

Not only this, but should "Western opinion begin 
to turn against Japanese policy, and I think it will 
as the facts become generally known, one of the 
consequences will be to give full force and expres- 
sion to the latent antipathy of the Japanese people 
toward the West and its fundamental ideals, the 
existence of which was so aptly illustrated by the 
anti-foreign outburst following the publication of 
the peace terms in Japan. The propaganda has 
taught the Japanese people to believe, and as far 
as possible disseminated the same view in the 
West, that in fighting Russia Japan was really 
fighting the battle of England and America under 
an arrangement by which she furnished the men 
and the two Western powers the money. The 
masses of Japanese make no distinction between 
the British and American governments and the 
people of those nations, and take literally state- 



46 THE NEW FAR EAST 

ments published in the Japanese press that the two 
Western powers are in hearty accord with and 
prepared to back the Japanese policy ; and any re- 
versal in their present attitude will be bitterly 
resented. In this connection it should be remem- 
bered that Japanese policy as it now appears to 
Americans is very different from the idea obtain- 
ing in Japan. Of course, Japanese statesmen 
know the real facts; but a wide intellectual gulf 
separates the oligarchy from the people. It may 
be that Japanese statesmen hope to get British 
and American investors so deeply involved that 
they will be impelled by their own interests to keep 
Japan financially afloat; and that this will also 
operate against a possible revulsion of Western 
popular sentiment. 

On the whole, I cannot see a very flattering 
future for Japan in this showing. And if there 
are important facts and circumstances of oppo- 
site tendency I have been unable to discover 
them. One hears much optimistic talk, but 
probe it a bit for facts and it evaporates. It 
is clear that no matter what may be the details 
of Japan's real designs and ambitions, no one 
expects that one of their features will be mili- 
tary retrenchment. Quite the contrary is antici- 
pated. One of the effects of the war is to elimi- 
nate Russia temporarily as a naval factor in the 
Pacific, and the fact that this is not assumed 
to imply a relaxation of Japan's energy in naval 
matters throws a beam of light upon her inten- 
tions. A new and more powerful navy is contem- 
plated. For what ? Success is a great stimulant, 



TRUE POSITION OF JAPAN 47 

and the Japanese are beginning to speak of them- 
selves habitually as a military nation. In the 
absence of any probability of encroachment upon 
the national territory, what does a military policy 
seem to imply! Against whom are such prospect- 
ive preparations directed? Does there loom in the 
background a ''The Orient for Orientals" doc- 
trine, with Japan as the leader? 

Such conjectures naturally arise in any attempt 
to penetrate the future. But at present we need 
only concern ourselves with immediate probabili- 
ties, as indicated by facts and circumstances ; and 
one probability is that before much time has 
elapsed Japan may find her policy opposed by one 
powerful, perhaps a combination of several West- 
ern powers. If this should come about, and Japan 
present to outside suggestion hindering her de- 
sires an outwardly resentful and belligerent atti- 
tude, the extent to which she will be able to make 
good such an attitude will depend upon her ability 
to fight a formidable opponent. This proposition 
has the two usual bearings — financial and mili- 
tary. I have already sufficiently reviewed her 
present and prospective financial situation. As 
to Japan's future status as a military power, the 
Western world should begin to consider whether, 
in the light of probable events, it is willing to lend 
the money to pay for its continuation and further 
development. For the money cannot be found in 
Japan. The chief reason for the anxiety of Japan- 
ese statesmen to bring the war with Russia to an 
end lay in the financial situation of the country, 
although when hostilities terminated Japan had 



48 THE NEW FAE EAST 

about reached a state of arrested progress in mili- 
tary matters. 

One is compelled to admire the success that has 
attended the efforts of Japan so far, especially 
when her methods are considered. But her future 
pathway is strewn with pitfalls. In her embarka- 
tion upon this war and the policy it foreshadows 
is recognizable the inherent gambling instinct of 
the Oriental. By nature optimistic, the national 
spirit, directed by the oligarchy, has been thrown 
with its full force into a movement which depends 
for ultimate success upon the favorable turning of 
all of a great number of chances. Should Japan 
continue by her propaganda to blind the English 
and American people to her impoverished national 
resources to the extent of obtaining future loans ; 
should she continue successfully to bamboozle the 
"Western world as to her real intentions and their 
meaning, and even when discovered so use her 
diplomacy as to prevent concerted action to check 
her ; should she by these means manage to struggle 
along for a decade under the burden of huge ex- 
penditure imtil Korea and Manchuria can be con- 
verted into sources of possible profit, and her hold 
upon China strengthened ; should she extricate her 
internal affairs from the disastrous state in which 
the termination of the war will leave them ; should 
she accomplish all these things — and one depends 
largely upon the success of the other — she may 
eventually win out. She is a nation that has taken 
a chance in the great international lottery, with 
the odds enormously against her; and the seem- 
ing policy of her statesmen can only be soberly 



TEUE POSITION OF JAPAN 49 

regarded as the action of men who have wittingly 
embarked in a mad gamble with destiny. Should 
they eventually succeed it will be the result of 
good luck rather than well-calculated manage- 
ment. Certainly the nerve to ''play the game" is 
not lacking. '' 



CHAPTEE IV 
THE SEIZURE OF KOREA 

The Political Struggle Between Japan and Russia in 
Korea — Antecedents to the Late War — Japanese 
and Russian Diplomatic Methods Compared — The 
Ante-Bellum Negotiations — Advantage of the Jap- 
anese — Control of Communications — Interruption 
of Telegraph Service — Mr. Pavloff 's Obtuseness — 
The Breaking off of Diplomatic Relations — The 
Situation in Seoul — Landing of Japanese Troops 
— The Situation at Chemul-po — Diplomatic Din- 
ners at Seoul — The Critical Moment. 

As ONE advances in the study of conditions in 
the Far East, seeking to discover in the happen- 
ings and analogy of recent great events and pres- 
ent conditions some clues that may serve as guide 
posts for the future, it is increasingly interesting 
to scrutinize the woof upon which the existing 
sympathy among Western peoples with many of 
the actions of Japan has been woven. It becomes 
clearer as I progress that much of it is founded 
upon an impression that in the political manoeu- 
vring and diplomatic correspondence which led 
to and preceded the late war Japan played the 
game fairly, while the reverse is true of Russia. 

This is a matter of considerable importance, 
aside from the academic interest attached to the 

50 



THE SEIZURE OF, KOREA 51 

details of great political moves ; for the methods 
and motives governing Japanese diplomacy have 
become, through her success, closely related to the 
issues involved in the eventual settlement of the 
Far Eastern question. Encountering this subject, 
with its attendant effects and tendencies, at every 
turn, I find a growing dijBficulty in thrusting it 
aside. It crops up in a hundred forms, always 
seeming to say: *'You will have to pay some at- 
tention to me sooner or later.'* Fortunately, I 
found while in Korea some very interesting mate- 
rial bearing upon the whole matter, of a character 
which tempts me to step for a time into the past, 
and inject into this discussion a chapter of history. 
I feel justified in so doing, if special justification 
is needed, because I have been assured that, while 
probably most of the material facts have been 
from time to time published in a disconnected way, 
no complete and unprejudiced account of an in- 
teresting incident has yet been given to the world. 
It is a matter of common belief in most coun- 
tries that for centuries Russian diplomacy has, in 
regard to many important questions, been con- 
ducted along what are usually spoken of as 
*' shady" lines. As experience has gradually con- 
firmed this impression, it has passed into a prov- 
erb. I will not pause here to inquire into the 
justice or injustice, on broad grounds, of this 
accusation, nor the part played in disseminating 
it in the past and present by the British press 
and news services. My own belief is that there 
is good foundation for the prevailing opinion, 
although in the diplomatic relations between 



52 THE NEW FAE EAST 

Eussia and the United States there was little that 
gave it ground before the question of the evacua- 
tion of Manchuria by Eussia was broached by 
Mr. Hay. This brought the Manchurian question 
prominently before the world, fixing public atten- 
tion upon Eussia 's constant evasions. Japan, 
with a clear record, so far as the Western public 
knew, thus was able to start her negotiations with 
Eussia with a strong popular presumption of good 
faith. It is hardly necessary to trace the origin 
of Western opinion in this connection further, es- 
pecially as I have already dealt quite extensively 
with that proposition. As a consequence, when the 
war between Eussia and Japan began and circum- 
stances surrounding the breaking off of diploma- 
tic relations and the commencement of hostilities 
gave rise to a dispute concerning the facts and 
precedents involved, the Western press showed 
a marked disposition to accept the Japanese ex- 
planation and view. The matter created quite a 
lively interest for the moment, but was soon over- 
shadowed by the events of the war, and so it still 
remains. But the influence of the incident upon 
the future of diplomacy promises to have great vi- 
tality, and the time seems opportune, while almost 
all the persons who are familiar by actual contact 
with the circumstances are living, with the facts 
still fresh in their minds and capable of being 
tested in a not too distant perspective, to revive 
the subject. So I have decided, after a careful 
investigation, to write an account of the closing 
phase of Eusso-Japanese diplomatic negotiation, 
especially as illustrated by the outbreak of hos- 



THE SEIZURE OF KOREA 53 

tilities in Korea, as an introduction to a considera- 
tion of existing conditions in the Hermit Kingdom. 

A brief review of the political struggle between 
Japan and Russia in Korea will throw much light 
on the subject. This struggle began soon after 
the war between China and Japan, and continued 
with varying intensity to the recent war. Prior 
to the China-Japan war, Russia had taken appar- 
ently little interest in Korea, as her Far Eastern 
policy was then in a nebulous state. Japan's easy 
and unexpected victory over China, and conse- 
quent demolition of the long-standing sovereignty 
of China over Korea, gave the latter kingdom 
a new political status. From a vague sort of 
dependency she suddenly emerged into a real 
autonomy, with Japan as sponsor. This awoke 
Russia to a realization that a new power had 
arisen to influence the future of Korea, and it is 
to the credit of the political acumen of her states- 
men that they were the first to grasp what was 
involved in the new condition, and what a policy 
of expansion by Japan meant. This marked a 
change in Russia's Eastern policy. It ceased to 
drift, and quickly took definite form. She and 
Japan clearly saw in each other real rivals, and 
thus began the conflict of interests which led to 
the late war. 

To enter into the details of the ten years' diplo- 
matic contest between Russia and Japan in Korea 
would be illuminating, but hardly worth while now. 
It would be little more than a narration of a long 
succession of political schemes, promoted on both 
sides by the usual diplomatic trickery, and at- 



54 THE NEW FAR EAST 

tended by varying success. On the whole, how- 
ever, Eussia was more generally successful, and 
steadily gained ground. Eealizing this, Japan 
determined to force the matter to an issue with- 
out further delay. She knew that she was pre- 
pared for war, while Russia was not, and that 
lapse of time would steadily diminish her advan- 
tage on that score. Consequently, Japan began 
the negotiations which ultimately led to war. In 
this connection it is proper to point out that not 
only does the logic of events clearly show that 
Russia did not desire war, but she had every 
practical reason for avoiding it. She was already 
in control of one of the chief bones of conten- 
tion, and the most valuable one, namely, Man- 
churia; and she asked nothing better than to be 
left quietly in possession. Again, she was slowly 
getting the advantage in the diplomatic game in 
Korea. She had everything to gain by peace, 
and nothing to gain by war. In fact, everything 
goes to show that, even up to and after the sever- 
ance of diplomatic relations by Japan, the Russian 
Foreign Office and its diplomatic representatives 
in the East failed to realize that war was at 
hand. These facts, which should by now be clear 
to any unprejudiced mind, have nothing to do 
with the right or wrong of the dispute between the 
two countries. 

When the war began, and for some time prior 
to it, the Japanese and Russian governments were 
represented at Seoul by, respectively, Gonsuke 
Hayashi and Paul Pavloff. Both were men of 
considerable experience and familiarity with the 



THE SEIZUEE OF. KOREA 55 

course of events in the Far East during the pre- 
vious decade. Of the two, Pavloff had the greater 
reputation, largely based upon his successful nego- 
tiation, while Charge d 'Affaires at Peking, of the 
Russian lease of Port Arthur and the Kwangtung 
peninsula. He was sent to Seoul in 1899, and on 
the whole it may be said that up to the eve of the 
war he managed Russian interests very well. But 
at the critical moment he permitted himself to be 
duped in a manner that is likely to prove a lasting 
stain upon his diplomatic record. It cannot be 
denied, however, that when the crisis came the 
Japanese had a decided advantage. 

Up to the latter part of January, 1904, things 
went on much as usual in Seoul. It is true that 
almost the entire diplomatic body, except Mr. 
Pavloff, was by that time convinced that war was 
inevitable. Even the not very astute Emperor 
saw the shadow of forthcoming events, and issued 
a proclamation declaring the neutrality of Korea. 
Late in January Mr. Pavloff seems to have dis- 
covered that his line of communication with his 
government was being tampered with. As a con- 
sequence, two Russian warships, the **Variag" 
and *'Koreitz," were sent from Port Arthur to 
Chemul-po to be used, if necessary, by Mr. Pavloff 
to carry despatches. 

It is necessary to consider, in this connection, 
the means that existed at the time for telegraph 
communication between Korea and other parts 
of the world. The one avenue then was a cable 
between Shimonoseki, Japan, and Fusan, Korea. 
All messages leaving or entering Korea must, 



56 THE NEW FAE EAST 

therefore, pass through Japanese hands. I had 
some difficxilty in tracing the origin of this con- 
cession, and have not been able to secure exact 
information about its terms. The cable was laid 
in 1884, and the concession seems to have carried 
with it certain privileges in connection with the 
operation of local land lines throughout Korea. 
This latter privilege was, however, disputed; for 
subsequently concessions to construct and operate 
telegraph lines were granted to other parties. In 
those days securing a concession in Korea was 
often a matter of bribing officials. Once laid, the 
Japanese cable engaged in business with the world 
through an arrangement with the Great Northern 
Telegraph Company, a Danish corporation doing 
an extensive telegraph business between Europe 
and the Orient. It is believed that there were not 
originally any specific terms to the Japanese cable 
concession, as when it was secured few persons in 
Korea had any idea of what it meant ; and it has 
been to the advantage of the Japanese to allow the 
matter to remain in an indefinite form, which per- 
mits it to be stretched whenever opportunity or 
necessity arises. This concession belongs to the 
good old days of commercial piracy in the Far 
East, which are now, fortunately, passing. But 
by its association with the Danish company, thus 
entering into the world's system of communica- 
tion, it undoubtedly assumed certain responsibili- 
ties, for performance of which civilization can 
hold it to account. Although its special privileges 
have been vigorously disputed upon occasion, the 
Japanese cable has so far managed to fight off 



THE SEIZUBE OF KOEEA 57 

competition through pressure brought to bear 
upon the Korean Government. Not long before 
the war, when the Russians wanted to connect 
their Manchurian telegraph line at the Yalu with 
the Korean line on the south bank, and actually 
did so, the Japanese Government succeeded in 
having the Korean Government sever the connec- 
tion in the interest of the cable monopoly. 

There is no denying, then, that when the war 
began it was quite possible for the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, if it desired, to stop any or all telegrams 
passing between Korea and the outside world. As 
to whether it really interfered with such communi- 
cation, there is not the slightest reasonable doubt 
that it did. In so doing the Japanese Government 
did not adopt the usual method of announcing 
its intention and notifying interested persons of 
the terms upon which messages would be sent or 
received. To do this would not only have exposed 
its intentions and destroyed much of the utility of 
the action, but it would have been a flagrant viola- 
tion of the neutral rights involved. War had not 
begun. Secrecy was required, and so secrecy was 
employed. To have stopped all telegrams would 
have at once revealed what was being done, so 
the Japanese contented themselves with stopping 
only press despatches (some of which were for- 
warded after being censored) and private tele- 
grams that might have a bearing on the political 
crisis. Except telegrams from the Eussian Gov- 
ernment to Mr. Pavloff, a majority of business and 
private telegrams coming into Korea were per- 
mitted to pass, and the recipients, not knowing 



58 THE NEW FAR EAST 

that their replies were not being sent through, did 
not for the moment suspect anything. Of course, 
this could not have been long kept up without 
causing suspicion and discovery, and it was not 
resorted to until the Japanese Government had 
fully resolved upon war and was shaping affairs 
so as to cause the advantage to rest with it at the 
moment of collision. The first blow has settled 
many a fight. When this interference, before the 
war had been declared and without any notice or 
advice, with private and business telegrams be- 
came known in Korea (which was soon after hos- 
tilities opened), much indignation was felt, and a 
nimaber of complaints made. Eather than have 
the matter ventilated, the Japanese Government 
chose quietly to settle, by pecuniary remuneration, 
some business losses caused thereby ; and tolls that 
had been prepaid on a few telegrams were also 
refunded. During the last day or two before hos- 
tilities began even mails to and from Korea that 
passed through Japan were delayed. 

Diplomatic relations between the two countries 
were severed February 6, 1904. Although it was 
not known at the time. Admiral Uriu's squadron, 
convoying troops to seize and occupy the Korean 
capital, had already left Japan. Even before ne- 
gotiations were formally broken off, Japan, as is 
now known, had begun hostilities by the seizure of 
Eussian ships at sea. The "Eussia" was seized 
in the Korean Strait on February 5th, and one or 
two smaller Eussian merchant vessels were seized 
off the Korean coast either on the same or the fol- 
lowing day. These ships were taken into Japanese 



THE SEIZURE OF KOREA 59 

ports and afterward condemned as prizes by the 
Japanese prize courts. 

While these stirring events were occurring, with 
hostilities (although no one knew it except the 
Japanese Government) actually begun, Mr. Pav- 
loff remained in complete ignorance at Seoul. It 
is difficult to conceive, in a trained diplomat, such 
a state of mind as he appears to have been in 
at this period. Although, on his own statement, 
he had not heard from his government for several 
days, he does not seem to have felt the slightest 
uneasiness. He had all along refused to entertain 
the notion that war was a probability. He was 
utterly unable, so heartily did he despise them, to 
take the Japanese seriously; and in this attitude 
probably lies the explanation of his undoing. The 
"Variag," a fast cruiser, was lying in Chemul-po 
harbor, and could have brought information from 
Port Arthur in two or three days at any time. 
Yet it does not seem to have occurred to Mr. 
Pavloff to use this means of communication until 
February 8th, two days after diplomatic relations 
had been suspended. And even then he does not 
appear to have considered time of pressing im- 
portance, for instead of the "Variag" he ordered 
the *'Koreitz," a small and slow gunboat, to pro- 
ceed to Port Arthur. 

Acting upon this order, the *'Koreitz" did 
start; but before it had cleared the bay it met 
the Japanese fleet under Admiral Uriu, escort- 
ing the transports. There is a conflict of state- 
ments about what occurred here, and there were 
no neutral witnesses. The commander of the 



60 THE NEW FAR EAST 

*'Koreitz" reported that he was proceeding on 
his course when he sighted the Japanese fleet 
emerging from the south channel. Although their 
appearance was unexpected and suggestive, he 
continued on his course until a number of Japan- 
ese torpedo boats advanced in what he described 
as a threatening manner. Upon seeing this, the 
commander of the "Koreitz" ordered that his 
ship be cleared for action; and in obeying this 
order a small gun was accidentally discharged, 
whereupon the Japanese discharged a number of 
torpedoes at his ship. Noting the tremendous 
superiority of the Japanese, and finding his course 
blocked, the commander of the "Koreitz" re- 
turned to report the incident to his superior, the 
commander of the "Variag." 

The Japanese version is that when the "Ko- 
reitz" was observed to be approaching, not know- 
ing but that her intention might be hostile, the 
torpedo boats were ordered forward, and upon 
being fired upon they discharged their torpedoes, 
but did not pursue the enemy. 

Placed thus between two contradictory versions, 
the impartial inquirer can only judge the facts by 
the surrounding circumstances. On the previous 
night, during the darkness, a small Japanese gun- 
boat which had for some time been at Chemul-po, 
weighed anchor and left. When daylight came it 
was gone. There is no doubt that it went to meet 
Admiral Uriu and either carry despatches to him 
(remember that he had been for at least a day, 
assuming that he put into Fusan for despatches, 
out of communication with his government) or 



THE SEIZUEE OF KOEEA 61 

report the situation at Chemul-po, or both. Ad- 
miral Uriu knew that hostihties had begun, but 
the Russian commander did not. Had the Eus- 
sians desired to take advantage of circumstances 
(assuming that they knew that diplomatic rela- 
tions were broken off, and chose to construe that 
as a state of war), it would have been easy for the 
''Variag" and ''Koreitz" to have sunk the small 
Japanese gunboat, captured a number of Japanese 
merchant vessels lying in the harbor, and taken 
them to Port Arthur, before the Japanese fleet 
arrived. There is no hypothesis that will bear 
reasonable interpretation, that occurs to me, that 
can be distorted to show that the Eussian naval 
officers in Chemul-po knew of the suspension of 
diplomatic negotiations, much less that they re- 
garded this action as a declaration of war. On the 
other hand, knowing that hostilities had been com- 
menced by Japan, Admiral Uriu's action is easily 
understood. In view of the fact that during that 
night he blockaded the Eussian ships in the harbor 
and destroyed them the next day, it may be sug- 
gested that had his intention in ordering forward 
the torpedo boats been hostile he might have com- 
pleted the job then and there. But there were sev- 
eral good reasons why he should not do so. He 
was convoying transports laden with troops, and 
aside from the fact that they would have been en- 
dangered by a naval fight in close waters, it was 
of first importance to get them landed without 
delay. It seems to me, therefore, that the state- 
ment of the Eussian captain is the more plausible 
concerning matters where there is a conflict. The 



62 THE NEW FAE EAST 

fact that the "Koreitz, ' ' when it left the inner har- 
bor, was not cleared for action, indicates that no 
hostile collision was expected. 

As soon as he had brought his ship to anchor, 
learning that the commander of the ^' Variag" had 
gone to Seoul, the commander of the ''Koreitz" 
hurried ashore to communicate the facts to the 
Eussian consul in Chemul-po. The consul reported 
afterward that he was unable to communicate 
with Seoul either by telephone or telegraph, both 
having been seized by the Japanese; which com- 
pelled him to send a native runner to Seoul with 
the news. The Japanese deny that they interfered 
with communication on this occasion, but here 
other evidence is obtainable, which conclusively 
shows that they did. Circumstances also bear out 
the Eussian consul's version. 

The night of February 8-9 was an exciting one 
in diplomatic and official circles in Seoul. Every 
one except the Eussian minister had been at 
tiptoe of expectation for several days. "While 
it was not known in Seoul, except by the Japanese 
officials, that diplomatic relations had been sev- 
ered, it was felt that the crisis was at hand, and 
developments were expected almost hourly. None 
of the other foreign ministers had been able for 
several days to hear from his government (un- 
doubtedly due to the Japanese interference with 
telegraphic service), and every one was in a state 
of suspense. It chanced that on this evening an 
official dinner party was being given at the Ger- 
man legation, which was attended by a number of 
members of the diplomatic body, including the 



THE SEIZUEE OF. KOEEA 63 

Japanese minister and some attaches of the Eus- 
sian legation. Mr. Pavloff for some reason did 
not attend, but had dinner at the Eussian lega- 
tion with a few friends, including the American 
minister. 

The dinner at the German legation passed off 
without unusual incident. The Japanese minister 
is reported to have been in particularly good 
spirits. He took pains to be extremely cordial to 
the Eussians present, expressing to one of them 
the hope that the existing strained relations be- 
tween the two countries would soon pass, a senti- 
ment that was toasted in a glass of champagne. 
At that very hour the Japanese troops were being 
landed at Chemul-po and loaded into trains to be 
forwarded to Seoul. Some persons who were 
present afterward recalled that just as the party 
was separating a message arrived for one of the 
Eussian attaches, who seemed disconcerted by it 
and hastened his departure. 

At the Eussian legation Mr. Pavloff, who on the 
score of his agreeable personality enjoyed wide 
popularity, was in especially good form. The 
American minister, it appears, had somehow 
heard of the arrival of the Japanese transports 
at Chemul-po, and mentioned it to the Eussian 
minister, supposing that he already knew it. To 
his surprise he found that Mr. Pavloff had not 
heard it. That such a move was totally unex- 
pected to the Eussians is also shown by the fact 
that the commander of the '' Variag" was present 
at this dinner. I believe that about the same time 
Mr. Pavloff learned, from another source, of the 



64 THE NEW FAE EAST 

seizure of the "Kussia." Mr. Pavloff, although 
surprised, did not seem to regard even these 
events as indicating war, and his spirits did not 
appear to be affected. Later in the evening, how- 
ever, he changed his view. This alteration in 
demeanor, which was observed by some of those 
present, was probably due to the arrival of the 
runner with the message from the commander of 
the "Koreitz." "What must undoubtedly have 
been a great shock to Mr. Pavloff did not prevent 
him from entertaining his guests during the re- 
mainder of their stay just as if nothing unusual 
had happened. He awoke the next morning to find 
himself virtually a prisoner in the legation. Four 
days later he left Korea. 



CHAPTER V 

A QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY 

Arrival at Chemul-po of the Japanese Fleet — Admiral 
Uriu's Ultimatum — Action of Foreign Naval Com- 
manders — The " Vicksburg" Incident — Conduct of 
the Russian Naval Commander — Failure of the 
Neutral Intervention — Opening of the Fight — 
Destruction of the Russian Ships — International 
Aspects of the Incident — Diplomatic Correspond- 
ence — The Russian Charges — The Japanese Reply 
— The Truth About the Matter. 

At Chemnl-po the night of February 8-9, 1904, 
destined to be so memorable, passed quietly. Be- 
fore dawn all the Japanese troops had been 
landed. The first train from Seoul that morning 
carried the commander of the "Variag," who was 
on board his ship quite early. The Japanese fleet 
could be seen, as the haze lifted, lying some dis- 
tance away in the bay, guarding the channels. 

It was not necessary to wait long for develop- 
ments. About 9.30 o'clock the Japanese consul 
in the town sent to the Russian and British consuls 
(no other nationalities were represented) a formal 
notice from Admiral Uriu, in the form of an ulti- 
matum. In substance, this notice stated that Ad- 
miral Uriu would give the Russian ships until 12 

65 



66 THE NEW FAE EAST 

o'clock (noon) to leave the harbor, and if by 4 
o'clock in the afternoon they had not moved, his 
ships would come in and sink them at their anchor- 
age. Neutral interests were accordingly warned 
to take notice. The Eussian consul immediately 
communicated with the captain of the ''Variag," 
and the British consul undertook to notify the 
other foreigners. 

There were at that time in the harbor four other 
foreign warships: the "Talbot" (British), the 
*'Elba" (Italian), the "Pascal" (French), and 
the "Vicksburg" (American). The commanders 
of these ships were invited to a conference on 
board the "Talbot" to decide what action should 
be taken. The commander of the "Vicksburg" 
attended the conference, but explained to the other 
commanders that he had received explicit instruc- 
tions from his government to take no part in any 
international action should trouble occur. He then 
withdrew to his ship and moved her to another 
berth, where she would be less liable to damage if 
shells should reach the inner harbor. It will prob- 
ably be many years before Eussians, particularly 
the Eussian navy, will forgive this action of the 
"Vicksburg," and many bitter references were 
made in the Eussian press to the incident. It is 
true that the commander of the "Vicksburg" had 
no discretion in the matter, and had he acted 
differently it would not have made the slightest 
difference. But owing to the cordial relations 
between the Eussian and American navies, ex- 
tending over a century, the Eussian ofiScers felt 
the matter very keenly at the time. 



QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY 67 

No complete report of what took place at the 
conference on the ' ' Talbot ' ' has been made public, 
but in one way and another the main facts have 
come out. The British, French and Italian com- 
manders at once decided that Admiral Uriu was 
proposing to commit a gross breach of interna- 
tional law, and they unanimously resolved to give 
the Russian ships whatever protection they could. 
A message was sent to the commander of the 
''Variag" informing him of this determination, 
and advising him to refuse to leave the harbor. 
Meanwhile, the ''Talbot," "Elba" and "Pascal" 
cleared for action. All the superfluous woodwork 
on the boats was torn out and thrown overboard. 
In an hour the inner harbor was strewn with this 
sort of wreckage. But while a tremendous inter- 
national contretemps was thus hanging in the bal- 
ance, the commander of the "Variag" sent word 
thanking the commanders of the British, Italian 
and French ships for their offer, and expressing 
his resolution not to involve them, but to go out 
and fight. Meanwhile, however, a launch from the 
"Talbot," in command of a young British officer, 
had been sent to convey to Admiral Uriu a protest 
against his proposed action by the commanders of 
the British, French and Italian ships. As the Jap- 
anese ships were lying well out, some time was 
required for the launch to reach the flagship. 

It was now getting close to noon, the hour fixed 
by Admiral Uriu's ultimatum for the Russian 
ships to come out. The commander of the "Var- 
iag" ordered the commander of the "Koreitz" to 
remain in the harbor and blow up his ship, while 



68 THE NEW FAR EAST 

the "Variag" should make a dash and attempt to 
escape. It seems that the commander of the * * Ko- 
reitz" refused to do this, and insisted on being 
permitted to go out also. To this the commander 
of the ''Variag" finally consented, although in so 
doing he completely destroyed whatever chance he 
had of saving his own ship. Alone, the " Variag" 
with her speed, might have got away, but handi- 
capped by the "Koreitz" the attempt was futile. 
So, shortly before noon the two ships weighed 
anchor and steamed slowly out into the bay. 

As to what happened to the British launch bear- 
ing the protest of the three neutral commanders, 
here again the facts have been officially sup- 
pressed. But such facts have a way of leaking 
out. There are two versions of the incident. The 
more accepted one is that the launch reached the 
flagship, and that while the officer was boarding 
her the first shell fired by the Japanese fleet at the 
outcoming Russian ships went screaming across 
the bay. It was then too late. Another version 
is that the launch had almost reached the flagship 
when the first shot was fired, and that it was com- 
pelled to turn back without being able to deliver 
the protest. The haze prevented the watchers on 
shore from being able to determine positively 
whether the launch gained the flagship in time. 
It is openly asserted and believed among foreign- 
ers in Korea that when Admiral Uriu saw that the 
British launch wanted to speak to him, suspecting 
the object of the mission, he hoisted the signal to 
commence firing and began the fight, although the 
enemy was then about four miles away. At any 



QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY 69 

rate, the mission of the launch proved fruitless. 
All concerned discussed the matter quite freely 
at the time, but the foreign ships were quickly- 
ordered away and the seal of official restraint 
placed on the lips of the officers. It is believed 
that the British Government was greatly dis- 
pleased by the action of the commander of the 
*' Talbot," and if any insult to England was in- 
volved in the incident of the launch and its re- 
ception, the British Government has seen fit to 
repress its pride as it has suppressed the facts, in 
the interest of its ally. 

It should be remembered that all this took place 
before war had been declared between Russia and 
Japan, in a neutral port of a neutral country. 

The story of the naval fight has been so often 
told that I will not repeat it here. It was utterly 
hopeless for the Russians from the beginning. 
The Japanese fleet, consisting of seven large ships 
and a number of smaller ones, concentrated its 
fire upon the '' Variag," paying no attention to the 
*'Koreitz." The Japanese marksmanship was 
very poor, but finally the "Variag" was disabled 
and turned back toward the harbor, where her com- 
mander opened her cocks and sank her in shallow 
water. Boats and launches from the other foreign 
warships rescued her crew. The "Koreitz" re- 
turned to the inner harbor practically unscathed. 
A short time afterward the other shipping in the 
harbor was notified that the ^'Koreitz" would be 
blown up, which was done. The commander of the 
*' Variag" explained after the fight that his reason 
for refusing the protection of the foreign warships 



70 THE NEW FAR EAST 

was because he felt that his military honor would 
be stained if he attempted to hide under the cover 
of neutral ships, and he preferred to fight against 
hopeless odds rather than accept such an alterna- 
tive. 

Such is the story of the beginning of hostilities 
in Korea, as I learned it from persons who are 
familiar with the facts. If into some of the trivial 
details error has crept, it is due to the inevitable 
variation of people's memories and impressions. 
But as to the fundamental facts, there is practi- 
cally no difference of opinion. I asked at least 
fifty persons in Korea, who by nationality and 
position are presumably neutral and unpreju- 
diced, the question: "Did the Japanese before 
the war interfere with telegraphic communication 
with the outside world?" Not a single person 
answered in the negative. I also asked them: 
"Do you believe that the Japanese stopped tele- 
grams from the Eussian Government to Mr. 
Pavloff?" Every person answered emphatically 
in the affirmative. I admit that I did not put this 
question to any Japanese or Eussians. 

It could not be expected that even in the excite- 
ment attending the beginning of hostilities such an 
incident would pass without international com- 
ment. The Eussian Government, as soon as it 
could communicate with its representatives who 
were affected, issued a statement to the world. 
To this the Japanese Government replied, which 
was followed by a rejoinder from Eussia. These 
documents formulate the official points of view, 
and should be permitted to speak for themselves. 



QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY 71 

I therefore reproduce them here, complete. On 
February 11, 1904, Count Lamsdorf, the Eussian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave out the follow- 
ing circular note : 

" Since the rupture of the negotiations between Russia and Japan, 
the attitude of the Tokyo cabinet has constituted an open violation 
of all customary laws governing the mutual relations of civilized 
nations. Without specifying each particular violation of these laws 
on the part of Japan, the Imperial Government considers it necessary 
to draw the most serious attention of the Powers to the acts of vio- 
lence committed by the Japanese Government with respect to Korea. 
The independence and integrity of Korea as a fully independent 
Empire have been fully recognized by all the Powers, and the in- 
violability of this fundamental principle was confirmed by Article 1 
of the Shimonoseki treaty, and by the agreement especially con- 
cluded for this purpose between Japan and Great Britain on Janu- 
ary 30, 1902 (Anglo-Japanese alliance), as well as by the Franco- 
Russian declaration of March 16, 1902. The Emperor of Korea, 
foreseeing the danger of a possible conflict between Russia and 
Japan, addressed, early in January, 1904, a note to all the Powers, 
declaring his determination to preserve the strictest neutrality. This 
declaration was received with satisfaction by the Powers, and was 
ratified by Russia. According to the Russian Minister to Korea, 
the British Government, which had signed the above-mentioned 
treaty with Japan on January 30, 1902, charged the British diplo- 
matic representative at Seoul to present an official note to the Em- 
peror of Korea, thanking him for his declaration of neutrality. In 
disregard of all these facts, in spite of all treaties, in spite of all 
its obligations, and in violation of the fundamental rules of inter- 
national law, it has been proved by exact and fully confirmed facts 
that the Japanese Government, 

"1. Before the opening of hostilities against Russia, landed its 
troops in the independent Empire of Korea, which had declared its 
neutrality. 

"2. With a division of its fleet made a sudden attack on Feb- 
ruary 8th — that is, three days prior to the declaration of war — on 
two Russian warships in the neutral port of Chemul-po. The com- 
manders of these ships had not been notified of the severance of 
diplomatic relations, as the Japanese maliciously stopped the de- 
livery of Russian telegrams by the Danish cable and destroyed the 
telegraph conununication of the Korean Government. The details 



72 THE NEW FAR EAST 

of this dastardly attack are contained and published in an official 
telegram from the Russian Minister at Seoul. 

"3. In spite of the international laws above mentioned, and 
shortly before the opening of hostilities, the Japanese captured, as 
prizes of war, certain merchant ships in the neutral ports and waters 
of Korea. 

"4. Japan declared to the Emperor of Korea, through the Jap- 
anese Minister at Seoul, that Korea would henceforth be under Jap- 
anese administration, and she warned the Emperor that in case of 
non-compliance Japanese troops would occupy the palace. 

"5. Through the French Minister at Seoul she summoned the 
Russian representative at the Korean Court to leave the country, 
with the staff of the Russian legation and consulate. 

" Recognizing that all the above facts constitute a flagrant breach 
of international law, the Imperial Government considers it to be 
its duty to lodge a protest with all the Powers against this procedure 
of the Japanese Government, and it is firmly convinced that all the 
Powers, valuing the principles which guarantee their relations, will 
agree with the Russian attitude. At the same time, the Imperial 
Government considers it necessary to issue a timely warning that, 
owing to Japan's illegal assumption of power in Korea, the Im- 
perial Government declare all orders and declarations which may be 
issued on the part of the Korean Government to be invalid. I beg 
you to communicate this document to the government to which 
you are accredited. 

" Lamsdorf." 

On March 9, 1904, the Japanese Government re- 
plied as follows: 

"The Russian Government are understood to have recently ad- 
dressed a note to the Powers, in which the Japanese Government are 
charged with having committed certain acts in Korea which are 
considered by Russia to be in violation of international law, and in 
which Russia further declares all future orders and declarations of 
the Korean Government to be invalid. The Imperial Government 
do not find it necessary in the present instance to concern themselves 
in any way with views, opinions or declarations of the Russian Gov- 
ernment, but they believe it to be their right and duty to correct 
misstatements of facts which, if permitted to remain uncontradicted, 
might give rise in the opinion of neutral Powers to incorrect infer- 
ences and conclusions. Accordingly, the Imperial Government de- 
sire to make the following statement respecting the five acts which 



QUESTION OF NEUTEALITY 73 

are declared, in the Russian note above referred to, to be fully proved 
and confirmed facts: — 

"1. The Imperial Government admit that a number of Japanese 
troops landed in Korea before the formal declaration of war was 
issued by Japan, but they must say that such landing did not take 
place before a state of war actually existed between Japan and 
Russia. The maintenance of the independence and territorial in- 
tegrity of Korea is one of the objects of war, and, therefore, the 
despatch of troops to the menaced territory was a matter of right 
and necessity, which, moreover, had the distinct consent of the Ko- 
rean Government. The Imperial Government, therefore, drew a 
sharp distinction between the landing of the Japanese troops in 
Korea in the actual circumstances of the case and the sending of 
large bodies of Russian troops to Manchuria without the consent of 
China, while peaceful negotiations were still in progress. 

"2. The Imperial Government declare that the Russian allega^ 
tion that they stopped the delivery of Russian telegrams by the 
Danish cable and destroyed the Korean Government's telegraphic 
communication is wholly untrue. No such acts were done by the 
Imperial Government. Regarding the sudden alleged attack, on 
February 8th last, upon two Russian men-of-war in the port of 
Chemul-po, it is only necessary to say that a state of war then ex- 
isted, and that, Korea having consented to the landing of Japanese 
troops at Chemul-po, that harbor had already ceased to be a neutral 
port, at least as between the belligerents. 

"3. The Imperial Government have established a Prize Court, 
with full authority to pronounce finally on the question of the le- 
gality of seizures of merchant vessels. Accordingly, they deem it 
manifestly out of place to make any statement on their part regard- 
ing the Russian assertion that they unlawfully captured as prizes 
of war the Russian merchantmen which were in the ports of Korea. 

"4. The Russian Government allege that the Japanese Govern- 
ment declared to the Emperor of Korea through their Minister at 
Seoul, that Korea would be henceforth under Japanese adminis- 
tration, and warned the Emperor that in case of non-compliance, 
Japanese troops would occupy the palace. The Imperial Govern- 
ment declares this charge to be absolutely and wholly without foun- 
dation. 

" 5. No demand, either direct or indirect, was addressed by the 
Japanese Government to the Russian Minister at Seoul to retire 
from Korea. The fact is as follows: On February 10 last, the 
French Charg^ d' Affaires at Seoul called on the Japanese Minister 
there and informed him, as it was afterwards confirmed in writing, 



74 THE NEW FAE EAST 

that it was the desire of the Russian Minister to leave Korea, and 
asked the opinion of the Japanese Minister on the subject. The 
Japanese Minister replied that if the Russian Minister would with- 
draw in a peaceful manner, taking with him his staff and the lega- 
tion guard, he would be fully protected by Japanese troops. So 
he withdrew of his own free will on the twelfth of the same month, 
and an escort of Japanese soldiers was furnished for him as far as 
Chemul-po. The Russian allegation that the Japanese Government 
forwarded a summons through the French representative in Korea 
to the Russian Minister to leave Korea is, therefore, not true. In 
this connection it may be remarked that the Russian consul at Fusan 
remained at his post as late as February 28 last. It is reported 
that he was compelled to stay so long owing to the absence of in- 
structions which the Russian Minister apparently did not think of 
giving to the consul before his own departure from Seoul. When it 
was known that the necessary instructions had at last reached the 
Russian consul, and that he desired to leave Fusan as soon as pos- 
sible, the Japanese consul at the same port offered him every facility 
for his departure, and his passage to Shanghai via Japan was ar- 
ranged by the Japanese consul." 

To this the Eussian Government retorted on 
March 12th, as follows : 

"Japan's argument that she was justified in landing troops in 
Korea before the declaration of war, because she had Korea's per- 
mission, and also that these troops arrived in Korea after 'the ex- 
istence of a state of war,' is without value, as Korea in January 
promulgated her neutrality to the Powers, which received it warmly, 
Great Britain even officially conveying expressions of gratitude 
to the Korean Government. Therefore, no state of war gave the 
Japanese the right to violate her neutrality by landing troops in 
her territory. Even the consent of Korea, though extorted by 
the Japanese, is without force, from the fact that the despatch of 
troops was not only before the war, but before the breaking off of 
diplomatic relations, as clearly established and indeed acknowledged 
by the Japanese themselves. 

" Japan's contention in defence of the attack upon the Russian 
ships at Chemul-po, that the port was not neutral on February 9, 
is false again, because Korea had proclaimed her neutrality. 

"Japan's denial of malicious interference with the transmission 
of Russian telegrams over the Danish cable cannot be sustained. 
A telegram to Baron Rosen (then Russian Minister to Japan) at 



QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY 75 

Tokyo, sent from St. Petersburg February 4, was not delivered until 
the morning of February 7. That delay did not occur on the Si- 
berian line, as is shown by the fact that a telegram for Viceroy 
Aliexieff, sent at the same time, was received the same day. There- 
fore, it is conclusive that the Rosen telegram was held by the Jap- 
anese and not delivered for two days. Communication with M. 
Pavloff (then Russian Minister to Korea) by the Korean telegraph 
ceased in the middle of January. As the Koreans were enjoying 
friendly relations with Russia, there is good ground for believing 
that the interruption was due to the Japanese. Thereafter M. Pav- 
loff used a mail steamer or special warship to communicate with 
Port Arthur. The Minister of Russia at Seoul, February 8, there- 
fore, knew nothing of the diplomatic rupture. 

"Japan pleads that the charge against her seizure of Russian 
merchantmen before the declaration of war cannot lie after the 
establishment of prize courts. Their seizure before the declaration 
of war, being piracy, is not defensible by the establishment of prize 
courts which cannot exist before a declaration of war. The steamer 
'Russia' was seized in the waters of southern Korea even (before M. 
Kurino had presented his note here. 

"Our information regarding Japan's announcement that in 
future Korea would be under her administration came from M. Pav- 
loff and also from the representative of a friendly Power at Seoul. 
Japan's denial, consequently, is fruitless, as also is the attempt to 
refute our statement that the Russian Minister and Consul at Seoul 
were told to leave. We had conclusive proof in St. Petersburg on 
February 10 that the French Minister at Seoul had officially notified 
our representatives that the Japanese Government had intimated 
that they should leave, and that the Japanese had occupied territory 
in Korea. [M. Pavloff was unable to notify our Consul at Fusan, his 
telegram being refused at the telegraph office." 

It will be noticed that in the presentation of 
her contention to the Powers, Russia made five 
distinct charges against Japan. First, that Japan 
landed troops in Korea before a declaration of 
war; second, that Japan attacked and destroyed 
two Russian ships in the harbor of Chemul-po 
before war had been declared and while the port 
was entirely neutral, and prevented telegrams 



76 THE NEW PAE EAST 

from reaching the Eussian officials in Korea; 
third, that Japan seized Eussian merchant ships 
in neutral waters before diplomatic relations had 
been severed; fourth, that Japan arbitrarily as- 
sumed administrative authority in Korea in vio- 
lation of the independence and neutrality of that 
country ; fifth, that the Japanese authorities prac- 
tically hustled the Eussian officials in Korea out 
of the country. 

In reply Japan admits the first charge, but as- 
serts that she landed troops by permission of the 
Korean Government. Japan positively denies 
that she prevented telegrams from reaching Mr. 
Pavloff, and asserts in regard to the attack upon 
the Eussian warships that a state of war already 
exisfed. As to the alleged seizure before the sev- 
erance of diplomatic relations of Eussian mer- 
chant vessels, Japan states that she had estab- 
lished prize courts to adjudicate such matters. 
It is significant that she does not deny having 
seized the ships. Japan denies that she notified 
the Korean Government that she intended to as- 
sume the administrative control of the country. 
Japan denies that her representative notified the 
Eussian Minister to leave Seoul. 

Now, once more as to the facts. Japan undoubt- 
edly did, and admits that she did land troops in 
Korea prior to a declaration of war, and asserts 
that she had Korea's permission to do so. This 
is a mere quibble. Korea 's consent in that matter 
was like her consent to the present administration 
of her affairs by the Japanese. Moreover, the 
Korean officials were as much surprised at the 



QUESTION OF NEUTEALITY 77 

landing of the troops as were the Eussian and 
other foreign diplomats. Japan admits that she 
attacked and destroyed the Eussian warships in 
the harbor of Chemul-po, but advances the argu- 
ment that since she had already landed troops it 
had ceased to be a neutral port. This is another 
quibble. Stripped of its verbiage, it assumes that 
since the neutrality of the port had already been 
violated by landing troops, it was no longer a neu- 
tral port. Meanwhile, until the Japanese Admiral 
got ready to attack them, the Eussian ships were 
blockaded in the harbor. Japan denies that she 
interfered with telegraphic communication, and 
that she stopped telegrams from the Eussian Gov- 
ernment to Mr. Pavloff. I have already given 
fully my reasons for believing this denial to be 
absolutely false. Japan evades the charge of 
seizing Eussian ships before diplomatic relations 
had been severed, but does not deny it. It is 
undoubtedly true. Japan denies that her repre- 
sentative informed the Korean Emperor of Ja- 
pan's intention to administer the affairs of the 
country, and warned him not to resist. This is 
another quibble. Japan did at once assume the 
administration of the country, and still holds it 
absolutely. As to the facts surrounding the de- 
parture of the Eussian officials from the country, 
there is a question of veracity as to the details 
between the Japanese Minister on one side, and 
the French and Eussian ministers on the other. I 
have not the slightest doubt, from what I could 
learn in Korea, that, whatever may have been the 
method employed, the Japanese compelled the 



78 THE NEW FAE EAST 

Russians to leave the country. So here we find 
another quibble. 

In the Russian rejoinder, a matter not previ- 
ously dealt with is brought forward. The Russian 
Government asserts that on the eve of the war, at 
the moment of the severance of diplomatic rela- 
tions, telegrams from the Russian Foreign Office 
to the Russian Minister in Tokyo were held by the 
Japanese Government from February 4 until Feb- 
ruary 7 (1904). It will be remembered that Mr. 
Kurino's note severing relations was presented 
to Russia on February 6. So just at this critical 
period the Russian Government claims that it was 
cut off from communication with its representa- 
tive in Tokyo, and that this had a material 
bearing upon the outbreak of the war. While in 
Japan I investigated this matter as well as I was 
able. Of course, no information can be obtained 
from the Japanese Government, except in confir- 
mation of the official position. But I found that 
a very distinct impression concerning the incident 
existed, and there is a very general disposition 
among foreigners residing in Japan to credit it. 
It would certainly be in harmony with Japan's 
actions in Korea during the same period. 

So, with all the evidence I can obtain before me, 
I do not hesitate a moment in finding, so far as all 
material facts at issue in this dispute are con- 
cerned, in favor of the Russian contention, and I 
believe this to be the opinion of almost the entire 
foreign population of Korea without regard to na- 
tionality. Apologists for Japan seem to base their 
defence of her on three grounds. First, she did not 



QUESTION OF NEUTRALITY 79 

stop the Eussian Minister's telegrams; second, 
if she did the Russian Minister had other means 
of communication, namely, by ship to Port Arthur ; 
third, if Japan did interfere with telegraphic 
communication, she had a right to do so, and any 
other nation would have done the same under the 
circumstances. 

I will leave discussion of these propositions to 
the statists. I only insist that a correct knowledge 
of the facts is essential to any fair discussion. 
What Russia has done in the past has nothing to 
do with this particular affair. In regard to this, 
it is certainly proper that both nations be judged 
by the facts, in order that the world may arrive at 
a just estimation of their purposes and what is to 
be expected of them in the future. 



CHAPTEE VI 

JAPAN IN KOREA 

Assurances of Japan Respecting Her Intentions in 
Korea — Ante-Bellum Statements — The First Pro- 
tocol — This Remarkable Instrument Examined — 
Usurpation of Korean Autonomy — Coercion of the 
Korean Emperor and Cabinet — Resort to Intimi- 
dation — The Emperor's Vain Appeals to the For- 
eign Ministers — Construction of Railways — The 
Second Protocol — Further Abolition of Korean 
Autonomy — Effects of the Japanese Occupation 
— Attempt at Financial Reform. 

Notwithstanding that the kingdom of Korea 
has lately been the scene of important changes, 
and constitutes a piece in the international chess 
game now being played in the Far East, discrimi- 
nating persons who have endeavored to follow 
events there must have noticed that there has been 
a paucity of news since the beginning of the war 
between Japan and Russia. Although very early 
in the war military activity shifted to Manchuria, 
carrying in its wake the special correspondents, 
the Japanese continued to maintain a strict cen- 
sorship upon communications leaving or entering 
Korea. Even now that the war is ended, such 
information as reaches the world comes almost 
entirely from Tokyo, and much of it is very mis- 

80 



JAPAN IN KOREA 81 

leading. For instance: I was in Tokyo when a 
member of the Korean royal family, Prince Yi- 
chai-Kak, attended by a large suite, came to 
Japan ostensibly to congratulate the Mikado upon 
the Japanese victory at Moukden and express the 
Korean Emperor's satisfaction at the existing 
relations between the two countries. Accounts 
of this pleasant demonstration were sent over 
the world by the Japanese press propaganda, 
conveying the impression that all was well and 
everybody happy in Korea. The exquisite irony 
involved in this *' visit" can only be appreciated 
through a correct understanding of the real situa- 
tion in Korea, then and now. 

In order to get clearly at the relation between 
Japan's actions in Korea since the war began and 
the issues of the coming settlement, it seems neces- 
sary to begin at the beginning. In opening the 
negotiations which preceded the war, the Japanese 
note to the Eussian Government, in presenting the 
issues to be adjusted by them, used in respect to 
Korea the following language (the italics are 
mine) : 

"Korea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defence, and 
Japan consequently considers her independence [that of Korea] ab- 
solutely essential to her own repose and safety." 

Frequent references, couched in similar terms, 
were made to Japan's desire to maintain the inde- 
pendence of Korea in the course of the diplomatic 
negotiations with Eussia, and even the Japanese 
declaration of war contained an explicit statement 
to that effect. Notwithstanding aU this, Japan, a 
few weeks after the war had begun, concluded a 



82 THE NEW FAR EAST 

protocol with the Korean Government^ a full copy 
of which is here presented (the italics are mine) : 

"Gonsuke Hayashi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni- 
potentiary of His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, the Major General 
Yi-chi-yong, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs ad interim of His 
Majesty, the Emperor of Korea, being, respectively, duly empowered 
for the purpose, have agreed upon the following articles: — 

Article 1. — For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and un- 
alterable friendship between Japan and Korea, and of firmly es- 
tablishing peace in the East, the Imperial Government of Korea 
shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, 
and adopt the advice of the latter regarding improvements in ad- 
ministration. 

Article 2. — ^The Imperial Government of Japan shall, in a spirit 
of firm friendship, insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House 
of Korea. 

Article 3. — The Imperial Government of Japan firmly guarantees 
the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. 

Article 4. — In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea, 
or the territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by the aggression 
of a third power, or internal disturbances, the Imperial Govern- 
ment of Japan shall immediately take such necessary measures as 
circumstances require, and in such case the Imperial Government 
of Korea shall give full facilities to promote the action of the Im- 
perial Japanese Government. 

The Imperial Government of Japan may, for the attainment of 
the above-mentioned object, occupy, when circumstances require 
it, such places as may be necessary from the strategic point of view. 

Article 5. — The Government of the two countries shall not, in 
the future, without mutual consent, conclude with a third power 
such an arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the 
present protocol. 

Article 6. — Details in connection with the present protocol shall 
be arranged as the circumstances may require between the repre- 
sentatives of Japan and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of 
Korea." 

This is certainly a remarkable document, and 
only the general excitement throughout the world 
occasioned by the opening of hostilities can ac- 
count for the fact that it caused so little comment 



JAPAN IN KOREA 83 

at the time ; thougli it must have been noted by the 
various chancelleries, which probably considered 
the time inauspicious for objecting to or discuss- 
ing it. What particularly distinguishes it is the 
apparent conflict between the two vital clauses. 
Article 1 provides that the Korean Government 
shall adopt the advice of the Japanese Govern- 
ment regarding administrative improvements, 
which amounts to an abdication of discretion in 
such matters by the Korean Government. Article 
3 guarantees the independence of Korea. It is 
somewhat difficult to see how a country can remain 
independent and at the same time be compelled to 
adopt the advice of another government about its 
own internal administrative affairs. The articles 
relating to the right of Japan to intervene in cer- 
tain matters clearly leave Korea entirely without 
discretion to approve or reject. A significant 
point in the phrasing of Article 5 should not be 
overlooked. It provides that the government of 
the two countries shall not do so and so. In all 
translations of this protocol I have seen, the sin- 
gular is used, which implies that it was intentional 
with the framers of the document. Does the use 
of the singular mean that there is to be but one 
government for the two countries? Perhaps we 
may find in events since the signing of this pro- 
tocol an answer to this. 

It is a rule of common law in all civilized coun- 
tries that the conditions under which a contract 
or agreement is entered upon may be taken into 
consideration in determining its value and mean- 
ing. So to get an insight into the bona fides of this 



84 THE NEW FAE EAST 

protocol it is necessary to review the circum- 
stances under which it was promulgated. It bears 
the date of February 23, 1904, two weeks after 
the opening of hostilities. Even before diplomatic 
relations with Eussia were severed, and as pre- 
liminary to so doing, Japan had despatched troops 
to occupy Korea, which country had an obvious 
strategic importance in the struggle. Immedi- 
ately on the beginning of the war Korea was 
flooded with Japanese troops, so that in a few 
weeks practically the entire country was occupied. 
For some time before hostilities began Japan had 
placed restrictions upon telegraph communication 
between Korea and the outside world, and upon 
the first landing of troops the Japanese, without 
as much as saying *'by your leave" to the Korean 
Government, seized the internal telegraph and 
telephone communications of the country. This 
was followed by military occupation of the capital, 
Seoul, and the polite hustling out of the country 
of the Eussian Minister. 

Months before the war, the Korean Emperor, 
distracted by the counter-pressure brought to bear 
upon him by the Eussian and Japanese govern- 
ments, and fearing even for his own life, had left 
his palace and gone to reside in a small house 
adjoining the United States Legation, where he 
felt some degree of safety. From this nook he 
issued a proclamation stating that it was the 
intention of Korea to remain absolutely neutral 
during the impending crisis or the hostilities 
which might follow it. The Korean Government, 
at best feeble and dilatory, was powerless to pre- 



JAPAN IN KOREA 85 

vent or even resist tL3 sudden military occupation 
of the country by the Japanese, the Emperor 
confining his action to complaints made to some 
of the foreign legations. This was the situation 
when the Korean Government was confronted 
with the Japanese demand that it sign a protocol 
defining the relations of the two countries. There 
was no help in sight, and so the foregoing protocol 
was signed. It is idle to assume that the wishes 
and desires of the Korean Government are in any 
substantial way represented in its terms. Korea 
was compelled to agree to whatever Japan wanted, 
and submitted with the best grace possible, in 
order to ''save its face" with its own subjects and 
the foreign powers. As for Japan, she was not 
yet ready to fully expose her policy, but she went 
as far as she dared for the moment. And it will, 
I think, be admitted that it was a very fair start. 

Thus did Japan, by a dramatic coup d'etat, 
seize the reins of power in Korea. Russia an- 
nounced to the world that she would not recognize 
as binding, so far as they affected her interests, 
and as they were procured by coercion, any agree- 
ments made between Japan and Korea during the 
continuance of the war. The other neutral powers 
simply took note of what was going on and pre- 
served a discreet silence. In vain did the Em- 
peror pour his complaints and fears into the ears 
of the foreign ministers, who only shook their 
heads and told him they were powerless to help 
him. He even wanted to come to the American Le- 
gation to live, but Minister Allen was compelled 
to intimate politely that the distinguished guest 



86 THE NEW FAR EAST 

could not be received. In this he was entirely 
right, since there seemed no real necessity for such 
asylum, and the United States might have become 
unpleasantly embroiled. Just whether there were 
any real grounds for the Emperor's fear of as- 
sassination is hard to say, but it is well known that 
since the murder of the Empress by Japanese 
assassins during the former period of Japanese 
ascendency in Korea, the Emperor has been very 
much afraid of his present friends and protectors. 

As the war progressed, with continual success 
to their arms, the Japanese in Korea gradually 
felt emboldened to use the power given them un- 
der the terms of the protocol. By a slow but sure 
process they assumed control of the chief govern- 
mental functions and began the systematic exten- 
sion of their authority to all its branches. In 
order to allay as far as possible the fears of the 
Emperor, Marquis Ito, the venerable Japanese 
statesman, was brought over in 1904 to visit and 
reassure him. It was hinted at the time that 
had he been encouraged by the Emperor to do so, 
Ito would then have remained in Korea in an 
*' advisory" capacity. However, after a short 
stay, he returned to Japan. 

Liberal as the terms of the first protocol appear 
to be, in giving Japan a free hand in Korean 
affairs, as time passed and they found themselves 
more firmly seated in the saddle, the Japanese 
demanded a further extension of their authority. 
By this time they had internal affairs pretty well 
in hand, but they now seem to have felt that the 
time was ripe to take control over the nation's 



JAPAN IN KOREA 81 

foreign affairs as well. This was clearly treading 
upon somewhat delicate ground, as it might en- 
counter opposition from some or one of the neu- 
tral powers. However, they decided to risk this, 
and so pressure was again brought to bear upon 
the Korean Government, with the result that on 
August 22, 1904, the following protocol was pro- 
mulgated (the italics are mine) : 

" I. The Korean Government shall employ a Japanese recom- 
mended by the Japanese Government, as an adviser to the Finance 
Department, in order that anything concerning financial matters 
may be decided by his advice. 

II. The Korean Government shall employ a foreigner recom- 
mended by the Japanese Government, as an adviser to the Foreign 
Office, in order that any important matters relating to foreign af- 
fairs may be decided by his advice. 

III. The Korean Government, in regard to the making of any 
treaty, conducting any diplomatic intercourse, or concerning any 
franchise or contract to a foreigner must consult the Japanese Gov- 
ernment in advance." 

Any constitutional lawyer or person familiar 
with such matters will, I think, agree that this 
second protocol, in conjunction with the one signed 
in February, 1904, constituted a complete abdica- 
tion by the Korean Government of every vestige 
of its authority in favor of the Japanese Govern- 
ment and left Korea without any genuine auton- 
omy. The circumstances surrounding its nego- 
tiation were the same as attended the signing of 
the first protocol, except that the Japanese author- 
ities acted with more assurance, and the Korean 
Government's ability to resist was materially 
weakened. As bearing upon the feeling of the 
Korean Government toward this protocol, I may 
say that while it was being discussed by the rep- 



88 THE NEW FAR EAST 

resentatives of the two governments, the Emperor 
informed some of the foreign ministers of what 
was going on and vainly urged them to protest. 
Failing to secure support from any quarter, the 
Emperor again bowed to the inevitable. A third 
protocol, signed in February, 1905, turned over 
to the Japanese full control of all avenues of com- 
munication, both postal and telegraph (the Japan- 
ese had long before seized them). 

Under the terms of these instruments (it did 
not wait upon written authority except when it 
suited), the Japanese Government proceeded to 
administer the domestic and foreign affairs of 
Korea. In so doing it instituted many changes. 
The Japanese control the policing of the country, 
still employing, however, some of the machinery 
of the Korean Government; a new financial sys- 
tem is being inaugurated; the diplomatic rep- 
resentatives of Korea in foreign countries are 
being recalled and Korea's diplomatic interests 
turned over to the Japanese legations in those 
places; the Korean army is being reduced and 
reorganized under Japanese direction; and re- 
forms in a number of other branches of the gov- 
ernment are being undertaken. 

Briefly put, this is what Japan has done in 
Korea since the beginning of hostilities. There 
remain to be considered the methods employed to 
secure this astonishing result, the actual and prob- 
able results to Korea and foreign interests in the 
country, and the relation of these matters to the 
settlement of the issues of the Far Eastern ques- 
tion. 



JAPAN IN KOEEA 89 

As to the immediate material effect of the Jap- 
anese occupation, it brought on a period of un- 
usual prosperity. Since the war began the Jap- 
anese Government has pushed construction on the 
Seoul-Fusan railway so rapidly that the line is 
now operating along its entire length. "Work was 
also pushed with equal rapidity on the railway 
between Seoul and the Yalu. This road was first 
constructed for purely military uses, but was 
later rebuilt to ordinary standards, and is now in 
operation along its whole route. A great deal 
has been done to improve the railway between 
Seoul and Chemul-po. Many public and semi- 
public works have been undertaken, especially 
new telegraph and telephone lines. These works, 
and the cost of keeping early in the war large 
numbers of troops in the country, gave employ- 
ment to many thousands of coolies and carters 
and provided a ready market for all kinds of 
native produce. Great sums have been spent, the 
bulk of which went to Korean laborers. As Ko- 
rea is a country where the people are very poor 
and money is scarce, the effect has been to give 
a perceptible stimulus to business and was felt 
by nearly all lines of commerce and industry. 
This is pointed out by the Japanese as evidence 
of the progress of the country under their con- 
trol, and indicative of a future with them at the 
helm of state. But there is no assurance that 
these extraordinary conditions will continue; in 
fact, the end is already in sight. And so far as 
the material gains to the country from Japanese 
occupation being cited as a justification for it, by 



90 THE NEW FAR EAST 

the same argument the Russian occupation of 
Manchuria would have been much more justified, 
for the Russians spent dollars in Manchuria where 
the Japanese have spent cents in Korea, and with 
precisely the same object — their own eventual bet- 
terment. 

The most far-reaching action so far taken by the 
Japanese is the attempt to reform the finances and 
currency of the country. In accordance with the 
second protocol, the Japanese Government ap- 
pointed Mr. Megata, a Japanese educated in 
America, to be financial adviser to the Korean 
Government. Mr. Megata at once came to Korea 
and took charge of the national finances. After 
studying the situation for several months, he de- 
cided upon a plan for reform, which was formu- 
lated into an agreement and ratified by the Korean 
Government under the usual pressure. The cur- 
rency of the country has long been in a wretched 
state, the principal circulating medium being a 
small nickel coin, which, owing to the large num- 
bers of counterfeits of varying excellence (many 
of which were made in Japan and introduced by 
the Japanese), had depreciated to less than half 
its face value. Mr. Megata 's plan was designed 
to put the country on a gold standard, after the 
manner adopted by Japan when she made the 
change. Under the agreement, the Dai-Icho Ginko 
(The First Bank), the leading Japanese bank 
doing business in Korea, becomes the fiscal agent 
of the Korean Government, empowered to collect 
all the internal revenues, which shall be deposited 
with the bank, as shall also the customs receipts. 



JAPAN IN KOEEA 91 

The Dai-Icho Ginko is to pay no interest on such 
deposits, but is to bear the expenses of collection. 
The bank is to establish branches for this pur- 
pose throughout the country. A new coinage has 
been issued to replace the old nickels, which are 
to be redeemed in the new coinage at the rate 
of two old nickels for one new one, or a little 
better than the present rate of exchange. This 
coinage is covered by a loan, made by the Dai-Icho 
Ginko, of 3,000,000 yen, redeemable in six and ten 
years, and drawing six per cent, interest. The 
loan is secured by a lien on the customs revenue. 
The agreement also provides for the circulation 
of Japanese currency in the country (this particu- 
larly refers to the so-called "war notes" issued 
by the Japanese Government for payment of ex- 
penses in Korea and Manchuria), and gives the 
Dai-Icho Ginko the priyilege of issuing its own 
notes and using certain government property as 
collateral security. Heretofore the coinage of 
money has been a royal prerogative in Korea, 
which accounts in a measure for the miserable 
condition of the currency; but from now on the 
Korean Government can issue no more coins, the 
Japanese taking control of the mint. 

This is the substance of the scheme for financial 
reform proposed by the Japanese Government, 
and judged purely on its merits there seems little 
reason to object to it, although it might have been 
accomplished by other methods. The arrange- 
ment promises to be a profitable one for the Dai- 
Icho Ginko, but the plan will be economical com- 
pared to past methods, and may in time have a 



92 THE NEW FAR EAST 

beneficial effect. It will be noticed that the agree- 
ment (it has not been made public, but I was able 
to see a copy) provides for the collection of taxes 
by the bank. This in itself involves a most impor- 
tant reform. It has been the custom, under the 
Korean regime, to farm out the collection of the 
taxes to the local magistrates, with the same evil 
results that have always accompanied the system 
everywhere. This agreement marks the first en- 
croachment of the Japanese upon the purely local 
functions of the Korean Government. 

However, promising as this plan seems to be in 
helping to straighten out the tangled financial sys- 
tem of the kingdom, it was not considered an en- 
tirely wise measure by some men (foreigners) of 
recognized ability and long experience in Korean 
fiscal affairs, who pointed out imperfections in its 
proposed modus operandi. When the plan was put 
into effect these forebodings were amply realized. 
The circumstances under which the old nickels 
were redeemable created difficulties that led to 
great confusion and worked injustice upon thou- 
sands of the poorer classes and merchants, while 
at the same time bringing, through manipulation, 
considerable profit to certain classes of Japanese. 
Eiots occurred in places, which the Japanese mili- 
tary suppressed with scant ceremony. The mer- 
chants appealed to the Emperor for relief, and, 
although he was not responsible for the condition 
complained of, he made a loan out of his private 
purse to relieve the panic. It is perhaps too soon 
to condemn this attempt of the Japanese to reform 
the financial system of the country (it certainly 



JAPAN IN KOREA 93 

needs reforming), but their first attempt has not 
so far proved very satisfactory to the Koreans. 

It cannot be denied, and should be mentioned in 
this connection, that the Korean Government is 
rotten to the core, and interference in its affairs 
by almost any foreign power can scarcely fail to 
bring about an improvement of conditions that 
will eventually benefit not only the Koreans them- 
selves, but all persons having interests in the 
country. This statement assumes, of course, that 
such interference will not disturb, by discrimina- 
tion, the interests and rights of other nationalities. 
But this, again, was also true regarding the occu- 
pation by Russia of Manchuria, a fact that should 
not be lost sight of in judging the actions of Japan 
in Korea; and it might, perhaps, be true of for- 
eign occupation of China. In the discussion of the 
future of Korea in the West a great deal of loose 
reasoning has been indulged in over this matter, 
in the effort to make events harmonize with the 
ebullition of popular sympathy with Japan. 



CHAPTEE VII 

JAPAN IN KOREA 

CONTINUED 

Effects of the Japanese Occupation upon Foreign In- 
terests in Korea — Predominance of American Inter- 
ests — Prosperity During the War — Japanese Re- 
moval of Foreign Advisers — PoUtical Pressure upon 
Commercial and Industrial Affairs — The Su-An 
Syndicate — Feeling of Foreigners in the Country — 
Diplomatic Position of Foreign Powers — Dr. Allen's 
Removal — Political Future of Korea — The Su- 
zerainty Agreement — Japanese Military Coercion 
— Suicide of Korean Ministers — Korean Emperor's 
Vain Appeal to America — Political Significance of 
Korea. 

The probability that Japan will contimie indefi- 
nitely to have a free hand in Korea suggests at 
once a consideration of the actual and prospective 
effects of the Japanese occupation and adminis- 
tration of affairs upon other foreign interests in 
the country. 

So far, the results are of conflicting tendency. 
It happens that in Korea American activity in in- 
dustrial and commercial lines has taken the lead 
of late years, chiefly owing to the energy and en- 
terprise of a single firm, and the good offices of 
Dr. Allen, for many years the American Minister, 
in helping his nationals. And it should be re- 
marked that American enterprises in Korea, as 

94 



JAPAN IN KOEEA 95 

they almost invariably are in all foreign countries, 
are based upon legitimate ventures and are rarely 
political schemes in disguise. Much of their suc- 
cess, once they get under way, is due to this. Such 
is the character of American interests in Korea. 
Americans operate the only really successful mines 
in the country; Americans built the first railway 
in Korea, which was afterward sold to the Japan- 
ese; Americans started the first street railway 
lines, electric lighting and telephone systems. 
No ulterior political designs lurked behind any of 
these propositions, and Dr. Allen did right to 
exert himself in their behalf. Having their incep- 
tion in legitimate enterprise, and conducted on 
business principles, they have prospered in a 
manner that has not failed to arouse the envy of 
other foreign interests. 

Up to now, American interests in Korea have 
profited by Japanese occupation ; or, rather, they 
have profited by the conditions that followed the 
Japanese occupation. This is to say that a ma- 
jority of American interests are of a character 
to benefit by any improvement of business condi- 
tions, and so they have felt the influence of general 
prosperity. The same may be said of other purely 
commercial foreign interests of all nationalities. 
Great care has been taken, so far, by the Japanese 
authorities not to tread upon the toes of Ameri- 
cans and British. The reasons for this policy are 
obvious. With other foreigners they are not so 
particular, especially the Germans and French. 

Except America, most of the Western powers 
have for many years pursued a plan calculated to 



96 THE NEW FAR EAST 

extend and safeguard their political influence and 
other interests in Korea. One of the results of 
this plan was the practically enforced employment 
by the Korean Government of a large number of 
so-called foreign advisers, supposed to assist in 
reforming and reorganizing its governmental and 
industrial affairs. Although the Korean Govern- 
ment would under pressure readily agree to em- 
ploy these advisers, it never pretended to take 
their advice after they came to Korea; so that 
while most of these men were quite capable in 
their various occupations, they soon found them- 
selves reduced to ornamental appendages of the 
government, with purely nominal occupation. A 
few resigned in disgust, but a majority accepted 
the situation and drew their salaries in leisure. 

Under pretence of introducing economy into ad- 
ministrative affairs, the Japanese are rapidly dis- 
pensing with the services of these foreigners. This 
seems a meritorious action on its face; but it ap- 
pears that they are being replaced by Japanese; 
indeed, for every foreigner removed several Jap- 
anese are usually appointed — at lower salaries, it 
is true, but amounting to a considerably larger 
aggregate. No one could have objected had Japan 
put the foreigners to work and compelled or given 
them an opportunity to earn their wages. They 
are, in the main, perfectly competent to perform 
their duties, and could easily be made very useful. 
But the Japanese are getting rid of them. Of 
course, in dismissing these men the fiction of 
Korean autonomy is preserved ; but the Emperor 
often sends privately for them and expresses his 



JAPAN IN KOEEA 97 

personal regret at their removal. So far, few 
British or American (there are very few of the 
latter) employes have been discharged by the Jap- 
anese, but some of them are beginning to feel very 
uneasy. The removal of Mr. MacLeavy Brown, 
who so long and ably administered the Korean cus- 
toms, is an indication of this policy ; and that this 
blow to British susceptibility was taken without a 
murmur shows the extent to which England is 
giving her ally free rein in the North. 

Not only has care been taken to refrain from 
action calculated directly to injure American in- 
terests, but in some instances measures have been 
inaugurated which promise a large profit to some 
of them. The street railways of Seoul were built 
and are operated by an American firm under a 
franchise permitting certain tariffs, expressed in 
Korean currency. The customary fare for certain 
distances is a Korean nickel, or at the present rate 
of exchange about a cent and a quarter in gold. 
The new nickel currency is worth more than twice 
as much, which, since the same fare may be 
charged, will more than double the earnings of 
the street railways. Thus at least one foreign in- 
terest stands to materially benefit by the currency 
reform, and if the street railway company is left 
undisturbed in its privileges it will make a great 
deal of money, as it is already operating at a nice 
profit. The Japanese have made several attempts 
to purchase these lines, in pursuance of their 
policy to get hold of everything worth having in 
the country, but a difference of opinion about the 
price has so far prevented a deal. 



98 THE NEW FAR EAST 

But the Japanese are rapidly obtaining a posi- 
tion in the country where they may apply pressure 
to other foreign interests if they choose, and it is 
not impossible that before long the principal 
American interests will find it to their advantage 
to sell out to the Japanese, or face the alternative 
of having their business seriously handicapped. 
It should be noticed that the third clause of the 
protocol of August, 1904, makes it necessary for 
all contracts or agreements between foreigners 
and the Korean Government to be referred to 
Tokyo. This means, flatly, that now and in the 
future no foreigner can start a business enterprise 
in Korea without the consent of the Japanese 
Government. It does not appear on its face to 
have any ex post facto bearing, but in matters 
like this one never can tell. And its object is 
perfectly obvious. Stripped of hypocritical inter- 
pretation, its effect undoubtedly is that in the 
coming industrial and commercial development of 
Korea Japanese interests are to have the first 
consideration. 

In fact, the pressure is already being applied. 
Foreign enterprises operating under concessions 
granted by the Korean Government prior to the 
Japanese occupation are now compelled to have 
all their dealings with the Korean Government 
referred to the Japanese authorities for final 
action, even in regard to the most trivial matters. 
Not only this, but a number of concessions granted 
to foreigners before the war have been revoked 
by the Japanese. This is true of all Russian, and 
of one French concession. The franchise for the 



JAPAN IN KOREA 99 

construction and operation of the railway from 
Seoul to the Yalu was originally granted to the 
French, but the Japanese have gone ahead and 
built the road regardless of the previous rights 
involved. It is true that they claim that the 
French concession had been forfeited, but the 
French dispute this, and it remains a matter to 
be adjusted in the future. 

As an example of how the new plan affects for- 
eigners other than Japanese who desire to do busi- 
ness in the country, witness the recent organiza- 
tion of the Su-An Syndicate, Ltd., to open and 
operate some mining concessions in northern Ko- 
rea. That the mining prospects included in the 
franchise just conceded to the new company have 
a large prospective value has been known for 
years, and an attempt was made some time ago 
to organize a British company to develop them. 
This effort failing for the time, owing to difficulty 
in securing financial support, it was recently re- 
vived as a project which associated with the 
English promoters a leading American firm in 
Korea. Strong as this combination was, and 
ample to carry the project to success under ordi- 
nary circumstances, it was thought prudent to in- 
clude a Japanese interest in order that no politi- 
cal obstacles to securing the franchise might be 
encountered. Thus originated the famous Ameri- 
can-British-Japanese concession of which so much 
political capital has been made in the Far Eastern 
press. Scores of editorials have appeared in the 
native and foreign Japanese papers, pointing to 
the organization of this company as another of 



100 THE NEW FAR EAST 

the many indications that England and America 
are supporting Japan in her policy. 

It is not easy to discover just how foreigners 
who have business interests in Korea really feel 
about the future under Japanese occupation (I 
have not met a single man who entertains the 
slightest notion that the Japanese intend ever to 
let go). Prudence counsels a still tongue, until 
there are clearer indications of how the interna- 
tional wind is going to blow. But in the course of 
a long talk with a leading foreigner who resides in 
Seoul I was able to gather much of his real state 
of mind. 

**I have not, so far," he said (the conversation 
occurred in 1905), ''felt much inconvenience owing 
to the occupation of the country by the Japanese. 
Our business is moving along very nicely; in fact, 
it has improved. How long this will continue I 
am unable to say ; but I look for generally better 
times in Korea. The old government certainly 
needs renovating, and the Japanese are starting 
energetically. It is true that we are sometimes 
put to trifling annoyance and some delay by the 
present necessity of having matters we have been 
accustomed to arrange with Korean officials re- 
ferred to the Japanese, making a double transac- 
tion where formerly only one was required; but 
no disposition to refuse our just requests has been 
shown. I have nothing to complain of in that 
quarter. ' ' 

"Do you regard your interests as secure under 
Japanese control?" I asked. 

**Oh,yes." 



i 



JAPAN IN KOREA 101 

' '■ Do you place your reliance upon the Japanese 
Government ? ' ' 

*' Certainly not," lie replied. ''I rely upon my 
own government [the United States] to protect 
me in my rights." 

' ' Should a result of the war be a permanent ab- 
sorption of Korea by Japan," I said, "and the 
eventual withdrawal of the representatives of all 
foreign governments, leaving the Japanese in 
unequivocal control, how do you think your inter- 
ests would be affected?" 

He answered with a serious face, but without 
hesitation : 

''I cannot bring myself to think that our gov- 
ernments will abandon us in that manner. But 
should they do so, notwithstanding that I have 
spent the best years of my life building up my in- 
terests here, I would sell my property for what it 
would bring and leave the country. ' ' 

This, I am firmly convinced, substantially repre- 
sents the views of an immense majority of for- 
eigners in Korea, regardless of nationality ; and I 
may say that it also reflects my own opinion. Such 
opinion has its root in fundamental traits of Jap- 
anese character relating to business affairs, and 
the attitude of the Japanese Government toward 
foreigners doing business in Japan ; but this sub- 
ject may be reserved for discussion in another 
connection. 

A matter that is certain to come up, in fact it is 
already being discussed by the Japanese propa- 
ganda, is whether the various foreign govern- 
ments, in view of the fact that Korea is withdraw- 



102 THE NEW FAR EAST 

ing her diplomatic representatives from abroad, 
and in view of the further fact that it is not pos- 
sible since the promulgation of the protocol of 
August, 1904, to have any real diplomatic inter- 
course with the Korean Government, will continue 
to retain their representatives at Seoul. Nothing 
could display greater cleverness than the man- 
ner used by Japan through the propaganda to 
steadily shift her ground in regard to the main 
propositions involved in the settlement, while at 
the same time remaining carefully posed in an 
attitude of self-sacrifice. Something of a shock 
will be felt in the Western world when the mask, 
having served its purpose, is dropped. Mean- 
while, pretence is piled upon pretence, without 
being able, however, to conceal the undercurrent 
of reality. 

The sudden removal in the Spring of 1905 of 
Dr. Allen, the American Minister at Seoul, has 
been a valuable morsel under the manipulation of 
the propaganda. An impression has been indus- 
triously disseminated in Korea and throughout 
the East that Dr. Allen was withdrawn because he 
had in some way offended the Japanese. I here 
reproduce a sample of the matter relating to Dr. 
Allen's removal printed in the Eastern press. It 
is clipped from a pro-Japanese newspaper, and is 
a fair example of the way the propaganda handled 
the incident : 

A PRO-RUSSIAN MINISTER WITHDRAWN 

A Washington correspondent says that the removal of Mr. 
Allen, the American Minister to Korea, constitutes another recog- 
nition of Japan's suzerain power. Mr. Allen has been fifteen years 



JAPAN IN KOREA 103 

in Korea in a diplomatic capacity, advancing from Secretary to 
Minister, and has exercised great influence over the Emperor. He 
was formerly a medical missionary. He was later made medical 
oflBcer to the Korean Court, and, as secretary and interpreter was 
attached to the first Korean Legation sent to the United States. 
Two years later he returned to Korea as American Secretary of 
Legation. He has always been pronouncedly pro-Russian. Two 
years ago, when in Washington on leave, he attempted to convince 
the President and Mr. Hay that their Far Eastern policy was wrong, 
and that instead of antagonizing Russia they should support Russia 
in her Manchurian venture. He was somewhat pointedly told that 
he was travelling outside of his province in entertaining views for- 
eign to those of his Government. When Mr. Stevens was appointed 
foreign adviser to the Emperor of Korea it was feared, both in 
Tokyo and in Washington, that he would meet with the antago- 
nism of Mr. Allen. It is understood that Japan, finding Mr. Allen's 
presence in Seoul detrimental to her interests, delicately intimated 
to Washington that his recall would be gratifying. The President 
without delay acted on the suggestion. Great pressure was brought 
to bear by Mr. Allen to induce the President to revoke his order of 
recall, but it appears to have made no impression on the Presi- 
dent. 



Note the care taken to convey the impression 
that this item emanates from Washington, imply- 
ing to it in Eastern miads an American official 
sanction. The Mr. Stevens referred to is an 
American employed by the Japanese Government, 
then acting as adviser to the Korean Foreign 
Office. One can imagine the feelings of Dr. Allen, 
after fifteen years' uninterrupted and peculiarly 
distinguished service at the same post through all 
the shiftings of political authority in America 
(during which he, in a perfectly legitimate man- 
ner and without improper discrimination against 
other foreign interests, did more to promote the 
enterprises of his nationals than I have ever seen 
accomplished elsewhere under analogous condi- 



104 THE NEW FAB EAST 

tions, and whose work was properly recognized by 
deserved promotion), at being compelled to step 
down under the implication of having been kicked 
out by the Japanese. The position acquired by 
Dr. Allen in Seoul is almost unique in the an- 
nals of American diplomacy. He retired as dean 
of the diplomatic corps, with the esteem and 
conMence of all grades of Koreans from the 
Emperor down, and with the regard to a most 
remarkably unanimous degree of the foreign resi- 
dents of all nationalities. Dr. Allen did not know, 
when I last talked with him in Seoul, the reason 
for his removal, but he attributed it to his long 
tenure of oJBQce, in so far as he had any theory at 
all. To my question if he had had any friction 
with the Japanese since the occupation, he em- 
phatically stated that his relations with them had 
always been most cordial, and he could not believe 
that the Japanese Government desired his re- 
moval, much less that the American Government 
would remove him for such a reason. It is hardly 
necessary to say that Dr. Allen had never been 
outwardly pro-Eussian or anything except pro- 
American. The incident of his sudden removal 
caused astonishment and indignation, and no little 
uneasiness among Americans in the Orient, who 
fully appreciate the importance attached to such 
moves in that part of the world. And it might be 
well for the government at Washington to care- 
fully consider how far it desires this covert sug- 
gestion that it is ready to lend its assistance to 
Japan's designs in Korea to be carried. Or, 
taking the view of the incident conveyed in the 



JAPAN IN KOREA 105 

article quoted, are we to believe that even long 
before the war ended, before its issue was deter- 
mined, and when praise of Japan's supposed dis- 
interestedness was filling the columns of the Amer- 
ican press, the United States Government had 
committed itself to the annexation of Korea by 
Japan? The recent announcement of the inten- 
tion of the American Government to withdraw its 
minister from Seoul, indicating its intention to 
in future address its diplomatic communications 
concerning Korea to Tokyo, gives a color of proba- 
bility to this theory. 

In regard to the political future of Korea, the 
"Western world may as well face the facts soon as 
late. There is not the slightest indication of any 
intention on the part of Japan to abide by her 
frequently expressed intention to maintain the 
independence of the kingdom. As long as it suits 
her convenience, and serves her purpose in con- 
cealing her wider designs from Western peoples, 
Japan will make a pretence of preserving the ex- 
isting status, not in the least disconcerted by 
remembrance that she went to war in 1894 because 
China asserted a nominal suzerainty over Korea. 
The Emperor may be retained as nominal head of 
the government for years, but he always will be 
(as he has been since February 8, 1904, when 
the Japanese troops occupied Seouiy virtually a 
prisoner in his palace; a political puppet whose 
potential mechanism is operated by the Japanese. 
To-day the independence of Korea is nothing but 
a shallow and perfectly transparent fiction, which 
did not need the recently signed protectorate 



106 THE NEW FAE EAST 

agreement, by wMch a Japanese governor-general 
is to administer affairs mider the Emperor, to be 
seen in a true light. 

The negotiation of this ''agreement" by Mar- 
quis Ito caused a flutter in Seoul, cowed as by this 
time the Koreans were. When Ito arrived in Seoul 
he wished to meet the Emperor at once, but the 
latter secluded himself and it required six days 
to bring the meeting about, in order to permit Ito 
to present his credentials as envoy extraordinary. 
Then Hayashi, the Japanese Minister and real 
ruler of the country, called a council of the Korean 
cabinet to draft the agreement. The members of 
the cabinet, or a majority of them, responded to the 
call and reluctantly presented themselves at the 
Japanese legation, where the conference was held. 
For hours the debate was kept up ; several mem- 
bers of the cabinet refused to sign and, leaving 
the legation in anger, joined the Emperor in his 
sleeping apartments, where had been assembled 
the remnant of the Imperial Guard. Crowds gath- 
ered in the streets and near the palace grounds, 
and began to make threatening demonstrations 
against the Japanese. 

The Japanese authorities then resorted to 
stronger measures. Thousands of Japanese 
troops were brought into the city from the adja- 
cent barracks and arranged about the palace, ex- 
cluding the Koreans, and making the Emperor 
and the recalcitrant ministers actual prisoners. 
One by one the ministers were sought out and 
their signatures secured. At least it was an- 
nounced that they signed the agreement. The 



JAPAN IN KOREA 107 

exact circumstances under which all of them did so 
may never be known, for several either committed 
suicide or were assassinated soon afterward, in- 
cluding ex-premier Chao and Min-yung-whan, a 
prominent Korean patriot, as the Koreans under- 
stand patriotism. After these events the Emperor, 
it is stated, also signed, and the *' agreement" 
turning over the absolute control of the ancient 
kingdom to Japan was promulgated, on Novem- 
ber 17, 1904.* 

Some time before this significant event the Em- 
peror, probably foreseeing it, had despatched an 
American friend, H. B. Hulbert, who has long 
resided in Korea, with an appeal to the President 
of the United States to aid in preserving the 
independence of his kingdom; but before Mr. 
Hulbert reached Washington the agreement had 
been signed. Of course, this appeal could have 
had no result under the circumstances, but some 
Americans may like to regard it as a recognition 
on the part of a weak nation of the existence of 
a sympathy in the United States for all those 
threatened with oppression. The incident is not 
without pathos. On January 29, 1906, the Em- 
peror issued a statement to the world asserting 
that his signature to the suzerainty agreement was 
forged; and inviting the powers to establish a 
joint protectorate to preserve the independence of 
his kingdom. It is suggestive of the real situation 
in Korea that this interesting news only became 
public through the instrumentality of a corre- 
spondent for a London newspaper, who personally 

* Appendix C. 



108 THE NEW FAR EAST 

carried it to Chi-fu, China, whence he was able to 
telegraph the gist of its contents. 

The details included in the foregoing account of 
the negotiation of the protectorate agreement 
were chiefly furnished to me by a foreign resident 
of Seoul who was in the city at the time, and they 
are substantially supported by all unprejudiced 
press accounts that I have seen. 

Before quitting the question of the political 
future of Korea, it may be well to recall the fact 
that its possession by Japan, like the possession of 
Port Arthur, has an importance out of proportion 
to the commercial possibilities of the country. 
Were the cormnercial and industrial interests of 
Western nations in the country the only issue at 
stake, its fate would hardly be worth considering. 
But the real importance of Korea lies in the geo- 
graphical position of the kingdom. As an inde- 
pendent kingdom it was a buffer between Japan 
and a policy of continental aggression; in the 
hands of Japan it becomes a stepping stone. 



CHAPTER VIII 

JAPAN IN KOREA 
CONCLUDED 

Effects of the Japanese Occupation upon the Koreans 
— Korean Hatred of the Japanese — Reasons for 
this Hatred — National Sentiments Involved — Jap- 
anese Abuse of Koreans — Character of Japanese 
Immigrants — A Personal Experience — Koreans 
Treated as a Conquered People — The " Nagamori 
Land Scheme" — The " Kong-chin-hoi" Society — 
The " Il-chin-hoi" — Pathetic Situation of the Em- 
peror — Japan's Intentions in Korea — Agricultural 
and Commercial Possibilities of the Country. 

If I have given priority to consideration of the 
effects of Japanese occupation npon the interests 
of foreign powers and foreigners doing business 
in Korea, it is not because I feel that its effects 
upon the Koreans are unimportant. My reason 
for deferring examination into this matter is be- 
cause, with other confusing issues out of the way, 
it will be easier to appreciate this one. I may re- 
peat that in its broader aspects Japanese control 
is likely to accomplish better results to the average 
Korean than a continuance of the country under 
its former government. But it is clear that reform 
might be accomplished by other means than a con- 
version of the country into a dependency of Japan. 
At any rate, it is interesting to note how the 
Koreans, of high and low degree, feel about what 

109 



no THE NEW FAE EAST 

the Japanese are doing and the prospect before 
them. 

There is only one possible answer to the question 
here implied. Born of long association and knowl- 
edge, and grounded firmly in the memory of past 
experience, there exists in the heart of the average 
Korean a deep and bitter hatred of Japan and 
everything Japanese. 

There does not exist in Korea, nor in any other 
Oriental land, any common intelligence about pub- 
lic affairs capable of conceiving, much less under- 
standing the general benefit which may follow a 
sweeping reform of the national administration. 
To begin with the official classes, they see plainly 
in Japanese control the final relinquishment of 
their inherited privilege to rule or misrule the 
country as they please. They already find their 
prerogatives curtailed, and the shadow of forth- 
coming events falls heavily upon them. They are 
astute enough to recognize that the present nomi- 
nal autonomy of the kingdom is nothing more than 
a polite fiction, and in this they seem to be keener 
witted than many persons in the "West. However 
disconsolate he may be at heart, the Oriental will 
*'save his face" by assuming a nonchalant de- 
meanor in public, and to go about in Seoul one 
might think that all is going as the people wish. 
Outwardly, most matters go on as usual. Beyond 
seeing an unusual number of Japanese soldiers 
and civilians about, things seem much the same 
as formerly. But underneath it all a majority of 
Koreans are haunted by a fear, now almost a cer- 
tainty, that their national existence is doomed; 



JAPAN IN KOREA 111 

that never again will their Emperor really rule. 
They would not be human beings, imbued with the 
common attributes of such, did they not resent 
this prospect, in the shaping of which their wishes 
have in no way been consulted. So to say that the 
Koreans object to the Japanese occupation con- 
veys but a very mild impression of how they 
really feel. 

And it requires no great perspicuity to discover 
the more palpable reasons for this sentiment. 
They are on the surface, so that he who runs may 
read. For several years there has been a large 
Japanese immigration into Korea. This immi- 
gration has been stimulated by the Japanese Gov- 
ernment for political reasons, through subsidized 
emigration bureaus in Japan, and has resulted in 
large Japanese settlements at the principal treaty 
ports and other towns. Since the war began this 
immigration has swollen enormously, until in 
Seoul the original Japanese quarter of the city 
will no longer hold the newcomers, and they are 
spreading out in all directions. These immigrants 
are not, as a rule, of a very good class ; and their 
injection into Korean towns and cities under con- 
ditions likely to accentuate the natural intolerance 
of the Japanese in his attitude toward the natives 
of the country has produced some unpleasant 
results. Within an hour after I landed at Chemul- 
po I witnessed three unprovoked assaults by Jap- 
anese upon Koreans, in which the Koreans were 
severely beaten. In these continual brawls the 
Koreans are afraid to offer any strenuous resist- 
ance, for that is likely to bring the Japanese sol- 



112 THE NEW FAE EAST 

diers or police down upon them. Two of the 
petty assaults I observed were also witnessed by 
Japanese military policemen, who simply laughed 
at the incidents. 

At Fusan I also witnessed, recently, during an 
hour's stroll on shore, one aggravated case of 
assault by Japanese upon a Korean coolie; and 
also another incident which has a more important 
bearing to Westerners, as illustrating the real 
sentiment of the average ignorant Japanese tow- 
ard foreigners. I was with two young Americans, 
on their way to be employed at the American min- 
ing concession in north Korea, and both seeing 
the Orient for the first time. We were strolling 
about the town and had reached the outskirts, 
where a number of Japanese coolies were digging 
a ditch. Without anything whatever being done 
to offend them one of them stopped his work and 
approached one of the young men, who, having no 
idea of what the man meant to do, stood quietly 
where he was until the Japanese deliberately jos- 
tled him with his shoulder. The other Japanese 
coolies laughed, which was echoed by a number 
of Koreans who were observing us from curios- 
ity. The American's face flushed and his hand 
clenched, but he was in unfamiliar atmosphere, 
so he turned to me. 

"Wliat ought I to do?" he said. 

"Pay no attention to it," was my advice. 

We were some distance from the town proper, 
and entirely out of reach of any succor, and I knew 
that any offensive demonstration on our part 
would result in us being stoned and otherwise 



JAPAN IN KOREA 113 

maltreated. "We had nothing to defend ourselves 
with, so we walked quietly back toward the centre 
of the town, followed for some distance by a num- 
ber of the Japanese coolies, who shouted derisive 
epithets after us. Of course, if we had been able 
to identify the men, a complaint to the Japanese 
authorities in the town would probably have re- 
sulted in their punishment. 

But the Koreans are differently situated. They 
do not dare complain unless the person abused 
be a man of importance, for nothing will be done 
except in the most flagrant cases, and retribution 
is almost certain to be later visited upon the com- 
plainant. "When the lower class of Japanese will 
act toward foreigners as I have shown, their dis- 
position toward the despised Koreans may be ap- 
preciated. Already the Japanese in Korea treat 
the natives as inhabitants of a conquered country. 
Little actual physical abuse of them is seen in 
Seoul, for there it may be observed and reported 
by foreigners, and the Japanese authorities com- 
pelled to punish the perpetrators. I have no in- 
clination to misrepresent the disposition of the 
higher Japanese officials in this matter. In cases 
of wilful maltreatment of Koreans by Japanese 
that come to their knowledge they visit prompt 
and severe punishment. But the thousands of 
petty instances, none the less galling to the Ko- 
reans because the physical injury may be slight, 
are never reported. However, such incidents have 
become so numerous that the Japanese authorities 
have taken means to check them by sending back 
to Japan many of the objectionable immigrants, 



114 THE NEW FAE EAST 

and are warning the Japanese emigration com- 
panies to be more careful about the character of 
the persons they send over; which constitutes a 
direct recognition that the evil exists. In the re- 
moter parts of the country, away from the sur- 
veillance of the central authority, there is hardly 
any check upon the impulses of the newly arrived 
Japanese in his treatment of the Koreans, and the 
Korean who may be thus abused has little chance 
for redress. 

An incident that has caused great bitterness 
among the Korean residents of Seoul is the recent 
Japanese demand that a large part of the city 
inside the wall be conceded for an extension of 
the Japanese settlement, the Koreans now occupy- 
ing the space (it is densely populated) to be reim- 
bursed for their property. The sum suggested 
for this reimbursement does not equal the present 
value of the property. And for centuries resi- 
dents within the walls have been exempt from 
taxation, a most coveted privilege. So it will 
easily be understood that the Koreans do not take 
kindly to the suggestion that they move out to 
make way for the Japanese. The demand has not 
yet been pressed, on account of the violent opposi- 
tion it encountered, but there is reason to think 
that it has only been suspended awaiting a more 
favorable time to urge it. Thus in a thousand 
petty ways, reproducing, essentially, all the gall- 
ing circumstances which, under similar conditions, 
invariably attend efforts to bend weak peoples 
to the yoke of self-appointed overlords, do the 
Koreans feel the Japanese occupation. 



JAPAN IN KOEEA 115 

Another proposal fathered by the Japanese 
authorities is known as the ''Nagamori Land 
Scheme. ' ' This ambitions project was originated 
by a Japanese named Nagamori, a speculator and 
promoter, who came to Korea shortly before the 
war and urged his proposition upon the Korean 
Government. He met with a cool reception, and 
for the time his scheme languished. But after the 
country had been occupied by the Japanese, he 
induced them to regard the project favorably, 
with a result that the Japanese authorities took it 
up and urged it as their own measure. Omitting 
its minor details, it was a plan to redeem the waste 
lands of Korea by improving and bringing them 
under cultivation by means of long leases upon 
the lands given to the Nagamori company. The 
scheme included all unoccupied crown lands, be- 
sides all privately owned land not already under 
cultivation, and involved about two-thirds of the 
total area of the country. Superficially, the 
scheme had a certain plausibility, but upon being 
closely scrutinized it stood revealed as turning 
over to Japanese control the greater part of the 
national domain, to be exploited as they saw fit. 

When the details of the Nagamori scheme be- 
came known to the Korean people, a popular 
agitation against it was begun, which grew in 
strength until it included persons from all walks 
of life. Soon the agitation took tangible shape in 
the organization of the "Kong-chin-hoi" Society. 
Meetings were held in Seoul, where the scheme 
was discussed and speeches denouncing it were 
made. Manifestoes directed against the Japanese 



116 THE NEW FAE EAST 

were also circulated. Under Japanese pressure, 
the Emperor issued a proclamation ordering that 
no more meetings should be held and that the agi- 
tation should cease. This led to a great demon- 
stration of the "Kong-chin-hoi" Society before 
the palace, which was dispersed by Japanese 
troops, no resistance being offered by the agi- 
tators. Thereupon martial law was declared, and 
the city of Seoul placed under Japanese police 
authority. 

But, although outwardly suppressed, the agita- 
tion continued along quieter channels until the 
Japanese authorities decided to fight it with a 
counter agitation. This led to the organization of 
the "Il-chin-hoi." The "Il-chin-hoi" pretended 
to be an organization of Koreans banded together 
for purely patriotic purposes. It issued a mani- 
festo to the people declaring its policy to be the 
protection of the throne and people. The **I1- 
chin-hoi'* drew to it very quickly the riff-raff of 
Seoul. The members were paid by the Japanese 
authorities, who provided for them a sort of uni- 
form cap. Hundreds of its members were nothing 
more than the idle boys of the streets. Soon after 
its organization, as a starter to its propaganda, 
the **Il-chin-hoi" held a large meeting just outside 
the city near the Peking Pass (where the Japanese 
authorities provided it with a building), and then 
paraded through the town. The Emperor sent 
some of his guards to order the crowd to disperse, 
whereupon the Japanese troops dispersed the 
Korean guards. 

Thus backed by the Japanese military, and am- 



JAPAN IN KOEEA 117 

ply provided with money to carry their agitation 
over the country, the "Il-chin-hoi" made rapid 
headway. It even succeeded in drawing into it 
many thousands of honest and patriotic Koreans 
from outside the capital, who, lacking knowledge 
of the facts surrounding the organization, were 
captured by the patriotic fervor of its manifestoes. 
So the ''Kong-chin-hoi," unable to hold meetings 
or agitate, languished; and the ' ' Il-chin-hoi, " 
stimulated by liberal use of Japanese money, 
waxed strong. The propaganda busied itself dis- 
seminating throughout the world news about the 
efforts the Korean people were making in favor 
of the Japanese administration of Korean affairs. 
However, after pressing it for some time, the 
Japanese authorities decided that it would be wise 
to drop, at least for the present, the Nagamori 
scheme, which seems to have been quietly shelved. 
The ''Il-chin-hoi" continued to hold meetings, but 
its enthusiasm soon waned. Having served its 
purpose, the Japanese are less liberal with funds, 
and it is probable that in a short time the organi- 
zation will die a natural death, unless kept alive by 
the Japanese as a convenient ''dummy" to illus- 
trate, upon occasion, the popularity of their rule 
with the Koreans. This is the brief and true his- 
tory of the one feeble attempt the Koreans have 
so far made to assert their right to a voice in their 
own affairs since the Japanese troops landed in 
the kingdom, and it may be the last. There is not 
likely to be a revival of serious anti-Japanese 
agitation, for the Japanese are sending away most 
of the Korean leaders, such as Y-ong-ik, who have 



118 THE NEW FAR EAST 

the energy and ability to perhaps accomplish 
something; and any forcible resistance is promptly 
suppressed by Japanese troops. Since the Japan- 
ese occupied the country hundreds of Koreans 
have been summarily executed. Unless some out- 
side influence is brought to bear in their favor the 
Koreans realize that the independence of their 
country is forever gone. The common people re- 
gard as very significant the fact that since the 
Japanese have come the Korean independence 
arch on the Peking Road is beginning to crumble. 
Perhaps the most pathetic figure in the present 
evolution is the Emperor. Harassed on one side 
by the constant demands of the Japanese, who 
piece by piece are robbing him of the last ves- 
tiges of his former power, and on the other by the 
complaints of his own officials, who find them- 
selves being rapidly deprived of all authority, he 
rarely leaves the miserable place where he now 
resides. With a number of really fine palaces at 
his command, he lived, when I was in Seoul, in a 
small house that was formerly one of the outbuild- 
ings of the Imperial library. His sleeping room is 
less than fifty feet from the American legation, 
and directly between the legation and the quar- 
ters of the legation guard. Here, with the Stars 
and Stripes flying not a hundred feet distant on 
either side, he fancies himself to some extent 
secure from physical violence. But he is haunted 
by constant fears. Many times during the first 
year of the Japanese occupation Dr. Allen, the 
former American Minister, was aroused in the 
night by a request from the Emperor to come to 



JAPAN IN KOREA 119 

see him, and often did the kind-hearted man leave 
his bed to do what he could to assuage His Maj- 
esty's alarm. Nobody of consequence in Seoul, 
except the Emperor, thinks that he is in any real 
danger, but he has never recovered from the 
shock caused by the murder of his wife. So here 
he passes his days, bewailing his unhappy fate 
to those to whom he dares commit himself, and 
devising fruitless schemes to get the Japanese out 
of the country. The Czar was no more anxious 
during the war for a decisive Eussian victory than 
was this miserable Emperor, and his wish was 
shared by an immense majority of his people. 
Living himself in mean circumstances, the Em- 
peror sees attaches of the Japanese legation use 
his splendid audience halls and the royal gardens 
to give afternoon teas and lawn parties. Fancy 
his feelings when compelled to despatch a member 
of his family to Tokyo to kowtow to the Mikado. 
It is true, I believe, that the Japanese paid the 
expenses of the embassy. To this condition have 
long years of misrule and political inanity brought 
a king and his people. Perhaps there is something 
of justice in it all. 

Taking a glance into the future, I can see no 
very flattering prospect before the country. Much 
depends upon the ability and spirit with which 
the Japanese conduct its affairs. If, under pres- 
sure of acute necessity to recoup her tremendous 
expenses caused by the war, Japan enters upon 
a selfish exploitation of Korea, to get what she 
can out of the country as quickly as possible, 
I am afraid there is a hard time ahead for most 



120 THE NEW FAE EAST 

people there. While in Japan I kept my eyes 
open for indications of her intentions in regard 
to Korea. Out of many columns of comment in the 
native and foreign press I select the following as 
a fair sample of the discussion that is going on. 
It is clipped from a foreign newspaper subsidized 
by the Japanese Government, and it appears to be 
a resume of an article in a leading native journal : 

OUR KOREAN POLICY 

The Kokumin says most people have a very nebulous idea about 
our Korean policy, while those who claim to possess a definite pro- 
gramme are generally labouring under erroneous notions. There 
are two groups that come under the latter category, and they run 
to mischievous extremes. One calls its policy a policy of righteous- 
ness and humanity, and contends that whatever Japan does for 
Korea should be done in a purely altruistic spirit. The Kokumin 
denounces this policy as worse than useless, in that it will act on 
Korea in the same way that the action of an indulgent father would 
on his prodigal son, and Korea has proved herself a thorough-going 
prodigal when left to herself. The other group insists on a policy 
which is quite the reverse of the former, and desires that in all her 
acts and actions in Korea Japan should be guided by her own in- 
terests only. The Kokumin regards this as the policy of the man 
who killed the goose that laid the golden eggs, and says the real policy 
of ours should be to render what assistance and counselling Korea 
stands in need of in becoming a well-governed nation, in such a way 
as to create a community of interests between the two countries, so 
that at the same and every time we benefit Korea we also profit our- 
selves. 

It will, of course, be noticed that it is, in this 
article, fully accepted that Japan intends to hold 
Korea. And it also shows that an influential 
section of the Japanese press and people regard 
Korea in the light of one of the fruits of victory, 
to be exploited to the advantage of Japan regard- 
less of the effect upon Korea. I have purposely; 



JAPAN IN KOREA 121 

chosen to reproduce the above, because of its sin- 
gularly moderate tone, which may be assumed to 
represent the views of the more intelligent and 
conservative leaders. It is worth noting, how- 
ever, that there is not the slightest intention of 
restoring the independence of Korea shown by 
either party. 

Assuming that such a policy as the Kokumin 
here advocates is eventually adopted, what is the 
future of Korea as a dependency of, or actually a 
part of Japan? That depends, naturally, upon 
the resources of the country and the opportunity 
offered for their development. Korea is not a 
naturally rich country. It is impossible to obtain 
accurate statistics bearing upon the resources of 
the kingdom, for such have never been compiled. 
But the greater part of the land is not suitable for 
agriculture, being mountainous and tolerably bar- 
ren. Still, there are many fertile valleys and up- 
lands. It is estimated that at present about forty 
per cent, of the arable land is in cultivation, nearly 
the same proportion as in Japan. As agricultur- 
ists the Koreans are about equal to the Japanese, 
which means they are away behind the times. But 
they are naturally industrious, and if given an op- 
portunity many of them would become prosperous 
and even wealthy. Conditions in the country have 
heretofore retarded the accumulation of wealth 
by depriving the masses of the people of all incen- 
tive to acquire more than they can consume from 
year to year. The collection of the taxes is in the 
hands of the local magistracy, which extorts from 
the people all their surplus earnings. So the 



122 THE NEW FAR EAST 

people, knowing that they are unable to keep their 
wealth unless they succeed in concealing it from 
the magistrates, have generally contented them- 
selves with merely raising what they could con- 
sume. Of course, no general prosperity is possible 
under such a government. Notwithstanding its 
wretched administration Korea is out of debt, and 
some experts hold the opinion that the country can 
produce ample revenue to support a competent 
government without burdensome taxation. 

One hears much in Japan about what will be 
accomplished in Korea under Japanese control, 
through the introduction here of millions of Jap- 
anese immigrants who will till the soil and pro- 
duce wealth. It seems to me that this is taking 
much for granted. If the Japanese will not or 
cannot cultivate their own country profitably, it 
is not to be assumed offhand that they will do in 
Korea what they have not done at home ; besides, 
the immigration so far is almost entirely of the 
commercial and small tradesman class. There is 
a considerable desire on the part of certain classes 
of Japanese to go to Korea, but there are peculiar 
reasons for this. In Korea the Japanese lord it 
over the natives of the country. The average 
Japanese finds his position superior to the Korean 
in a similar station of life. Even the Japanese 
coolie finds a still meaner coolie to do his heavier 
work and cringe before him. So for the moment 
life in Korea has its attractions to the Japanese, 
and they are coming by thousands. But whether 
this will result in any great benefit to the country 
is still an open question. 



JAPAN IN KOEEA 123 

There is undoubtedly room for a considerable 
development of commerce and the mineral re- 
sources of the country. But it will not be all 
smooth sailing. Even the sorely needed financial 
reform, although sure to better commercial condi- 
tions greatly in the long run, will probably in 
the beginning work a hardship upon the poorer 
classes (it has already begun to do so), as the 
price oi commodities, greatly stimulated by the 
temporary prosperity, will not immediately be- 
come adjusted to the new level. And there is 
likely to be a reaction from the present prosperity, 
which is due almost entirely to the building of 
railways by the Japanese. This work will soon be 
finished, and there is nothing in sight to take its 
place. Wages will drop to their former level, pre- 
ceding the fall in the price of commodities, thus 
decreasing the purchasing power of the people 
without a corresponding reduction of the cost of 
living. If within the next few years Korea does 
not experience a prolonged period of commercial 
and industrial depression it will be cause for as- 
tonishment. 

In Korea Japan has a problem, not necessarily 
an asset, on her hands. 



CHAPTER IX 
MANCHURIA 

Relations of Manchuria to the Far Eastern Question — 
Japan Rebuffed — The Russian Aggression — Re- 
cent Events and Their Significance — Enormous 
Russian Expenditures — Count Witte's PoHcy — 
Admiral Aliexieff's Failure — The Beginning of the 
War — Prosperity of the Chinese Population — 
Later Developments — The Japanese Advance — 
Changes in Conditions — Sufferings of the Chinese 
— Results of the Japanese Administration — Some 
Effects of Martial Law upon Non-combatants. 

The relation of Manchuria to the whole Far 
Eastern question is fundamental. Being the chief 
bone of contention in the war recently ended and 
its battle ground, it naturally becomes a principal 
factor in the settlement. Any final adjustment 
that does not safeguard the political future and 
equitable development of this important part of 
China means a continuance of the chaotic condi- 
tions which have prevailed for the last five years ; 
a situation teeming with causes for international 
irritation and friction, and embodying a constant 
menace to the peace of the world. 

This being true, an examination into the condi- 
tion of this unhappy country, and the forces now 
being brought to bear upon its destiny, partakes 

124 



MANCHUEIA 125 

of the nature of a surgeon's probe feeling its way 
among the complex and vital parts of the human 
body. As accurate knowledge of human anatomy 
directs the probe, so only can a clear understand- 
ing of conditions in Manchuria be relied upon to 
guide international action. Unfortunately, it is 
not easy to reach a clear understanding in this 
instance, for opposing interests are constantly 
exerted to distort and obscure the facts, while 
motives of state are cloaked by the suave and often 
unreliable utterances of diplomacy. However, I 
shall attempt to depict certain more or less signifi- 
cant conditions in Manchuria during the last few 
years ; and in this endeavor I have the advantage 
of having been in the country during three differ- 
ent periods, embracing the Eussian occupation 
prior to the war, the Russian occupation during 
the war, and later during the Japanese occupation 
of the region from which they had dislodged the 
Russians. 

In order to make clear the present situation in 
Manchuria and its relation to the eventual settle- 
ment, a brief review of the history of the country 
during the last decade is almost indispensable. 
Before the war between Japan and China the 
majority of Western nations hardly realized the 
existence of this splendid domain. Undoubtedly 
Russia, owing to territorial contiguity and funda- 
mental interest in Asiatic affairs, was a close ob- 
server of the progress of events in this locality! 
Her plans for the trans-Siberian railway were 
already matured, and the importance of a terminal 
as far south as possible was fully recognized. But 



126 THE NEW FAE EAST 

Russia was content to proceed deliberately and 
with caution. At that time China was assumed to 
be capable of offering effective resistance to for- 
eign aggression, and it was not advisable to draw 
too much attention to Russia's activity. The 
China-Japan war, and its unexpected result, 
brought a change. In this connection it is inter- 
esting to note that from Japan's entrance into 
Asiatic continental affairs the Far Eastern ques- 
tion, as it is now understood, began to take shape. 
In fact, it is perhaps not too much to say that 
Japan created the Far Eastern question in its 
present form, and it is well to keep this in mind in 
attempts to analyze the causes of the recent war, 
and its possible results. 

The defeat of China by Japan, and the conse- 
quent demonstration of China's military impo- 
tence, awoke the Western powers to a realization 
of several important matters. They saw that 
China was incapable of defending herself, that 
Japan was ambitious to establish herself on the 
continent, and that unless the peace terms were 
modified by intervention the dismemberment of 
China had actually begun. Russia, being most 
vitally affected next to China, took the initiative, 
and succeeded in enlisting the support of France 
and Germany to deprive Japan of any territorial 
indemnity except Formosa. It has been the fash- 
ion of late years, especially in the British and 
American press, to criticise Russia's action as de- 
priving Japan of the just fruits of her victory. 
My own opinion, based on considerable familiarity 
with the questions involved, is that the action of 



MANCHUEIA 127 

the three powers was in itself entirely proper and 
conducive to the good of the world. Japan got 
Formosa and a huge indemnity, which more than 
paid the expenses of the war, while for the mo- 
ment the integrity of China was preserved. Great 
Britain and America, both vitally interested in 
protecting China, sat by with folded hands, refus- 
ing to participate in the concert. This was due, 
at that time, to no sympathy with Japan's ambi- 
tions. America's attitude was due to indifference 
and a desire not to meddle, while England 's tradi- 
tional jealousy of Eussia, coupled with good rea- 
sons for remaining neutral, probably led her to 
regard the proposition with suspicion. That the 
action of France, Germany and Eussia was 
prompted by entirely selfish and perhaps ulterior 
motives does not detract from the substantial jus- 
tice of the position taken by them. 

Although the balance of power was for the time 
preserved, two new and vital elements had been 
injected into Far Eastern politics which were sure 
to bear fruit. China was helpless, Japan ambi- 
tious. Here was food for reflection, and the chan- 
celleries began to buzz with the formulation of new 
projects. Eussia, even then scenting the inev- 
itable collision of her ambitions with those of 
Japan, and believing that China was on the verge 
of crumbling, determined to be forehanded in 
pushing a policy designed to bring to her a goodly 
share of the spoils. France, already established 
in the south, began unobtrusively to look after her 
fences in that direction. Germany, with a budding 
trade and an Emperor who, as some one has said. 



128 THE NEW FAR EAST 

is ** looking for interests to protect," lost little 
time in inventing an excuse to seize Kaio-chou Bay 
and establish a ' ' sphere of influence ' ' in Shantung. 
England demanded and secured a lease of Wei- 
hai-wei and some adjacent territory, while Russia 
succeeded in negotiating a lease of Port Arthur. 
These events came rapidly, and each was largely 
the cause or result of the others. All of them had 
their direct origin in the China-Japan war, begun 
by Japan in pursuance of the ambitions born of 
her rehabilitation. For the time disappointed, 
Japan accepted her repulse with such grace as she 
could assume, and quietly devoted her energy to 
preparing to renew the fight for a foothold on the 
continent when favorable opportunity offered. 
'-■ Meanwhile Russia, having secured permission 
from China to build the Manchurian branch of 
the trans-Siberian railway from Harbin to Port 
Arthur, pushed forward energetically the work 
of gradually converting that large and fertile re- 
gion into a Russian adjunct. In this she was 
favored by circumstances, being able to partially 
veil her political activity behind the terms of the 
railway franchise, while the *' boxer" disturbances 
afforded an excuse to send large bodies of troops 
into the country. Thus she pushed her troops and 
colonists along with the construction gangs in such 
a manner that the encroachment was for a tim^ 
almost imperceptible. That Russia's advance 
through Manchuria was of immense and lasting 
material benefit to the country and its inhabitants 
will not be denied except by the most incorrigible 
Russophobe. She found the country almost with- 



MANCHURIA 129 

out a government worthy of the name, prospering 
after a fashion, it is true, because of the industry 
of the people and the magnificent natural resources 
of the land. Gradually, and without interfering to 
any great degree with Chinese administrative proc- 
esses, although the mailed fist was unhesitatingly 
employed when occasion demanded, order and a 
security before unknown were achieved. It is 
roughly estimated that from the time the Russians 
began the construction of that part of the railway 
which runs through Manchuria to the beginning 
of the war they spent 300,000,000 roubles ($150,- 
000,000) in the country. Nearly all of this went 
into the hands of the Chinese population. The 
general trade of the country, both foreign and do- 
mestic, grew with remarkable rapidity. Many 
enterprises designed to develop the country were 
inaugurated by the Russians. No less than seven 
flour mills were built at Harbin, and the inhabi- 
tants of the Sungari Valley, which is peculiarly 
adapted for the purpose, were encouraged and as- 
sisted to undertake the culture of wheat. Coal 
fields were opened, giving employment to many. 
The building of new towns and the establish- 
ment of large barracks provided ready markets 
for many kinds of native produce and mate- 
rials. Even the commerce of foreign nations felt 
the general stimulus. This was particularly true, 
up to a certain point, of American and Japanese 
trade. 

This was the situation when Count Witte was 
compelled to resign the direction of Russia's Far 
Eastern affairs, and Admiral Aliexieff substi- 



130 THE NEW FAR EAST 



tuted. Up to tliat time the Russian policy, while 
undoubtedly designed to ultimately bring Man- 
churia and Korea, and, in the event of dismem- 
iberment. North China, under Muscovite control, 
maintained a cautious and pacific course. Count 
iWitte realized that the only hope for success de- 
pended upon making Russian occupation advan- 
tageous to the world at large, including the native 
population, and to this end he directed his wise 
and far-seeing policy. And there is good reason 
to think that had he remained in power the war 
would have been avoided, and without the relin- 
quishment of anything essential to Russia 's ambi- 
tions. Certainly Japan would never have been 
given an opening which enabled her to begin the 
war with the direct sympathy of the nations upon 
which she must depend for financial support. 
However, it took Aliexieff but a short time to undo 
Witte's work. A military policy was substituted 
for a commercial one, and measures taken not only 
to bring Manchuria absolutely under Russian con- 
trol, but to exclude other nations from the privi- 
leges and benefits they had enjoyed under their 
treaties with China. These measures quickly con- 
centrated international attention upon Russia's 
actions, and brought about the diplomatic pres- 
sure, inaugurated by Mr. Hay, to check them by 
causing the Russians to retire from the country. 
From the moment Aliexieff assumed the manage- 
ment of affairs, Russia's designs in Manchuria 
were destined to fail. 

When the war began Manchuria was declared 
to be within the theatre of operations, and Russia, 



MANCHUEIA 131 

the whole of it being at that time under her con- 
trol, established martial law. This martial law 
was, however, of a mild type, and except in some 
comparatively unimportant matters did not seri- 
ously interfere with ordinary affairs. In fact, the 
war brought, in the beginning, quite a boom to the 
country as a whole. Eussia^immediately began to 
assemble large armies and undertake extensive 
works for their accommodation and defence. To 
supply her troops she purchased immense quanti- 
ties of native products, which were paid for in 
cash at unusually high prices. Tens of thousands 
of Chinese were employed in various capacities, at 
greatly increased wages. While, for military rea- 
sons, the Eussian authorities took a somewhat 
tighter grip than formerly upon control of native 
administrative affairs, the general administration 
still remained practically in the hands of the regu- 
lar Chinese officials. I was with the Eussian army 
during this period, and can testify that the treat- 
ment of the Chinese was on the whole just and 
humane. In stating this I claim no altruistic in- 
centive for Eussia. Such a policy was not only 
wise; it was absolutely necessary under the cir- 
cumstances. The supplies in the country were 
needed for the Eussian army, and it was only by 
offering the inducements of good prices and fair 
dealing that ready and prompt delivery could be 
secured. There is little ground for the accusations 
made so freely in the pro-Japanese press, that the 
Eussian military authorities compelled the Chi- 
nese to sell their possessions against their will. |j 
So far as I could observe, the Chinese were, as a * 



132 THE NEW FAR EAST 

rule, not only willing but anxious to sell. And why 
not? Horses and mules, within three months after 
the war began, were bringing three times their 
usual price, and nearly all other products ad- 
vanced in like proportion. Work was plentiful at 
high wages. The country had just enjoyed several 
good seasons and was, chiefly owing to the large 
sums spent during the previous years by Russia, 
unusually prosperous. The merchants had accu- 
mulated large stocks, while even the poorest 
farmer had at least some vegetables, fowls and 
eggs to sell. And there was a good market for 
almost everything useful or edible. Even in re- 
spect to dealing with Chinese who were suspected 
of acting as spies for the Japanese, the Russians 
were leniently careless — too careless, in fact. Such 
were general conditions during the earlier part 
of the war, while the greater part of southern and 
central Manchuria was occupied by the Russian 
army. 

Later war swept a broad and bloody path 
through the heart of that fertile and beautiful 
land. The Japanese armies steadily advanced, 
until when the war ended they were well into 
Manchuria, with the best and most thickly popu- 
lated sections of the country under their control. 
Naturally, many changes could be observed upon 
my return to Manchuria, in the summer of 1905. 
These changes may be divided into two general 
classes — those due to the inevitable devastation of 
war, and those resulting from Japanese adminis- 
tration of the provinces wrested from the Rus- 
sians. 



MANCHURIA 133 

Since responsibility for the detriments to a 
country ravaged by war is jointly shared, as a 
general rule, by the belligerents, it is well to 
consider them first. In Manchuria these detri- 
ments were much the same as those which invari- 
ably attend war in any country, but circumstances 
were such as materially to augment both their ex- 
tent and effect. This war was of a magnitude 
rarely equalled, and embraced within the actual 
scope of conflict an almost unparalleled area. 
Add to these conditions the fact that the principal 
operations were in a densely populated and 
highly cultivated region, and the reasons for 
certain results become clear. After the battle of 
Liao-yang (September, 1904) the Eussian army 
retreated to a position extending generally from 
east to west along a small stream called the 
Sha-ho. Here it was soon confronted by the main 
Japanese army, and the hostile forces went into 
winter quarters and remained comparatively in- 
active for several months. During this period the 
country occupied by the two armies covered ap- 
proximately an area of fifty by twenty miles, lying 
in the valleys of the Liao Eiver and its tributaries, 
and which supports a Chinese population of about 
two millions. In this region, before the war, the 
traveller was never out of sight of half a dozen 
villages, and almost every acre of land was in cul- 
tivation. 

The passage of the war trail left this country 
desolate. There were two principal reasons for 
this. As the winter of 1904-05 came on, the de- 
mand for fuel became imperative, and it was per- 



134 THE NEW FAE EAST 

haps inevitable that as soon as the little that 
remained of standing timber was exhausted, the 
troops should begin to burn the materials which 
composed the homes and furniture of the Chinese. 
Passively succumbing to necessity many Chinese 
within the Russian lines demolished their homes 
and sold the material to the Russians for fuel, for 
which they received a substantial (in the aggre- 
gate) but inadequate remuneration. Some of 
these homeless ones had no alternative than to 
drift back to Moukden, where they congregated 
in the course of the winter to the estimated num- 
ber of 100,000. It is permissible, perhaps, some- 
times to pause, in discussing the happenings of 
the war, to pay a passing tribute to what many 
assume to be a non-existent quality — Russian hu- 
manity. These refugees received much considera- 
tion from the Russian military authorities, who 
did a great deal to mitigate their hardships. 
Foodstuffs and other supplies, with which the 
army was none too well supplied, were provided, 
as well as a large contribution of money, and every 
assistance was given the Chinese officials and 
humane organizations in relieving the destitution. 
To some extent the same conditions prevailed 
on the Japanese side. However, since the gen- 
eral movement of the Russian army had been a 
retrograde one, it had accumulated in its retreat 
a large majority of the Chinese refugees, who 
naturally abandoned their habitations in great 
numbers upon the approach of battle. Many of 
the refugees had the means of leaving the country, 
and seeking asylum with relatives and friends in 



MANCHUEIA 135 

China proper, outside the war zone ; and the Eus- 
sian authorities, ignoring for humanitarian and 
common sense reasons the danger of these persons 
carrying military information, interposed no seri- 
ous obstacle to their departure. 

The Japanese military authorities saw fit to 
adopt a different attitude. They did not wait until 
the destruction of their homes compelled the Chi- 
nese to vacate, but soon after the occupation of 
Liao-yang an order was issued that no Chinese 
were permitted to remain within a designated area 
embracing the zone of actual contact. The chief 
reason given for this wholesale eviction was that 
the Japanese army could not run the risk of these 
Chinese carrying information about military 
movements to the enemy. So were several hun- 
dred thousand peaceful Chinese compelled to 
abandon their homes and the greater part of their 
possessions and seek shelter elsewhere. Nor were 
they, as on the Russian side of the line, permitted 
to leave the country. For fear they would give 
information, they were confined to certain limits 
under pain of death for any infraction of the regu- 
lation. It is worthy of remark, in passing, that 
this regulation did not, of course, prevent many 
Chinese from slipping across the border into 
China, who could have easily turned informers 
had they the desire and knowledge; but it did 
succeed in working a needless hardship upon 
scores of thousands, who were thus thrown back 
upon the charity of a population already ex- 
hausted by the passage of the war dragon. Some 
thirty thousand of these refugees assembled in 



136 THE NEW FAE EAST 

Liao-yang and many others in the larger towns, 
where they received such succor as offered. Here 
again did Dr. Westwater, Mr. Webster and other 
missionaries exert themselves, as they have so 
often done in the troublous times of the last few 
years ; and the Chinese authorities, as far as they 
were able, responded to the call. Although the 
attitude of the Japanese military authorities was 
such as to hamper external relief, considerable 
quantities of supplies and materials were, in the 
course of the spring and summer of 1905, sent 
through from China to relieve the immediate needs 
of these refugees and enable them to again become 
self-sustaining. 

Early in 1905 occurred the great battle of 
Moukden, which swept the Eussian army back for 
another hundred miles and transferred the area 
of contact to the northern watershed, drained by 
the Sungari and its tributaries. Soon after this 
battle an order was issued by the Japanese mili- 
tary authorities giving permission to the Chinese 
who had been ejected from their habitations in 
the Sha-ho region to return to their homes. But 
many of them had no homes to go to. An area 
of about 1,500 square miles had been largely 
stripped of buildings and visible improvements, 
except those used by the combatants for military 
and other purposes. Here and there one of the 
larger towns, which had been conveniently situ- 
ated for a hospital or military base, had been 
spared, but a great majority of the villages had 
vanished. Gone also were household articles and 
agricultural implements, and cattle, fowls and 



MANCHURIA 137 

seeds necessary for sustenance and the planting 
and cultivation of new crops. Thus were a ma- 
jority of these unfortunates practically debarred 
from resuming their customary avocations, owing 
to lack of tools and means to sustain life until a 
crop could be raised. Here and there some, with 
a courage and patience few peoples could equal, 
raised a roof over the crumbling walls of their 
former homes, and with such implements and 
seeds as they could secure began to put in a crop. 
But it soon developed that this was attended with 
great danger within the battle zone. During the 
previous winter both belligerents had planted 
mines along the lines, while thousands of unex- 
ploded shells were lying everywhere. Reports 
received in Liao-yang during the planting season 
indicated that probably as many as fifty Chinese 
farmers were killed by these mines and shells. 
This mortality is not in itself so terrifying, but the 
manner of death seriously alarmed the Chinese, 
who were afraid to work the fields which had been 
fought over. Under such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that not more than half a crop should 
have been planted in 1905 in the eastern part of 
the Liao valley, a fact that meant much depriva- 
tion among the population during the next winter. 
Of course, thousands of Chinese were killed and 
maimed in the course of the fighting, but that was 
apparently regarded as a minor result of the war 
to non-combatants. The Japanese Government 
has not yet reimbursed the evicted Chinese for 
the damage they sustained, although some were 
given warrants acknowledging the indebtedness. 



138 THE NEW FAE EAST 

which were still uncollectible long after they were 
received. 

Far the most significant changes brought by the 
war in conditions in central and southern Man- 
churia belong to the second class — those resulting 
directly and indirectly from the Japanese occu- 
pation. It may be well to state at once that under 
Japanese administration the condition of the Chi- 
nese population altered very much for the worse, 
and that a vast majority would even to-day wel- 
come the return of the Eussians. This statement, 
I know, runs contrary to the fiction that the Chi- 
nese regard the Japanese as liberators who fought 
China's battles against a hated foreign conqueror, 
which has been widely disseminated. And it 
would be hardly fair to the Japanese to let it stand 
without explanation, for while much of the anti- 
Japanese sentiment now prevailing among all 
classes of Chinese in Manchuria is undoubtedly 
due to past and present military administrative 
measures, much arises from conditions for which 
the Japanese cannot be held entirely responsible, 
but which are the result of what had gone before. 

Since a majority of the measures which are 
causing so much discontent among the Chinese are 
traceable to the Japanese military administration, 
a brief outline of its working system during the 
war will throw much light on the subject. Imme- 
diately upon their occupation of a district, the 
Japanese authorities issued proclamations to the 
Chinese and foreigners, except Japanese, who re- 
sided there, informing them that martial law was 
established and conveying a warning against the 



MANCHURIA 139 

commission of certain acts. The principal procla- 
mations threatened with summary death persons 
who communicated to any one information about 
the movements or condition of the Japanese 
army; those who in any way damaged that part 
of the railway under Japanese control; those 
who interrupted or damaged any Japanese tele- 
graph or telephone line; persons who held any 
communication with the Eussians or their agents, 
and the same penalty was attached to a number 
of other offences. Another proclamation offered 
rewards for information regarding the move- 
ments or condition of the enemy, of the presence 
of spies, and of persons who committed any of 
the acts prohibited by the general proclamations. 
These proclamations, in Chinese and English, 
stared one in the face about Newchwang and 
other places. 

However, no reasonable objection can be made 
to such regulations in themselves, as military 
measures, although the moral paradox of provid- 
ing death and a pecuniary reward for the same 
act, reversed as to its application, may have oc- 
curred even to the Chinese. While they did not to 
the same extent flaunt threats in the faces of the 
people, the Russians enforced similar regulations, 
and they are usual in war. Much depends upon 
the method of enforcement. It will be easily per- 
ceived that a very delicate question of human 
rights is here involved. Here were millions of 
people, not parties to the war, which was waged 
over their country without their consent. Cir- 
cumstances compelled them to have relations with 



140 THE NEW FAR EAST 

both belligerents under conditions which placed 
the non-combatant population completely at the 
mercy of the military. I assert without hesitation 
my opinion that in so far as the Russians erred at 
all in dealing with the Chinese population during 
the war, it was on the side of leniency. I am also 
convinced that the Japanese erred most decidedly 
in the opposite direction. 

There was, as the war progressed, a noticeable 
change in the general character of the Japanese 
military administration. Early in the war, while 
only a comparatively small and thinly populated 
section of the country was under Japanese con- 
trol, their attitude toward the Chinese seems to 
have been characterized by moderation. It was 
considered important at that time to maintain the 
* * liberator" pose, with a view to its effect upon the 
public sentiment of the world, and also to encour- 
age a friendly disposition toward Japan among 
the native population further north. And the 
policy was not entirely without success in this re- 
spect, although the people of southern Manchuria 
retained a lively recollection of the Japanese in- 
vasion of ten years before. When I was in central 
Manchuria early in the war many Chinese re- 
garded the Japanese advance with favor, and 
hoped for better conditions from it. This senti- 
ment accrued considerably to the advantage of the 
Japanese army, and brought to it military infor- 
mation of value, while at the same time acting 
adversely upon the Russian service of security 
and information. However, by the middle of sum- 
mer, 1904, reports indicating dissatisfaction 



MANCHURIA 141 

among Chinese officials in the country occupied 
by the Japanese began to reach us at Liao-yang 
and Moukden; but I was at that time inclined to 
regard them as Russian canards, although they 
came, as a rule, from Chinese sources. Still, there 
was no general feeling of apprehension at the 
approach of the Japanese army, beyond the 
anxiety naturally connected with residence in a 
war zone. 



CHAPTER X 

THE JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 

Second Year of the War — The Japanese Administra , 
tion — Insecurity of Life Among the Chinese Popu- 
lation — Summary Executions — "Ex post facto" 
Regulations — Effects of the Advance of the Jap- 
anese Armies — Work of Spies and Informers — 
Military Regulations for the Conduct of Non-com- 
batants — Japanese Camp-followers — Hardships of 
the Chinese — Chinese Financial Losses — Confis- 
cation of Chinese Property. 

When, in the summer of 1905, I returned to 
Manchuria, a year had passed ; a year of uninter- 
rupted success to Japanese arms on land and sea. 
Almost the whole of southern Manchuria was 
occupied by the Japanese armies and subject 
to their military administration. Screened by 
a military censorship which prevented as far as 
possible publicity concerning events in the coun- 
try, except such as was given out at Tokyo, mar- 
tial law was bringing its rigors to bear upon 
the advancement of a political and commercial 
policy. The necessity for moderation no longer 
existed in the same degree as formerly, and as a 
consequence the military administration treated 
the native population just as it saw fit. Naturally, 

142 



JAPANESE IN MANCHUEIA 143 

the effects of this administration were felt in many 
ways, directly and indirectly, and an explanation 
of some of the then existing conditions may illumi- 
nate the whole subject. For purpose of general 
classification, these effects may be discussed un- 
der two headings — effects upon the lives and upon 
the property of non-combatants. 

Although it does not entirely accord with the 
Oriental view. Western moral ideals consider a 
man's life of greater importance than his prop- 
erty, so I will discuss the former phase first. To 
begin with my conclusion, the life of a Chinese in 
this part of Manchuria was during the war period, 
and even now is to a large extent absolutely at the 
mercy of the Japanese military administrators. 
It is true that the usual law of the land was and 
now is nominally in force. A man accused of any 
ordinary crime or misdemeanor will, as a rule, be 
apprehended by the Chinese officials and tried and 
punished, if found guilty, by customar;;^ process. 
It would have been impracticable, even if desir- 
able, for the Japanese entirely to take into their 
own hands the administration of local affairs, for 
it would have required more administrators than 
could then be spared, besides having a tendency to 
foment local disorder. But behind and above the 
law of the land is another, an overlaw, and this law 
of last resort is under existing conditions nothing 
but the will of the Japanese military administra- 
tion. 

With this fact in mind, the effect of Japanese 
martial law upon security of life among the Chi- 
nese population has added interest. The proc- 



144 THE NEW FAE EAST 

lamations which I have briefly summarized enii- 
merated a number of offences punishable by 
death. It is not possible, at present, to obtain 
exact figures relating to the number of Chinese 
who have been executed by the Japanese since 
they have been in control of the country; for in 
many instances a man was arrested and not heard 
from again by his relatives and friends, his fate 
remaining a matter of moral certainty, but indefi- 
nite information. But I was, while in Manchuria, 
able to talk with a number of foreigners and Chi- 
nese on whom I rely, for various reasons, and 
who are in a position to be well informed about 
what was going on; and they told me that the 
number of summary executions of Chinese by 
the Japanese military authorities has run into the 
hundreds. All sorts of charges form the basis of 
these executions, but they all hark back to the 
proclamations already mentioned. It will be 
noted that the terms of those proclamations are 
extremely elastic. For instance, holding commu- 
nication with the enemy and his agents was pun- 
ishable by death, but no exact or even approximate 
definition of what constituted such communica- 
tion was given. And so with the other clauses. 
But the Japanese were not satisfied with enforc- 
ing their regulations from the time they assumed 
authority over the country. They gave an ex 
post facto interpretation to them. There is no 
doubt that they executed many Chinese, some of 
them high officials, on account of their relations 
with the Russians during the period of Russian 
occupation. 



JAPANESE IN MANCHUEIA 145 

When the framers of the Constitution of the 
United States inserted a clause prohibiting ex 
post facto laws in any form, they merely recog- 
nized and safeguarded one of the fundamental 
principles of human justice. An examination of 
certain conditions in Manchuria during the war 
clearly illustrates the application of retroactive 
regulations by the Japanese. It should be remem- 
bered that for several years the Chinese popula- 
tion had been practically under Eussian military 
authority, which they were powerless to resist. 
Owing to the immense improvements undertaken 
by the Eussians, and the enormous expenditure 
made necessary by the war, millions of roubles 
had been put in circulation, and the people had 
become somewhat accustomed to the use of Eus- 
sian currency. They could not have well refused 
this money had they desired, but as soon as they 
learned that it had a stable value it was received 
willingly, as any other good money would have 
been. It was also inevitable that the Chinese 
officials should, from the necessities of the situa- 
tion, remain on as good terms as possible with 
the Eussian authorities, and it may be assumed 
that many of them, from sincere or pecuniary 
motives, sympathized with Eussia in the conflict. 
And who will deny the right of a Chinese in Man- 
churia to form and hold his own opinion in a mat- 
ter like this ? 

This was the general situation when, by the ad- 
vance of the Japanese armies, one mailed hand 
was exchanged for another in the control of the 
country. The Japanese posted the cities and 



146 THE NEW FAE EAST 

towns with their proclamations and set to work to 
enforce them. Then began a state of affairs 
which, had it occurred in the Balkans or in Man- 
churia under Eussian control, would quickly have 
resounded through the world. During the Eus- 
sian occupation prior to the war, the Japanese 
Government had sent hundreds of Japanese into 
the country with instructions to adopt the dress 
of the Chinese and domesticate themselves; and 
many of these persons succeeded in escaping de- 
tection after hostilities commenced, remaining to 
act as spies and secret agents. Also were many 
Chinese in the employ of the Japanese. No 
sooner did the Japanese armies occupy the coun- 
try, and promulgate their military regulations, 
than these informers came out of their retirement 
and quickly assumed a position of importance. 
They pointed out to the Japanese authorities 
Chinese who were known or suspected to sym- 
pathize with or have business relations with the 
Eussians. It mattered little that the men thus 
accused might be of high standing, and the fact 
that a majority of them, especially officials, could 
not have avoided relations with the Eussians. 
Many were executed upon the witness of these 
professional informers, often without even a sem- 
blance of a trial. The regulations provided that 
Chinese who knew of any infraction of them and 
failed to inform the authorities were punishable 
by death ; while many were tortured in attempts to 
force them to disclose military information. It is 
hardly necessary to point out, even assuming that 
the Japanese military authorities were justified 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 147 

in taking extreme measures, the abuses which lurk 
in such a method. Here was opportunity for petty 
and venal natures to vent personal enmities and 
spites. And there was the additional stimulus of 
large rewards. One of the military proclamations 
expressly offered an increased reward for infor- 
mation of this nature, and in a country like China 
such an inducement could not fail to bear fruit. 

There came also, in the trail of the armies, thou- 
sands of Japanese coolies of the meaner sort, who 
seem to regard the Chinese as conquered people, 
and certainly have, in many instances, treated 
them as such. These camp-followers showered 
petty abuses upon the poorer classes of Chinese, 
who soon learned the futility of resenting such 
actions. At first they would complain to the 
superior Japanese authorities, and occasionally 
secure the punishment of an offender; but they 
found this to be an unprofitable proceeding, for 
it marked them as victims of the informer. It 
was easy to trump up some kind of a charge. I 
have it upon creditable authority that Chinese 
were summarily executed, in the early part of the 
Japanese occupation, on the evidence of their 
having Russian money in their possession. 

The widespread dissatisfaction with Japanese 
administration now prevailing among the Chinese 
is due, however, less to insecurity of life than to 
its effect upon the material prosperity of the peo- 
ple. The inhabitants of Manchuria are used to 
war, and life seems less dear to the Oriental than 
to the Westerner. Even their own government 
has dealt severely and often unjustly with them. 



148 THE NEW FAR EAST 

And in regard to the condition of the country now, 
as compared with the Russian occupation, certain 
vital factors cannot be traced to the Japanese, but 
belong in the category of detriments incidental to 
war, which they have inherited. I have given 
some idea of the condition in which the war left 
a large part of the poorer people, especially the 
inhabitants of the Liao valley and the former 
battle zones. In the first year of the war, with a 
good surplus in hand and excellent crop prospects, 
the Chinese were glad to sell their products at the 
high prices prevailing under the Russian regime, 
and the country was then pretty well stripped of 
produce adaptable to military uses, especially of 
animals. During the second year the demand was 
even greater, but conditions were very different. 
The Chinese then needed such produce as they 
retained to subsist upon, and their remaining ani- 
mals were particularly precious, being absolutely 
indispensable to the planting and cultivation of 
the crops. So where, a year before, to purchase a 
man's horse or mule at a good price was a profit- 
able transaction for him, to compel him to part 
with it under Japanese occupation was a serious 
deprivation. Yet the military necessities of the 
Japanese army compelled frequent requisitions 
upon the country. It was not the fault of the Jap- 
anese that they were occupying a land already 
stripped of its surplus products, but this did not 
alter the effect of conditions upon the native popu- 
lation. 

Fully recognizing this, there still is no doubt 
that many matters directly traceable to Japanese 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 149 

administration are responsible for much of the 
discontent. With the appearance of the Jap the 
era of high prices passed. The Japanese is not 
by nature and habit a **free spender" like the 
Eussian, and besides he is thoroughly acquainted 
with values in this part of the world. So he at 
once put commercial and industrial affairs on a 
normal basis ; a usually unfair proceeding, when it 
is considered that the purchaser not only fixed the 
price but also, when he chose, compelled the pos- 
sessor to sell. In other words, the Japanese mili- 
tary authorities ''commandeered" supplies wher- 
ever they could get them at prices which suited 
themselves, but which generally did not at all suit 
the former owners. Upon occasion this procedure 
was scarcely less than absolute confiscation. For 
instance, during the Russian occupation many 
Chinese merchants, taking advantage of the un- 
usual demand, brought large stocks of goods into 
the country, which they were able to dispose of at 
a good profit. Since many of these articles were 
principally consumed by the Russians and other 
foreigners, and were not of a character used by 
Orientals to any great extent, the finding of them 
in possession of native merchants was considered 
by the Japanese military authorities as ample 
warrant to seize the goods, and often to imprison 
or put to death the possessor. Even where it could 
not be positively shown that the Chinese had been 
dealing with the Russians, their stocks were often 
taken by the Japanese on a valuation fixed by 
their own appraisement, a transaction which rep- 
resented ruin to many merchants, since it did not 



150 THE NEW FAE EAST 

reimburse them for their property mider the con- 
ditions surrounding its acquisition and transport. 
Wages were also cut in two, and thousands thrown 
out of employment, so the change in conditions 
touched all classes. 

But the factor that bore hardest upon the Chi- 
nese population was the result of changes in the 
circulating medium which followed immediately 
upon Japanese occupation. I have mentioned the 
introduction of the rouble into circulation, and the 
reason for it. Early in the war the rouble, under 
the influence of the speculative manipulation so 
common throughout the East, fluctuated consid- 
erably; but as time passed the people became ac- 
quainted with its value and accustomed to its use, 
and it passed at par, less the discount attendant 
upon converting it into silver. The sudden influx 
of the Japanese naturally found large sums of 
Eussian currency in the possession of the Chinese, 
amounting in the aggregate to many millions of 
roubles. One of the first acts of the Japanese ad- 
ministration was practically to outlaw the rouble, 
and while there may have been no calculated con- 
nection between this action and certain results 
from it, there can be no question as to the relation 
of one to the other. The country had been but a 
short time under Japanese administration when 
it became known among the Chinese that to be 
found in possession of any considerable amount of 
Eussian currency would lead to almost certain 
arrest and possibly death. This had the natural 
result of creating a panic, and the people were 
anxious to get rid of their roubles at almost any 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 151 

price. Under Eussian control there had been no 
great difficulty about sending the roubles down to 
Tientsin and other parts of China, where they 
could be exchanged into other currency, or depos- 
ited in the banks subject to draft, and Chinese 
bankers did a thriving business of this nature. 
But the Japanese authorities levied an embargo 
upon this, and the Chinese possessor of Russian 
currency found himself unable to spend his money 
in the country and equally unable, except at con- 
siderable risk, to exchange it for other money. So 
the rouble dropped and dropped. Here was a fine 
speculative opportunity, which was not neglected. 
Alarming reports were circulated, representing 
the rouble to be now valueless. Certain commer- 
cial houses sent their agents among the people to 
buy up the roubles, which they secured as low as 
fifty per cent, of their real value. 

A haze of official reticence obscures the details 
of this remarkable transaction, but certain points 
stand out plainly enough. As soon as the Japan- 
ese occupied Newchwang, the branch there of the 
Yokohama Specie Bank was reopened, and this 
bank made the fiscal agent of the Japanese Gov- 
ernment in Manchuria. For use in paying the 
expenses of the army in Manchuria and Korea, 
the Japanese Government had issued a paper cur- 
rency in small denominations, known as ''war 
notes." These notes were made on their face 
redeemable in silver whenever presented at a 
fiscal agency of the Japanese Government. It was 
announced that the notes issued in Manchuria 
would be redeemed at the Tientsin branch of the 



152 THE NEW FAE EAST 

yokohama Specie Bank on certain specified dates. 
The agents sent among the Chinese to buy up rou- 
bles were provided with these notes, although in- 
structed to pay silver when necessary. Naturally 
the Chinese, ignorant of the value of the new cur- 
rency, wished to exchange their roubles for silver, 
but when pressed to accept the Japanese war notes 
were afraid to refuse, and millions of yen were 
thus accepted at par. There is good reason to 
think that many of the roubles thus secured found 
their way to the Yokohama Specie Bank, which 
sent them to Tientsin, where they were then and 
always have been worth practically face value. 
Undoubtedly many people profited by this neat 
financial speculation, including some Chinese and 
foreign commercial houses, whose association with 
the Japanese authorities is known to be somewhat 
closer than merely friendly. 

Its effects upon the generally poor and ignorant 
Chinese who thus disposed of their Eussian money 
did not, however, at once terminate. Within a 
month or two after their introduction the ''war 
notes" began to depreciate. On the occasion of 
the first date set for their redemption at the Yoko- 
hama Specie Bank in Tientsin, so great a crowd 
assembled that the clerical force could not accom- 
modate the people, and banking hours passed with 
two-thirds of the offered notes unredeemed. This 
circumstance, coupled with the regulation which 
made it necessary to send them to Tientsin for re- 
demption, eventually depreciated the notes more 
than twenty per cent., most of which loss fell upon 
the poorer Chinese, who had accepted them for 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 153 

value received or Eussian currency. It is esti- 
mated that millions of dollars were "squeezed" 
out of the Chinese population by this process, 
which represented, as a rule, a dead loss to those 
classes which can least afford it. Later the war 
notes recovered somewhat, and when I was last in 
Manchuria the ordinary receiver, who took them 
at par, did not lose on an average more than ten 
per cent. Thus, with produce rising in value and 
growing scarcer, with prices and wages declining, 
and a depreciated currency backed by no specie 
reserve so far as I could learn, but which they 
were compelled to accept, it is no wonder that the 
Chinese in Manchuria grew discontented. The 
average Chinese is incapable of clearly reasoning 
from cause to effect through a period of any 
extent, and he naturally, as he compares his 
present situation with his prosperity under Eus- 
sian control, attributes his misfortunes entirely 
to the Japanese administration. And there is no 
doubt that the Japanese, in their personal rela- 
tions with them, treat the Chinese with more 
severity than did the Eussians. This statement 
will surprise many whose idea of a Eussian is 
represented by the pictures which in a time of dis- 
order in Eussia are kept standing with slight 
alterations in the London illustrated newspapers, 
and in which a Cossack is usually represented 
applying a knout to some unfortunate, or impal- 
ing a child upon his lance. But I assert it to be 
substantially a fact, nevertheless. An English 
resident of Manchuria, in speaking to me upon 
the way the Japanese authorities have succeeded 



154 THE NEW FAE EAST 

in breaking the spirit of the Chinese, tersely 
said: 

''The Japs know how to put the fear of God 
into their souls." 

In the greater part of the country controlled by 
the Japanese, especially away from the observa- 
tion of foreigners, a Chinese could not, during the 
war, call his life or property his own, and lived in 
constant fear of the military informer. This is 
none the less true because most correspondents, in 
the presence of more striking events, overlooked 
or chose to ignore the humbler tragedy which the 
war brought to millions of non-combatants in 
Manchuria. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 
CONCLUDED 

Effects of the Japanese Occupation of Manchuria upon 
Foreign Interests — Mihtary Control of Ports of 
Entry — Some Effects upon American Trade — 
Disreputable Methods of Competition — Military 
Blockade upon Commerce — Japanese Colonization 
of Manchuria — Japanese Judicial Jurisdiction — 
Judicial Discrimination against Foreigners — Jap- 
anese Judicial Supervision over the Chinese — The 
" Hung-hutzes" — The Neutral Border — Russian 
and Japanese Military Use of "Hung-hutzes" — 
General Nogi's Flank Movement — China's Neu- 
trality — Old "Fakes" Revived. 

No INQUIRY into the situation created in Man- 
churia by the war would be complete without some 
examination of the effects of the Japanese occupa- 
tion, so far as it has gone, upon foreign interests 
in the country. This was the rock upon which the 
Russian policy first came to grief. And the ten- 
dencies of Japanese administration have a signifi- 
cance far beyond present results. 

Next to Japan, America had the largest trade 
in Manchuria prior to the war. During the Rus- 
sian occupation, even for long after hostilities 
began, American trade increased rapidly. This 
was not due to Russian favoritism, but because 

155 



156 THE NEW FAR EAST 

some American products had already obtained a 
good foothold in the country, and many of them 
are of a character useful to the Russian army. 
Far from interposing obstacles to their entry, the 
Russian military authorities exerted themselves 
to bring them in. No conclusion is to be drawn 
from this except that, as a general rule, it is 
advantageous for the Russians to purchase some 
kinds of American goods, while it is disadvan- 
tageous to the Japanese. 

"When, by the seizure of Dalny, Port Arthur and 
Newchwang, all the important Manchurian ports 
of entry passed into the hands of the Japanese, a 
gradual change commenced to develop, which for 
a time almost put a stop to American and other 
foreign trade in the country. Here again we find 
this resulting from causes arising out of two gen- 
eral conditions — the inevitable detriments of war, 
and the administrative measures of the Japanese 
military authorities. Far the greater detriments, 
as indicated by developments so far, have arisen 
from the former cause, but those springing from 
the latter cause have more significance. 

Until the battle of Moukden, whereby the Rus- 
sians lost touch with Sin-min-tun, the northern 
terminus of the Imperial Railways of North China, 
a gateway by which goods could enter that part of 
Manchuria under Russian control remained open, 
and immense quantities of merchandise for the 
Russian army and the uses of the Chinese popula- 
tion passed through constantly. The taking of 
Moukden, and consequent occupation of Sin-min- 
tun by the Japanese, cut off this avenue of trans- 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 157 

portation. Assiuniiig that the Japanese were jus- 
tified during the war, in order to prevent supplies 
from reaching the Eussian army, in entirely inter- 
rupting all traffic into northern Manchuria, it was 
nevertheless a hardship upon the native popula- 
tion, who found both their source of certain sup- 
plies and their chief market cut off. And m so 
far as their supplies were derived from foreign 
products, the interests of foreign nations also 
suffered, and will continue to do so while such 
conditions last. But southern Manchuria was then 
under the control of the Japanese, and the mili- 
tary reasons which may be assumed by some to 
justify interruption of commercial communication 
with northern Manchuria did not apply there. 
All goods then entering southern Manchuria were 
either consumed by the Chinese population or 
accrued to the use of the Japanese army. It may 
be a matter of regret to the foreign manufacturer 
or producer that the habits of the Japanese cause 
them to use comparatively little, especially in their 
military operations, of ordinary foreign products, 
but it can hardly be made a matter of complaint. 
However, the foreign producer, even under war 
conditions, retains an interest, and a legitimate 
interest, in the consuming habits and purchasing 
ability of the Chinese population of Manchuria, 
where he has spent years in inducing them to 
accept and use his merchandise. It is interesting, 
then, to note some of the effects of Japanese ad- 
ministration upon foreign trade in the region 
under its control. 

In discussing this subject I will chiefly adhere. 



158 THE NEW FAR EAST 

in selecting episodes for purpose of illustration, 
to those affecting American interests, because, 
while illuminating the principle involved, they are, 
next to the Japanese, the most extensive both in 
actuality and prospect, and may be assumed to 
more nearly touch the readers of these pages. 
The principal American trade in Manchuria is in 
various kinds of cotton goods, flour, oil and a 
number of minor food products, such as tobacco 
and condensed milk. This enumeration is not, of 
course, intended to be comprehensive. Under 
Russian occupation, especially after great armies 
were assembled, a large trade grew up in products 
used solely by this white population, which may be 
regarded as temporary unless Russia should even- 
tually annex or control the country, or part of it. 
So that trade may properly be left out of consid- 
eration in this discussion, although its elimination 
seriously affected American trading firms in the 
Far East. But certain manifestations directly 
and perhaps permanently affecting that part of 
American trade which has been considered to be 
stable are cropping up under Japanese adminis- 
tration, and some of them have an appearance 
that greatly disturbs Americans and other for- 
eigners having commercial and property interests 
in Manchuria. 

After the war with China, the Japanese Govern- 
ment used a considerable part of the large indem- 
nity it received to establish and subsidize foreign 
industries in Japan. One of these industries is the 
manufacture of cotton goods, with which it hoped 
to supply a major part of the home demand, and 



JAPANESE IN MANCHUEIA 159 

to compete with American and European products 
in China. So far, the results have been rather dis- 
appointing ; and to-day the Japanese Government, 
financially crippled by the late war, sees the 
subsidized industries so important to its commer- 
cial future languishing and still unable to stand 
unassisted, while at the same time it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to continue the subsidies. 
This statement applies to more than cotton manu- 
factures in Japan. No sooner had the Japanese 
secured control of trade in Manchuria, by occupa- 
tion of all the entry ports, than measures were 
taken to obstruct the importation of foreign 
goods. Our old acquaintance, ** military neces- 
sity," so variously useful in the late war, was of 
course the instrument employed. I will not un- 
dertake to delineate the many and often subtle 
methods by which it has been made extremely 
difficult and often impossible to import foreign 
goods into the country. Naturally, all foreign 
goods were not materially affected. Trade in cer- 
tain articles even increased, on account of the 
inmaediate requirements of the Japanese army. 
It was only since the last inlet to Manchuria was 
closed that the shoe began to pinch in earnest, 
and at present nearly every line of American 
goods having a sale in that part of the country 
held by the Japanese is being adversely affected. 
Nor do the increasing poverty of the Chinese and 
the recent existence of a state of war altogether 
explain this condition. 

Cloaked by the advance of the Japanese armies 
and protected from publicity by the censorship, a 



160 THE NEW FAR EAST 

movement of great political and commercial sig- 
nificance is going on in Manchuria. This is the 
colonization by Japanese immigrants of a number 
of the larger cities and towns. It is similar to the 
colonization of Korea, except that here it was 
kept under cover until very recently, and a calcu- 
lated attempt made to give the impression that the 
introduction of large numbers of Japanese civil- 
ians was merely connected with the military oper- 
ations. Of late, however, this mask has been to 
some extent discarded, and the Japanese news- 
papers are permitted guardedly to refer to the 
subject. A majority of these immigrants are 
traders and artisans, with a sprinkling of official 
and professional people. At Liao-yang, Hai- 
cheng, Kai-ping and Newchwang there are now 
large and apparently thriving colonies, and a Jap- 
anese concession is being laid out at Moukden. It 
may be remarked, in passing, that this coloniza- 
tion is directly contrary to the published treaty 
now in force between Japan and China, except in 
regard to the treaty ports of Newchwang and 
Antung. These immigrants, under the protection 
and with the direct assistance of the military au- 
thorities, are opening shops and engaging in all 
kinds of enterprises. Already has the military 
administration supported some of these immi- 
grants in unwarranted property claims against 
the Chinese, and even, in a few instances that I 
know of, against foreigners. 

I introduced this matter of Japanese immigra- 
tion into Manchuria here, however, not to call 
attention to its political significance, but to point 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 161 

out certain effects it is having upon foreign, and 
particularly American commercial interests. Take 
the item of cotton fabrics. Every commercial 
house that has ever done business in the Far East 
knows the importance the Chinese attach to the 
trade-mark of an article, or the "chop," to use 
the vernacular. Certain brands of cotton goods 
manufactured in America have become well and 
favorably known in Manchuria, where they find 
a ready sale, and this is true of other lines. 
Since the Japanese occupation it has been difficult 
to import these goods into Manchuria, and go- 
downs at Shanghai and Tientsin were, when the 
war ended, filled with cases awaiting shipment. 
Shortly before peace was made the Shanghai 
Chamber of Commerce, an institution represent- 
ing all nationalities, addressed the Japanese au- 
thorities regarding the embargo upon trade, and 
received a polite reply, stating that the military 
officials, while keenly regretting the detrimental 
effect of the war upon commerce, did not see their 
way to modify the regulations then. But while 
** military necessity" did not permit, except such 
as were required by the Japanese themselves, the 
importation of foreign goods into the country, the 
Japanese traders and commercial agents were 
making the most of the opportunity thus afforded. 
And they are not scrupulous about the methods 
employed. For instance, I have seen counterfeit 
labels of three brands of American cottons pasted 
upon fabrics of similar color and appearance. The 
counterfeit labels are poor imitations, and easily 
detected, but are quite sufficient to deceive the 



162 THE NEW FAE EAST 

Chinese purchaser who cannot read English. 
"Where can the goods which are thus being pushed 
under false colors come from if not from Japan? 
I have no proof that they do come from there, 
but an understanding of all the surrounding con- 
ditions makes it a moral certainty. I have also 
seen counterfeits of the labels of American tinned 
meats, of a brand of condensed milk that has 
a large sale in the Orient, and of a brand of 
American cigarettes until recently made in fac- 
tories taken over from the American owners by 
the Japanese Government when it created its 
tobacco monopoly. There is little reasonable 
doubt that this inferior stuff was brought into the 
country under cover of the protection afforded 
by the military embargo, and foisted upon the 
Chinese as the genuine articles. I was unable to 
determine the extent of this imposition, but know 
it is considerable in the interior, where it is less 
likely to be detected. It is easy to see that its 
effect will be not only to institute an unfair com- 
petition, but ultimately to ruin the reputation of 
the genuine product. I have no proof that the 
Japanese Government is privy to these transac- 
tions, but its relations to at least one of the enter- 
prises thus affected are such as to give ground 
for grave suspicion, even if the surrounding cir- 
cumstances were less convincing. After six 
months of energetic diplomatic pressure at Pe- 
king, the Japanese minister at last induced the 
Chinese Government, in the summer of 1905, to 
refuse to issue passports to all foreigners desiring 
to travel outside the Great Wall, and the American 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 163 

and other ministers apparently acquiesced in the 
ruling. Thus was the door closed upon foreign 
individuals as well as foreign goods. 

In respect to the effect of Japanese administra- 
tion upon foreign property rights in Manchuria 
several cases came to my notice, and I select one 
to use as illustration because it embodies some 
essential and fundamental features. A foreigner 
residing in a town in Manchuria acquired, in the 
course of a somewhat complicated transaction 
with a Chinese, an imperfect title to a piece of real 
estate, which title the Chinese subsequently re- 
fused to perfect, although the foreigner held his 
written agreement to do so. The matter, which 
had originated during the Russian occupation, but 
which was subject to the extra-territorial laws, 
finally reached a point where the foreigner felt it 
necessary to resort to law to compel the Chinese to 
fulfil his agreement. He naturally expected the 
cause to be determined by the consular authorities, 
but found that the Japanese military court had 
assumed jurisdiction over civil affairs. Mean- 
while a number of Japanese immigrants had 
*' squatted'^ on the property and commenced to 
erect buildings. When the foreigner learned this, 
he at once protested to the Japanese authorities, 
and was assured that the building would be 
stopped pending a decision of the case. But un- 
expected delays in the adjudication of the case 
intervened, and meanwhile, notwithstanding the 
assurance of the officials, the Japanese continued 
to build on the property. Renewed protests 
brought renewed assurances, but no relief. My 



164 THE NEW FAE EAST 

last information was that the case had not yet been 
decided ; but the Japanese judge sent to inquire of 
the interested foreigner whether, in the event of 
the decision being given in his favor, he would 
permit the Japanese to remain on the property. 

The incident is so trivial that it would not be 
worthy of mention did it not illustrate a very 
significant point. This happened in a treaty port, 
where subjects or citizens of other nations are sup- 
posed to enjoy the same rights and privileges as 
the Japanese, and where any dealings with Chi- 
nese are regulated by the various treaties with the 
Chinese Government. Yet in this case, and it is 
only one of many of similar character, the Japan- 
ese authorities assumed jurisdiction in litigation 
between a Chinese and a foreigner, in which no 
Japanese interest was involved. The fact that 
the country was, at the time the litigation arose, 
under military law afforded the excuse for claim- 
ing jurisdiction and the power to enforce it; but 
some time after the war ended the Japanese au- 
thorities still continued to exercise jurisdiction in 
such cases and there is no evidence of any genuiae 
intention to relinquish it. It is not necessary to 
multiply these illustrations of the practical opera- 
tion of Japanese administration in Manchuria. 
Enough has probably been related to give an idea 
of the general effect and aim of the administrative 
policy, which is undoubtedly directed from Tokyo, 
upon interests other than Japanese, and from the 
present perhaps some inkling of the future may 
be gleaned. Even if, after conditions have set- 
tled somewhat, foreign diplomatic pressure should 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 165 

secure a modification of these conditions, the in- 
terim will have served to give Japanese commerce 
and industry an advantage. 

In the treatment of Chinese inhabitants, with 
reference to disputes and litigation arising be- 
tween Japanese and Chinese, an even more par- 
tisan attitude has often been adopted in the 
adjudication of causes. Under ordinary circum- 
stances such matters would be decided, outside the 
treaty ports, by the regular Chinese courts. But 
one of the first acts of the Japanese upon occupy- 
ing a locality was to curtail the jurisdiction and 
often to entirely abolish the authority of the Chi- 
nese courts, even in regard to purely Chinese ad- 
ministrative affairs; while, of course, no Chinese 
court was permitted to have anything to say about 
matters involving Japanese. I have mentioned 
the influx of Japanese immigrants under cover of 
military necessity. A great majority of these 
immigrants are of the same low character as those 
in Korea, and their conduct is much the same. 
They have been distributed in all parts of the 
country under Japanese control, where they lost 
no time in establishing themselves as comfortably 
as possible. Nor did they, especially during the 
war, hesitate to take possession of anything they 
fancied. For various reasons easily understood, 
thousands of Chinese, many of them persons of 
substance, abandoned their homes upon the ad- 
vance of the Japanese armies. Many of the non- 
combatant Japanese who came in the wake of 
the armies found these abandoned homes conve- 
nient to their use, and promptly occupied them. 



166 THE NEW FAR EAST 

As time passed and partial order was restored in 
these regions, the refugee Chinese began to return, 
only to find, in many instances, Japanese ' ' squat- 
ters" established in their former homes. Under 
the existing circumstances the only remedy of the 
Chinese lay in an appeal to the courts, which 
meant the adjudication of the issue by a Japanese 
official. 

It is not my purpose to excite indignation 
against Japan by narrating in detail some of the 
specific instances of injustice and lasting injury 
done to Chinese residents of Manchuria under this 
system. The general condition is common to war 
in populated countries, where innocent people be- 
come vicarious sacrifices to circumstances beyond 
their control, and it would have been impossible 
entirely to avoid such manifestations. But it is 
certainly pertinent and proper to indicate some of 
the immediate effects of Japanese administration 
upon the inhabitants. And as to the methods of 
the Japanese authorities, the line of conduct pur- 
sued in the cited case of a foreigner in a treaty 
port may well serve as an example. It is true that 
many Chinese, after long and aggravating delay, 
succeeded in having their property restored to 
them ; but many have so far failed, with little pros- 
pect of ever obtaining possession or satisfactory 
reimbursement. Indeed, conditions have been such 
that hundreds of Chinese who found themselves in 
this predicament have chosen to swallow their loss 
rather than run the risk of becoming the object of 
serious accusations under the provisions of the 
military proclamations, which might be, and often 



JAPANESE IN MANCHUEIA 167 

were under similar circumstances, preferred by 
Japanese threatened with eviction. If, after nor- 
mal conditions are restored in the country and 
Chinese administrative autonomy is permitted to 
resume its functions (in my opinion a remote, 
perhaps never-to-be contingency), the lapse of 
time, the presumption of possession and the diffi- 
culty of producing evidence will operate against 
the chances of the rightful owner obtaining an 
equitable settlement. 

Before passing from special conditions in Man- 
churia and their relations to the broader aspects 
of the Eastern question, it may be well to refer 
to some local manifestations peculiar to this part 
of China, which have been the subject of consid- 
erable comment and misunderstanding. Promi- 
nent in this class is the institution known as 
* ' Hung-hutzes. ' ' To really understand the ' ' hung- 
hutze" organization and its functional relations 
to governmental processes in Manchuria one must 
understand China ; and to know China is difficult. 
I will not attempt to trace the development of 
civilization in this part of the world in order to 
detect the sources of this quaint institution; al- 
though it might reveal in many of its progressive 
phases an analogy to common elements in Western 
life. Suffice to say that there developed in Man- 
churia a social condition where private security, 
outside of cities or the denser populated areas, was 
largely dependent upon the use of paid merce- 
naries. In time these mercenaries extended and to 
some extent perfected an organization, with estab- 
lished rules and recognized chiefs, and gradually 



168 THE NEW FAR EAST 

through common usage came to exercise certain 
functions. To put the matter tersely, the "hung- 
hutze" is a mixture of policeman and robber. It 
is true that regular authority has always regarded 
him as an outlaw ; but by an arrangement similar, 
in its essential features, to the understandings 
that exist between our police and some elements 
of the criminal classes, he was often useful to it, 
and enjoyed considerable immunity so long as his 
operations were confined to certain limits. As a 
result, in a country where central authority is 
unusually weak, the commercial classes formerly 
found it profitable to pay the "hung-hutzes" for 
protection of their junks and caravans. The atti- 
tude of the "hung-hutze" is very simple. "You 
pay me and I will assure safe conduct to you and 
your goods; refuse and I will rob you myself." 
As a rule, the Chinese in Manchuria have found 
that it paid to pay. Naturally, the ' ' hung-hutzes ' ' 
are recruited largely from the disorderly and 
criminal classes, and many ex-soldiers are to be 
found among them. Among a distinctly unmili- 
tary people, coupled with possession of arms, 
which is uncommon, it was at one time easy for 
an organization like this to terrorize outlying 
regions and even, upon occasion, to defy the 
regular authorities. And in a nation where local 
autonomy in government is carried to its extreme 
limit, the central government at Peking was un- 
able to interfere effectively. 

After the "boxer" disorders in north China 
thousands of Chinese who had taken part in the 
attacks upon foreigners, many of them former sol- 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 169 

diers, and who feared punishment, sought safety 
in Mongolia and Manchuria with the **hung- 
hutzes. ' ' Owing to the looting of the great arsenal 
at Tientsin, these former ''boxers" were armed 
with rifles and swords, and possessed plenty of 
ammunition. As a result, the ''hung-hutzes" be- 
came more powerful than ever before. But a new 
force came to oppose them, and, for the first time, 
drag them into the fierce light of international 
publicity. This was the Russian occupation of 
Manchuria. The Russian Government had seized 
the opportunity afforded by the "boxer" trouble 
to send thousands of troops into north China and 
Manchuria, and was seeking excuses to keep them 
there. In this dilemma the "hung-hutzes" served 
the object, and provided employment for the Rus- 
sian soldiers. When the Russians finished with 
them the "hung-hutzes" were crushed as an or- 
ganization, although repeatedly resurrected for 
political purposes. But the human integrals re- 
mained, dispersed among the rural population, 
where were also hidden their arms and equip- 
ments. 

So it was when hostilities between Russia and 
Japan commenced, and Manchuria became the 
scene of the conflict. As soon as war was declared 
John Hay called the attention of the powers to the 
desirability of confining the hostilities to a spe- 
cifically delineated area, which suggestion met 
with general approval. This area was made to 
include Korea and that part of Manchuria lying 
east of the Liao River, which stream marked the 
boundary of the neutral zone ; and both the bellig- 



170 THE NEW FAR EAST 

erent nations formally agreed to the limitation 
and bound themselves to respect it. When the war 
began all the territory contiguous to the neutral 
border was in possession of the Russians. It soon 
became evident that it was necessary to keep a 
close watch upon the boundary, in order to prevent 
if possible the operations of Japanese spies. So 
considerable bodies of Russian cavalry constantly 
patrolled the Liao River, and frequently made in- 
cursions into the neutral zone in pursuit of sus- 
pects or in search of information. This quickly 
attracted the attention of the Japanese minister 
at Peking, who promptly protested that the Rus- 
sians were violating the neutrahty of China, and 
the cables carried the charge over the world. At 
that time the Japanese were not in a position to 
come in military contact with the neutral zone, but 
they expected to be, and were acting on the well- 
used diplomatic canon: ''Accuse your antagonist 
first. '» 

The Russian authorities replied that their 
trifling incursions into neutral territory were 
made necessary by the fact that Japanese agents 
were engaged in assembling and arming former 
*'hung-hutzes" and using them to cloak the opera- 
tions of Japanese spies in the war zone. In this 
connection it should be remembered that the Liao 
River is only a short distance from Moukden, 
Liao-yang and other then important Russian mili- 
tary bases, and the railway which fed the Russian 
army. It is a fact that early in the war a num- 
ber of expeditions were undertaken by Japanese 
officers in disguise, penetrating from neutral ter- 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 171 

ritory, with a view to interrupting traffic on the 
Russian railway, and while failure attended 
nearly all such attempts it was not a matter to be 
ignored. The protest of Russia against the mass- 
ing of any large number of Chinese troops along 
the neutral border, and the diplomatic dangers en- 
tailed by such action on the part of China, re- 
sulted in poor policing of the territory, and a 
consequent revival of genuine ''hung-hutze" oper- 
ations. Both belligerents found in these *'hung- 
hutze" bands a convenient agency, and both used 
them to any feasible extent, which at that time 
was slight. It may be said that Russia and Japan, 
in their counter-assertions and accusations, both 
told the truth about their opponent and lied about 
themselves. Under the circumstances it would 
probably have been impossible to respect abso- 
lutely the integrity of the neutral boundary. 

But in view of the prevailing impression that 
Russia was the chief offender in this respect, it is 
pertinent to show that the only material and im- 
portant violation of the neutrality of China, and 
one which powerfully influenced the general result 
of the war, was the act of the Japanese. I refer 
to the flanking movement of General Nogi at the 
battle of Moukden, by which the right of the Rus- 
sian army was turned. Immediately after the 
battle the Russian commander, through his gov- 
ernment, called international attention to this vio- 
lation of neutral territory and its disastrous con- 
sequence to the Russian army. The Japanese 
Government promptly denied the charge m toto, 
in a communication which, if it was not trans- 



172 THE NEW FAE EAST 

mitted to other governments through diplomatic 
channels, was given to the press of the world as an 
official statement. Here again we encounter a rep- 
resentation of the Japanese Government in regard 
to an important matter of fact, and since, in view 
of the position the nation has now assumed in the 
world, the question of the dependence to be placed 
upon its diplomatic and otherwise official assur- 
ances is of great interest and importance, the 
truth should be known. I travelled along the neu- 
tral border soon after the battle of Moukden for 
the purpose of informing myself about conditions, 
and investigated this matter. Without repeating 
here the many evidences upon which I base my 
opinion, I do not hesitate to go on record by stating 
that a considerable part of General Nogi's army 
crossed the Liao Eiver and, masked by a cloud of 
Japanese cavalry disguised as and intermixed 
with ''hung-hutzes," made a detour to the north 
and, recrossing the river, fell upon the right and 
rear of the Eussian army. The question at issue 
in the circumstances which attended this inci- 
dent is not the possible stupidity or negligence 
of the Eussian scouts, or the cleverness of the 
Japanese commander in thus stealing a march 
upon the enemy; but was there a deliberate and 
carefully planned violation of an international 
obligation ? There can be but one truthful answer 
to this question, and that affirmative. 

Before dismissing an incidental situation which 
may be reproduced in some degree in almost any 
war, and consequently carries broad possibilities, 
one or two other phases may be cited. While the 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 173 

Eussian army still occupied Moukden the Imperial 
Railways of North China, whose northern ter- 
minus is now at Sin-min-tun, a town a few miles 
west of the Liao River, was of great help in the 
introduction of supplies for the army and native 
population. After the Japanese army occupied 
Moukden this railway became equally valuable to 
it. All through the war the Chinese Government 
had winked at the fact that the railway (it is a 
British corporation) was carrying miscellaneous 
supplies which eventually found their way inside 
the Russian lines. Nor is it easy to see just how 
this might have been consistently stopped ; for the 
responsibility of the railway terminated when it 
deposited the goods at Sin-min-tun, and food- 
stuffs, which constituted the bulk of supplies 
thus sent, are not properly contraband. Besides, 
the needs of millions of Chinese residing in the 
war zone had to be considered. Taken altogether, 
it is a very pretty problem in neutrality that was 
here presented, and one is hardly prepared to 
settle it outright. But the disposition of the Jap- 
anese, now so constantly in evidence throughout 
the Far East, to adopt Russian methods with im- 
provements and extensions, created an unexpected 
complication. Soon after their occupation of 
Moukden, the Japanese authorities began to offer 
to the railway large quantities of military supplies 
which had been landed at the port of Newchwang, 
to be transported, via Kao-pang-tze, to Sin-min- 
tun. By this time the Japanese had openly estab- 
lished a garrison at Sin-min-tun, well inside the 
neutral zone, and exercised a sort of supervision 



174 THE NEW FAR EAST 

of the railway terminus there. The railway com- 
pany promptly refused to accept such shipments 
from one Japanese military base to another, 
through neutral Chinese territory ; with the result 
that Japanese troops occupied the railway termi- 
nus at Yinkow, just across the river from New- 
chwang, and informed the local railway officials 
that unless their shipments were carried they 
would seize the railway north of Kao-pang-tze. 
The railway officials thereupon withdrew their 
rolling stock over night from the Yinkow and Sin- 
min-tun divisions and stopped the operation of 
trains. This action immediately damped the arbi- 
trary ardor of the Japanese, for a railway with- 
out rolling stock is not very useful, and when 
the matter was diplomatically taken up in Peking 
the Japanese Government disavowed responsibil- 
ity for the incident. Ultimately a way was found 
to ship considerable quantities of Japanese sup- 
plies by this route without too openly violating the 
obligations of Chinese neutrality. 

After the battle of Moukden all pretence of 
respecting the neutral border north of Sin-min- 
tun was practically abandoned by the field repre- 
sentatives of both belligerents, and until the end 
of the war it became a contest as to which could 
better use the facilities of the border country. 
Here the advantage rested decidedly with the 
Japanese, for the prestige of success and the 
growing fear of them in the minds of the Chinese 
became valuable assets. Japanese officers were 
entrusted with the task of arming and organ- 
izing the "hung-hutzes," and converting them 



JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA 175 

into an irregular force, to strip western Manchu- 
ria and eastern Mongolia of products available 
for military uses. Thus were several thousand 
military bandits turned loose upon the country, to 
the great annoyance and suffering of the people ; 
and when their depredations attracted attention 
at Peking their operations were charged upon the 
Russians, and the disorders used as a further 
excuse to establish Japanese troops in the region 
affected. In replying to a protest of foreign mer- 
cantile firms, after the conclusion of peace, that 
their goods were not permitted free transit in 
Manchuria, the Japanese military authorities gave 
as a reason for this disability the unusual activity 
of the ''hung-hutzes." The use made by the Rus- 
sian military authorities of "hung-hutzes" in the 
late war was insignificant compared to their sys- 
tematic handling by the Japanese. 

Thus, in political manipulation of circumstances 
and events in the Far East during the last few 
years, have the Japanese fished out and adapted 
to their uses almost every well-worn '' fake " in the 
Russian diplomatic junk-heap. 



CHAPTEE XII 
FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 

Unreliability of Diplomatic Utterances as a Basis for 
Sound Opinion — Basic Motive of Most Foreign 
Policies in the Far East — The British Policy — 
Birth of the "Open Door" Doctrine — England's 
Motive in Advancing It — Securing Support for the 
New Doctrine — Progress of the Forces for Dis- 
memberment — The "Sphere of Influence" Doctrine 
— Proposed Division of China — The Anglo-German 
Agreement — The " Yiang-tse Valley" Agreement — 
The Hay Agreement — Lesson of the "Boxer" 
Troubles. 

Any intelligent observer of recent events in the 
Far East must have been impressed by the fact 
that, during all the political scheming and wire- 
pulling that has taken place in China and Korea, 
outward diplomatic harmony has usually pre- 
vailed among the foreign powers interested in 
the solution. The chancelleries have apparently 
been agreed as to what was proper to do, and only 
seemingly trifling differences as to method have 
ever caused a hitch. All the powers have favored 
the political integrity of China. All the powers 
have, at times, advocated the ' ' open door. ' ' They 
have not only frequently so expressed themselves, 

170 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 177 

through their accredited diplomatic agents, but 
some have gone on record in more than one docu- 
ment of state. Witness the international agree- 
ment guaranteeing the integrity of China and the 
''open door," which Mr. Hay induced all the 
chiefly interested powers to accept. With what a 
blare of diplomatic trumpets was this important 
matter announced to the world. Judged by their 
diplomatic utterances, the Eussian and Japanese 
governments both desired the same things in 
Manchuria and Korea. Yet suddenly they sur- 
prised the greater part of the world by flying at 
each other's throats. 

It is not merely to have a fling at prevailing 
diplomatic methods that I here refer to these 
matters of common knowledge, but to point out 
that such utterances are worth no more to-day 
than they were three years ago as a basis for ra- 
tional opinion. So it is necessary, in attempting 
to estimate the future course of events in the Far 
East, to search for national motives not only in 
the diplomatic statements of the respective gov- 
ernments, but also by examination into their poli- 
cies as demonstrated by actual facts and the 
analogy of contemporaneous conditions; and to 
determine their drift with even tolerable accuracy 
they should be examined separately. 

Of the various foreign policies now actively 
exerted in the Far East, it may be said that the 
objects of all are substantially the same, and 
spring from that kind of patriotism which has been 
wittily described as *'the love of another man's 
country, and the determination to grab it. ' ' With 



178 THE NEW FAE EAST 

the single exception, among the greater powers, 
of the United States of America, these policies 
have the common intent to control as large a part 
of the Orient as is possible, either by open politi- 
cal administration or surreptitious device ; and if 
some now appear superficially to contradict this 
statement, it is because for the moment a greater 
prospective advantage promises to follow a mod- 
erate course. And, in excepting the United States, 
candor compels me to say that its attitude is 
probably due, in a measure, to past and present 
national indifference to wider political and com- 
mercial prospects and to the fact that, in respect 
to the continental Far East, it was a little late in 
getting into the game and found everything pre- 
empted. The fact that the scheme of nature has 
a way, in balancing the accounts of civilization, of 
extracting more good than evil out of the forces 
which shape the evolution of the race, deprives 
this statement of the pessimism it would otherwise 
contain. 

Since Great Britain was the pioneer among the 
greater Western powers in the Orient, and has 
long exerted and still exerts great influence upon 
the course of events there, one naturally turns to 
her first. Owing to her possession of India and 
other Oriental countries, the relations of Great 
Britain with China have for centuries been re- 
garded by British statesmen as important, and 
pains have been taken to advance British interests 
in the Celestial empire. Except commercially, the 
British policy has not usually been aggressive, but 
has, especially in the absence of any active com- 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 179 

petition in the field, been cautious and ingratiat- 
ing. From the vantage point of Hong-Kong, which 
she early had the foresight to secure, England 
slowly but surely extended her commerce, and 
with it her political influence, throughout the Far 
East. When the Far Eastern question assumed 
its present tendency, which I have found it con- 
venient to date from the China-Japan war, Eng- 
land's position in that part of the world was decid- 
edly superior to that of any other Western power. 
Her commerce was firmly established, nearly all 
of the great foreign financial, commercial, indus- 
trial and shipping enterprises being in British 
hands. In short, without entering extensively into 
details, she was in a position to encounter compe- 
tition from a point of vantage. 

It is probable that British statesmen regarded 
Japan's decisive victory over China with mixed 
emotions. They very likely were surprised, in 
common with the greater part of the world; but 
they do not seem to have been at all sure as to the 
immediate or probable effects. England refused 
to join with Eussia, Germany and France in shoo- 
ing Japan off the continent. Scrutinizing her atti- 
tude at this time its astuteness is obvious. By 
refusing to take sides she was in a position to re- 
tain the friendship of both China and Japan ; and, 
besides, her refusal did not affect matters one way 
or the other. Significant events followed fast. It 
soon became clear that, in invoking a concert to 
suppress Japan in the interest of Western civiliza- 
tion, Eussia had in mind to herself reap most of 
the material benefits of the transaction. Before 



180 THE NEW FAE EAST 

Eussia secured Port Arthur England cared little 
for a coaling station in north China. But now she 
at once felt the necessity of having one, and 
nabbed Wei-hei-wei. Then came Germany's seiz- 
ure of Kiao-chou Bay, and tentative reaching 
for the Philippines. England was not exactly 
alarmed, but she realized that these moves meant 
new forces in the Far East, which might limit her 
progress or even threaten her existing advantage. 
So British statesmen set to work to devise a policy 
that might be used to safeguard England's inter- 
ests. Presently this policy made its bow to the 
world in the shape of the "open door" doctrine. 

This doctrine has been so much discussed in 
recent years that it is hardly necessary to define 
it ; but it may help to say that its vital principle 
is to maintain in those Oriental countries which, 
on account of internal weakness, are unable to re- 
sist external aggression and are, consequently, 
liable to it, an equal commercial and industrial 
opportunity to all foreign nations. There can be 
no doubt that this is a just principle ; so much so 
that in time all the interested powers have felt 
compelled to put themselves on record as approv- 
ing it, no matter what their real desires and inten- 
tions may have been or may be now. However, 
he is but an amateur in international matters who 
thinks that in advancing this just policy England 
was prompted by altruistic motives. At the time 
she began to proselyte for the ' ' open door, " as a 
possible antidote to the threatening dismember- 
ment of China, this happened or was thought to 
be a policy peculiarly fitted to advance the inter- 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 181 

ests of Great Britain. British commerce, as I 
have said, was already firmly established through- 
out the countries to be affected by the doctrine, 
and there existed little if any doubt in the minds 
of British statesmen of the ability of British in- 
terests to maintain their superior position against 
any competition lacking the assistance of special 
political pressure. The only way to permanently 
apply such pressure in China and Korea is for 
sections of those countries to fall under the domi- 
nation of nations whose commercial rivalry Eng- 
land fears. So the ''open door" doctrine was 
designed by British statesmen to secure the exist- 
ing supremacy of their commercial interests, and 
indirectly their political interests in the Far East, 
and incidentally to compel prospective competitive 
nations to enter the field at a disadvantage. This 
attitude was not without some justice. During the 
course of many years English sailors and mer- 
chants, with the direct encouragement and assist- 
ance of the government, had built up a large and 
profitable business in the Orient, and they had a 
certain right to interpose a reasonable objection 
to seeing much of this trade depreciated or de- 
stroyed by the political intervention of other for- 
eign nations. 

Having launched the new doctrine, England set 
out to secure supporters for it. For this she freely 
used the British control of news services from the 
Far East, which was almost absolute at that time ; 
and in addition sent many prominent men, some 
of them officials of the government, to travel in 
the Orient and write books exploiting the British 



182 THE NEW FAR EAST 

point of view. The propaganda was particularly 
directed to America, where circumstances favored 
its acceptance. This favorable disposition was 
probably largely due to the invention, presumably 
by Germany, of a doctrine designed to evade the 
*'open door" without seeming to override it; and 
which eventually came to be known as the ' ' sphere 
of influence" doctrine. Meanwhile, the unex- 
pected acquisition of the Philippines by the United 
States of America tended to draw the attention 
of Americans to a part of the world to which 
they had been comparatively indifferent. At this 
time (say 1899) the situation in China seemed to 
presage early dismemberment. About then the 
''sphere of influence" doctrine reached the height 
of its acceptance. Even England was either de- 
ceived as to its real intent, or had made up her 
mind to accept the inevitable and grab for herself 
as large a slice of China as possible. At any rate, 
there is no doubt that she toyed with the ' ' sphere 
of influence ' ' doctrine, and at one time seemed on 
the verge of accepting it outright. 

It is interesting, in this connection, to recall the 
situation in China at that time. Although the 
occupation of portions of the empire by the troops 
of foreign nations was not so extensive as it be- 
came later and is to-day, the intentions of a nmn- 
ber of them had been rather clearly expressed, 
either in diplomatic correspondence or significant 
moves. It was generally agreed that should dis- 
memberment take place, Russia expected to get 
Manchuria, Pechihli province, and the greater 
part of Mongolia. Germany laid claim to Shan- 




Map of the empires of China and Korea, showing^ the varions "spheres of influence" 
tentatively claimed by foreign powers at the time the "sphere of influence" doctrine attained 
its most definite form (about 1899). The immediate vicinities surrounding Peking and Seoul, 
the capitals of the two empires, were by common consent considered to be neutral ground 
where all interests met on equal footing. 




Map of the empires of China and Korea, showing the tentative status of the various 
"spheres of influence" with the changes caused by the result of the Russo-Japanese war. 
The only material change is in the positions of Japan and Russia. Japan now controls the 
whole of Korea, even the neutral area surrounding Seoul being eliminated, and the southern 
part of Manchuria; while Russia's position north of the Great Wall has receded a little. 

The United States of America is the only one of the great powers directly interested in 
the future of the Far East that is without any "sphere of influence" that is even tentatively 
recognized by the other foreign powers. 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 183 

tung, and territory lying directly to the westward, 
including Shansi, Sliensi and that part of Mon- 
golia adjoining Tibet on the north. France had 
staked out the provinces contiguous to her Tong- 
king possessions, and probably would have been 
contented with Yunnan, Kwangsi, Kweichau and 
the island of Hainan. Japan had her desires 
fixed on Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsi provinces. 
This left for England Tibet and the provinces 
of Kiangsu, Nganhwui, Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, 
Kwangtung and Czechuen, embracing the entire 
Yiang-tse valley, and an outlet from it to the 
south through Hunan and Kwangtung to Canton. 
While there is at present a disposition in some 
quarters to regard the ' ' sphere of influence ' ' doc- 
trine as something never sufficiently delimitated 
to have been capable of adjustment, there is no 
doubt that a fairly close understanding was had 
among the interested powers. In fact, there is 
little doubt that at least three of them had reached 
a definite agreement. The matter was so well 
understood that numerous maps indicating the 
respective "spheres of influence" were published 
throughout the world, which, while usually at- 
tended by a depreciatory attitude in diplomatic 
circles, undoubtedly contained a strong element of 
probability. 

Thus was the whole of the Chinese Empire ap- 
propriated in prospect, and while the fate of Ko- 
rea was not so actively discussed, it was generally 
thought that she would fall to Japan or Russia, 
or be divided between them. It will be noticed, 
in fact it was noticed at the time, that should 



184 THE NEW FAR EAST 

dismemberment take place along these lines the 
United States would be left entirely out of it. 
Realization of this, coupled with the belief that 
with equal opportunities American trade will be 
able to make headway in the Orient, drew Amer- 
ican statesmen to the ''open door" doctrine. 
While there should never have been any doubt 
that the ''sphere of influence" idea is diametri- 
cally opposed to the "open door," England flirted 
with it for a while. Reasonable, I may say 
positive, proof of this exists. I refer to what is 
known as the "Yiang-tse valley agreement" be- 
tween England and China, and the somewhat sim- 
ilar agreement between England and Germany. 
Without entering into the details of this latter 
document, it suffices to say that its kernel lay in 
a mutual agreement on the part of Germany and 
England to recognize and respect each other's 
interests in their respective spheres of influence. 
This agreement, following the one with China, was 
too significant not to attract attention. What is 
essential is that it attracted the special attention 
of John Hay. That statesman must have seen 
that England was inclined to play fast and loose 
with the "open door" doctrine, after America 
had virtually been committed to it, for he lost no 
time in taking action. He addressed a note to 
the German Government, which, as it led to in- 
ternational action of great importance, may be 
profitably reproduced, in part, here. The com- 
munication was dated September 6, 1899, and was 
addressed to Count von Biilow, the German min- 
ister for foreign affairs. 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 185 

Sir: At the time when the Government of the United States 
was informed by that of Germany that it had leased the port of 
Kiao-chou and the adjacent territory in the province of Shantung, 
assurances were given to the ambassador of the United States at 
BerHn, by the Imperial German minister of foreign affairs, that the 
rights and privileges insured by treaties with China to citizens of 
the United States would not thereby suffer or be in any way im- 
paired within the area over which Germany had thus obtained control. 
More recently, however, the British Government recognized by a 
formal agreement with Germany, the exclusive right of the latter 
country to enjoy in said leased area and the contiguous "sphere 
of influence or interest" certain privileges, more especially those 
relating to railroads and mining enterprises; but as the exact nature 
of the rights thus recognized has not been clearly defined, it is pos- 
sible that serious conflicts of interest may at any time arise, not 
only between British and German subjects within said area, but 
that the interests of our citizens may also be jeopardized thereby. 
Earnestly desirous to remove any cause for irritation and to insure 
at the same time to the commerce of all nations in China the un- 
doubted benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by 
the various powers claiming "spheres of interest" that they shall 
enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navi- 
gation within such "spheres," the Government of the United States 
of America would be pleased to see His Imperial German Majesty's 
government give formal assurances and lend its cooperation in 
securing like assurances from the other interested powers that each, 
within its respective sphere of whatever influence. 

First: Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any 
vested interest within any so-called "sphere of influence" or leased 
territory it may have in China. 

Second: That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall 
apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are 
within said "spheres of influence" (unless they be free ports), no 
matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable 
shall be collected by the Chinese Government. 

Third: That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of 
another nationality frequenting any port of such "sphere" than 
shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher rail- 
road charges over lines built, controlled or operated within such 
"sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other 
nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied 
on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported 
over equal distances. 



186 THE NEW FAE EAST 

The communication closed with some sugges- 
tions as to the method to be adopted to secure such 
agreement among the powers. An exchange of 
views took place during the course of the next few 
months between Mr. Hay and various European 
chancelleries on the subject. Although there is 
little doubt that some of them hesitated to accept 
the suggestion, none was in a position to decline 
gracefully, and in the end all acceded ; whereupon 
Mr. Hay so informed Count von Billow. Count 
von Billow's reply on this occasion is interesting 
and worth reproduction. It bears the date of Feb- 
ruary 19, 1900. 

Your Excellency informed me, in a memorandum presented on 
the twenty-fourth of last month, that the Government of the United 
States of America had received satisfactory written replies from all 
the Powers to which an inquiry had been addressed, similar to that 
contained in your Excellency's note of September 26 last, in regard 
to the policy of the open door in China. While referring to this, 
your Excellency thereupon expressed the wish that the Imperial 
Government would now also give its answer in writing. Gladly 
complying with this wish, I have the honor to inform your Excel- 
lency, repeating the statements already made verbally, as follows : 

As recognized by the Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica, according to your Excellency's note referred to above the 
Imperial Government has, from the beginning, not only asserted, 
but also carried out to the fullest extent, in its Chinese possessions, 
absolute equality of treatment of all nations with regard to trade, 
navigation and commerce. The Imperial Government entertains 
no thought of departing in the future from this principle, which at 
once excludes any prejudicial or disadvantageous commercial treat- 
ment of the citizens of the United States of America, so long as it 
is not forced to do so, on account of considerations of reciprocity, 
by a divergence from it by other governments. If, therefore, the 
other Powers interested in the industrial development of the Chinese 
Empire, are willing to recognize the same principles, this can only 
be desired by the Imperial Government, which in this case, upon 
being requested, will gladly be ready to participate with the United 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 187 

states of America and the other powers in an agreement made upon 
these lines, by which the same rights are reciprocally secured. 

Upon receiving this note, Mr. Hay notified the 
other powers that the United States considered 
adherence to the ''open door" policy as definite 
and final. This was formally acceded to by France, 
Russia, Germany, Italy and Great Britain, and 
was later acceded to, in principle, by Japan. 

There is already a disposition among well in- 
formed persons to give to John Hay the credit for 
rescuing and again placing on its feet the "open 
door" doctrine, after England had tentatively 
abandoned it. I was in China when Mr. Hay died, 
and I was then impressed with the tone of much 
press comment there, some of which even went so 
far as to say that but for the intervention of the 
illustrious American the ''open door" doctrine 
would have perished. The foregoing brief state 
correspondence contains much of real significance. 
Why should Mr. Hay take such energetic action 
unless he thought the "open door" was seriously 
in danger? He was not given to meaningless 
effort. Why his anxiety to get the powers on 
record in writing? Can we assume that in his 
references to collection of duties in China, to port 
charges and railroad tariffs, and other such indi- 
rect but conunon means for commercial discrimi- 
nation he was merely firing in the air? Or was he 
aiming at something specific ? I will not here enter 
into those details, nor the matters which made the 
address of this note to Germany pertinent at the 
time. This agreement of the powers put for 
the moment a check on the ' ' sphere of influence ' ' 



188 THE NEW FAR EAST 

doctrine. The Anglo-German agreement was 
promptly permitted to fall into innocuous desue- 
tude. A short time afterward Count von Biilow, 
in a speech in the Reichstag, practically repudi- 
ated it. Of what use was a sphere of influence 
unless it could be used to cut under commercial 
competition? With the right to do this challenged 
by a great power, and supported by the definite, 
if unwilling, assent of all the chiefly interested na- 
tions, a ' ' sphere of influence ' ' had no real utility. 
However, the phraseology of Count von Billow's 
reply is interesting. Note the reference to Ger- 
many's *' Chinese possessions," and the implied 
reservation of the right to discriminate against 
other commerce therein should the German Gov- 
ernment be forced to do so by the action of other 
nations. 

During this period England was engaged in a 
war in South Africa, and it seemed for a time that 
her Far Eastern policy would expire of inanition 
and uncertainty. She was not in a position to 
adopt an aggressive attitude, and it was clear that 
the forces working for dismemberment were get- 
ting the upper hand. England still leaned toward 
the ' ' open door, ' ' but if it came to a general split- 
up she was exceedingly well provided for, with the 
best part of China as her recognized ''sphere of 
influence, ' ' and with a strong power like Germany 
as a buffer between her Far Eastern frontier and 
Russia. In this dilemma, she tried to carry water 
on both shoulders, and contend for the ''open 
door" while at the same time looking out for her 
interests if, perchance, the "sphere of influence" 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 189 

doctrine should gain ascendancy. The "boxer" 
trouble, which came at this time, created a diver- 
sion. There was a great rush among the powers 
to send troops to China. Except the United 
States and Italy, they all sent many more soldiers 
than were needed to suppress the disorder, and 
many of them are still there. The events of the 
''boxer" war need not be reviewed. It had one 
significant demonstration. This was the readi- 
ness and military efficiency of Japan. England 
was quick to observe and act. Events were moving 
rapidly, events which she alone was powerless to 
check. So came about the first alliance between 
Great Britain and Japan. The ''sphere of influ- 
ence" doctrine temporarily dropped out of sight, 
and the "open door" was again hoisted to the 
peak. 

Then came the war between Russia and Japan, 
to which England contributed her credit, and its 
result; and now comes the new alliance with 
Japan. 



CHAPTER XIII 

FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 
CONTINUED 

The New Anglo-Japanese Alliance — Real Intent of this 
Instrument — The Turning Over of Korea to Japan 
— England's Reason for this Action — "Special In- 
terests" of England and Japan in Eastern Asia — 
"Territorial rights" of England and Japan — The 
Japan-China Manchurian Agreement — Destruction 
of Chinese Autonomy in Manchuria. 

If the late war failed, in the making of peace 
between Russia and Japan, to result in any de- 
cisive advance toward a solution of the Far East- 
ern question, it at least produced in the new alli- 
ance between Great Britain and Japan something 
which will have a tremendous effect upon the set- 
tlement.* The general intention and scope of the 
instrument is declared in the preamble, which 
follows : 

''A — The consolidation and maintenance of gen- 
eral peace in the regions of eastern Asia and 
India. 

"B — The preservation of the common interests 
of all the powers in China by insuring the inde- 
pendence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and 

* The full text of the Anglo-Japanese alliance will be found in 
Appendix A. 

190 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 191 

the principle of equal opportunity for the com- 
merce and industry of all nations in China. 

**C — The maintenance of the territorial rights 
of the high contracting parties in the regions of 
eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their 
special interests in the said regions." 

Let us strip this preamble down a little to get 
at what it really means. The first clause is merely 
the usual thing, and quite meaningless. The sec- 
ond clause is an intelligible declaration for the 
open door, but its meaning would have been 
clearer had the characteristic bit of diplomatic 
humbug been omitted. Instead of its object being 
**the preservation of the common interests of all 
the powers in China, ' ' it is, of course, the preser- 
vation in China and the far and middle East of 
the interests of Great Britain and Japan. The 
phrasing almost amounts to an impertinence, 
since none of the other powers have asked Eng- 
land and Japan to take care of their interests in 
that part of the world, and none of them would be 
at all disposed to admit greater competence on the 
part of these two powers to look after other na- 
tional interests than is possessed by the other 
nations themselves. The third clause appears to 
be intentionally ambiguous. Its declared object 
is the maintenance of the ''territorial rights" of 
Great Britain and Japan "in the regions of east- 
em Asia and of India and the defence of their spe- 
cial interests in the said regions." The ambiguity 
lies in the doubt as to where the territorial rights 
which are to be defended lie. If Japan had any 
territorial rights in eastern Asia or India at the 



192 THE NEW FAE EAST 

time this alliance was signed it is not generally- 
known. A most significant omission in the pre- 
amble is the failure to guarantee the independence 
of Korea, which was included in the first Anglo- 
Japanese alliance. 

However, the third clause is the kernel of the 
nut, and probably holds all of sincerity and real 
purpose that the whole preamble contains. There 
is no humbug in this clause. It declares its object 
flatly to be purely selfish, and has, therefore, a 
ring of genuineness. It will endeavor to maintain 
the territorial rights of not all the nations inter- 
ested, but of Great Britain and Japan. It will 
defend in the regions affected not the *' common 
interests of all the powers," but the '^special 
interests" of the contracting parties. Here is 
something the mind can lay hold of; and it only 
remains to determine what are the territorial 
rights and special interests of England and Japan 
in those regions to get fairly at the real intent of 
the treaty, and how it may affect the interests of 
other nations. 

Fortunately, the terms of the treaty afford a 
reasonably clear view of its scope. While, in the 
wording of all the articles, there is an evident 
attempt to give an impression that the alliance is 
conceived in a defensive spirit, this impression 
vanishes upon close scrutiny. On the whole, it 
stands revealed as an offensive and defensive alli- 
ance, in the broadest meaning of these terms. This 
intent has been cloaked as far as phraseology 
could accomplish it. Article II provides that 
should either power be involved in war "in de- 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 193 

fence of its territorial rights or special interests ' ' 
the other shall at once come to the assistance of 
its ally and wage war in common with it. It will 
be noticed that the word "defence" is used, but 
*' special interests" may be made to stretch a long 
way. 

Undoubtedly the most significant thing about 
the new alliance is the recognition on the part of 
England of Japan's paramountcy in Korea. This 
is a distinct advance over the former treaty, and 
is the price England pays for Japan's promised 
assistance in protecting British possessions in 
India. This is an interesting proposition and 
directly affects the interests in Korea of other 
nations. While Japan has completely usurped 
political authority in Korea, and fully intends to 
retain it, the kingdom is still presumptively inde- 
pendent. Other nations, particularly America, 
have large commercial and industrial interests 
there. It may be that some or all of these nations 
will prefer that Korea remain independent, fear- 
ing that under Japanese sovereignty their inter- 
ests may suffer. Yet the kingdom has been coolly 
disposed of without a pretence of consulting their 
wishes. England has formally recognized the 
right of Japan to do practically as she pleases in 
Korea, and under the terms of the alliance will be 
bound to come to Japan's assistance should any 
other nation dispute Japan's ascendancy. There 
is no denying that, in so far as it affects Korea, 
the alliance hands it over to Japan and binds Eng- 
land to assist Japan in holding it. This looks very 
much like forcibly depriving other nations of their 



194 THE NEW FAR EAST 

rights there, and that their interests may be small 
or problematical does not affect the principle in- 
volved. And it should be remembered that this 
new treaty was signed August 12, 1905, or before 
the war between Russia and Japan was ended. 
The fact that this clause binds Japan to undertake 
no measures in Korea contrary to the ''open 
door" principle is designed to deprive it of its 
sting, but it will be poor consolation to the other 
powers, with Japan's authority absolute, should 
they find their interests suffering. 

Let us examine England's situation in respect 
to Korea. At one period of the country's history 
British trade was paramount in Korea, but within 
the last decade this condition has changed, until 
lately she has been losing ground. The greater 
part of British goods sold in Korea to-day first go 
to Japan, and are carried into Korea through the 
channels of Japanese commerce. So England, 
finding herself in a position to profit by Japanese 
friendship, and realizing that in direct competition 
with America and Germany she is steadily falling 
behind, has a good business reason for looking 
favorably upon a Japanese occupation of the 
Hermit Kingdom, and one which does not apply, 
in the same degree, to other nations. But even if 
turning Korea over to Japan should adversely 
affect British commerce there, England would still 
have an excellent reason for making the conces- 
sion, and this lies in the added security given to 
her Indian frontier and other interests by the 
alliance. Something had to be done to make the 
alliance reciprocal, and British statesmen proba- 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 195 

bly thought they could well afford to take chances 
in Korea under Japanese control to secure a posi- 
tive gain elsewhere. That in making this deal the 
interests of other nations, in so far as they could 
be affected, might suffer by the change, could not 
have been expected to deter them. How the other 
powers will feel about this remains to be seen. 

The prominence given in the preamble of the 
new alliance to a declaration in favor of the ' ' open 
door" in China has led many to regard this doc- 
trine as the fundamental principle upon which the 
alliance rests. This view is not without plausi- 
bility, but it is weakened by the tantamount reser- 
vation to themselves by the contracting parties of 
the safeguarding of the ''common interests of all 
the powers, ' ' which implies the right to determine 
what those common interests are. It is profitless 
to twist phrases in an attempt to show that this is 
not the intention of this clause. Since any in- 
fringement of the interests of either England or 
Japan will call both nations to arms, the clause 
can work out in no other practical way ; for I sup- 
pose no one thinks that England and Japan will 
permit other powers to decide when their, or to 
adopt the wording of the second clause, the ' ' com- 
mon interests ' ' are threatened or violated. Under 
any such construction the alliance would have no 
utility to the contracting powers. The essence of 
the second clause of the preamble is that any other 
nation which may dissent from what England and 
Japan regard as best for the ' ' common interests ' ' 
in China will either have to submit to their deci- 
sion or fight both of them combined. And however 



196 THE NEW FAE EAST 

* ^ defensive ' ' it may be in theory, such an alliance 
can easily become decidedly ''offensive" when it 
comes to working out the details as tested by the 
course of events. 

It seems clear, then, that the intent of the alli- 
ance is that England and Japan shall have the 
power; if not the right, to construe the ''open 
door" doctrine in the light of their own needs and 
advantage. To say this is not necessarily to at- 
tack the good faith or intentions of these two 
powers. They have the right to make a treaty 
for such a purpose if they see fit, just as some of 
the other powers might make an alliance to coun- 
teract its influence. One of the questions which 
may be seen looming up is whether it will provoke 
such an opposing alliance. This depends, natur- 
ally, upon what construction the two powers even- 
tually place on the term ' ' common interests ' ' ; and 
the antecedents for that construction lie in a de- 
termination of their own special interests. 

I have already indicated the reasons underlying 
England's action in originally promulgating the 
"open door" doctrine. But her position in China 
has materially altered since then. She still occu- 
pies the first position commercially and indus- 
trially, but her "Western competitors are gaining 
upon her so rapidly that already she sees her 
supremacy threatened. The former confidence 
that, with equal opportunity, British interests can 
more than hold their own has vanished. How this 
may affect England's attitude toward the "open 
door" is evident. It is conceivable that in time 
the "open door" may be positively disadvan- 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 197 

tageous to British interests in China. In fact, this 
presumption is not without probability. There 
are at present practical difficulties in the way of 
a complete abandonment of the ''open door" by 
England other than the obligation entailed by 
diplomatic assurances; but any one who has 
studied the course of her advancement in the 
Orient can scarcely doubt that should it become 
a thorn in her side a means to evade it will be 
found. British policy is for British interests first, 
last, and all the time, which is true of most na- 
tional policies. To have dropped the ' ' open door ' ' 
doctrine out of the new alliance with Japan, espe- 
cially while at the same time giving her ally a 
free hand in Korea at the possible expense of 
other Western nations, would have been a diplo- 
matic faux pas of the first magnitude, and might 
have been disastrous to the successful launching 
of the treaty, by provoking action designed to 
thwart it. And I have no doubt that the ''open 
door" will be insistently talked about should a 
disposition to criticise the alliance grow in Amer- 
ica. "Wliat I wish to point out is that it is by no 
means certain, or even probable, that the special 
interests of England in China will for long be 
best served by strict adherence to this policy. 
And even if England should desire to adhere to a 
modified "open door" doctrine, as a means of 
preventing the formation of a formidable opposi- 
tion to the alliance, it is clear that her wishes must 
conform in a measure to those of her ally. 

So, in reason, the special interests mentioned in 
the third clause of the preamble to the treaty must 



198 THE NEW FAE EAST 

be a mean between the interests of England and 
Japan. This brings us to a consideration of the 
special interests in China and Korea of Japan. 

In behalf of Japan the alliance engages to de- 
fend her territorial rights and special interests in 
eastern Asia. Taking first the matter of terri- 
torial rights, let us see what these rights are. The 
fact that such rights are mentioned specifically in 
the treaty establishes their existence at least in 
the minds of the contracting parties, who mutually 
bind themselves to fight, if necessary, to preserve 
them. This treaty was signed, it appears, on 
August 12, 1905 ; so it cannot possibly be presumed 
to refer to anything which may have occurred 
since that date. What, then, were the territorial 
rights of Japan in eastern Asia on August 12, 
1905? Port Arthur and the Kwangtung penin- 
sula could not well have been meant, although then 
occupied by Japanese troops. But the war with 
Eussia was then going on, and such an act on the 
part of England would have been directly hostile 
to Eussia, since it bound her to help Japan defend 
the ground already won. Yet in attempting to get 
at the meaning, in so far as it refers to Japan, of 
this clause we are driven to assume that it must 
allude to territories on the continent then occupied 
by Japanese troops; for on the day the alliance 
was signed Japan did not possess on the continent 
of Asia, either by sovereignty or leasehold, a foot 
of territory. Then, to thus give it its obvious 
meaning, since otherwise it has no intelligible 
meaning at all, the territorial rights in Asia of 
Japan referred to in the treaty must be Korea and 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 199 

that part of Manchuria then held by the Japanese 
armies. 

Turning to the special interests in eastern Asia 
of Japan, it seems better to discuss first those 
within regions where she is disposed to claim ter- 
ritorial rights, since it is clear that such rights, if 
recognized, will place her on a better footing than 
other nations. It is true that she is engaged by 
oft-iterated declarations to evacuate Manchuria 
and restore the administration of that region to 
China. But the same assurances were given about 
the independence and integrity of Korea, and 
have now been almost openly thrown aside. And, 
in the abstract, I consider Japan's diplomatic ut- 
terances concerning her intended course in Man- 
churia to be worth just as much as her declara- 
tions regarding Korea have already proved to be, 
although circumstances may compel a different 
course in the two territories. 

At Peking, on December 22, 1905, an agreement 
between Japan and China regarding the future of 
Manchuria was signed. The negotiations had 
been in progress for several months, but the ut- 
most secrecy was observed by the commissioners, 
and very little information became public. And, 
while due announcement of final agreement was 
made, only brief reports as to the contents of the 
agreement have so far been given out, notwith- 
standing the intense interest in the terms through- 
out the world. It has been officially stated that 
the text of the treaty will not be made public until 
formal ratifications have been exchanged by the 
two governments. Just when ratifications will be 



200 THE NEW FAE EAST 

exchanged is a matter of conjecture, and it is pos- 
sible that some time will pass before the terms are 
published in their entirety. 

However, several matters determined by the 
new agreement have been announced. There are 
to be a number of new treaty ports in Manchuria. 
China transfers to Japan the Eussian leasehold on 
the Kwangtung peninsula. This was anticipated, 
as in the peace treaty Eussia transferred her in- 
terest in the lease to Japan. The Chinese com- 
missioners are believed to have resisted the trans- 
fer, pointing out that a treaty is not a negotiable 
agreement, to be staked upon the result of a war 
with an outside power; but of course they were 
compelled to yield. In respect to the general 
trend of the agreement, it has been semi-officially 
announced that Japan's position in Manchuria is 
to be the same as that of Eussia in the northern 
part, which bases its special privileges chiefly 
upon terms governing the construction and opera- 
tion of the railroad. China agrees to the transfer 
by Eussia to Japan of the southern end of the 
Manchurian railway, and grants Japan a conces- 
sion to construct a railway between Liao-yang and 
the Yalu. 

These terms, so far as they have been made pub- 
lic, are more remarkable for what they conceal 
than the light they throw upon the ultimate inten- 
tions of Japan. It is evident that only those of 
the terms that may be expected to be favorably 
received have been given out. Lacking complete 
information, it is not possible to discuss the agree- 
ment intelligently. Doubtless^ when it is pub- 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 201 

lished, it will receive the scrutiny its importance 
deserves, and any disposition of the contracting 
nations to indefinitely withhold it will constitute 
a reason for legitimate suspicion that its contents 
will not be satisfactory to other interested pow- 
ers. So far as is known, the new treaty contains 
no reference to the mooted question of whether 
Japan will demand an indemnity from China for 
restoring Manchuria to her, and in lieu of pay- 
ment continue to occupy that part of the country 
now held by Japanese troops. It may be that 
Japanese statesmen came to recognize, in view of 
the sufferings and irreparable losses of the Chi- 
nese in Manchuria during the war, the sardonic 
irony of this proposition; but it was at one time 
seriously discussed by the Japanese press, and 
even found supporters in the West. 

In regard to the existing Japanese occupation 
of southern Manchuria, I do not hesitate to say 
that Japan has already gone farther in usurping 
Chinese administrative autonomy than ever Eus- 
sia did. For years to come, no matter if serious 
* * roor-backs " prove to be absent from the new 
treaty, Manchuria will be a danger spot. Should 
Japan and Eussia, through the inability of other 
powers, singly or in combination, to decide upon 
a method of keeping them to the fulfilment of 
their promises, be permitted to firmly establish 
themselves in Manchuria, the disintegration of 
China will become a practical certainty. 



CHAPTER XIV 

FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 
CONCLUDED 

The Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty — The Agreement Re- 
specting Manchuria — Analysis of These Clauses — 
The Matter of " Railway Guards" — China's Unavail- 
ing Protests — Period of Evacuation — A New Military 
Frontier — Japan's Occupation of Port Arthur — Re- 
vival of the "Sphere of Influence" Doctrine — The 
German, Russian and French Policies — The German- 
Russian Entente — Coincidence Between the Designs 
of Japan and Russia — England's Equivocal Posi- 
tion. 

In attempting to determine the future of that 
important part of the Chinese Empire, it is well 
to keep in mind just what Russia and Japan, in 
making peace, agreed to do in Manchuria. Article 
III of the peace treaty follows :* 

First — ^To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, 
except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung peninsula, 
in accordance with the provisions of additional article one annexed 
to this treaty, and 

Second — ^To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive 
administration of China all the portions of Manchuria now in oc- 
cupation or under the control of Russian or Japanese troops, with 
the exception of the territory above mentioned. 

Russia further declares that she will not in the 
future claim in Manchuria any territorial advan- 

* The full text of the treaty will be found in Appendix B, 
202 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 203 

tages or preferential or exclusive concessions, but 
Japan makes no such declaration, which is signifi- 
cant in view of the fact that it was considered wise 
to put Eussia on record. Why, in a mutual agree- 
ment as to the future of Manchuria, did Russia 
alone renounce exclusive rights and privileges? 
The supplementary article referred to deals with 
the details of the military evacuation and future 
policing of the property interests of each. Eigh- 
teen months is fixed as the maximum time within 
which Japan and Russia must withdraw their mili- 
tary forces, except railway guards to the number 
of fifteen per kilometer of line. It is stipulated 
that the removal of troops should begin as soon as 
the treaty was ratified. 

Plain as these clauses seem to be in assuring, 
should they be carried out in good faith, the res- 
toration of Manchuria to China, some loopholes 
for equivocation may be noticed by one familiar 
with conditions in the country. In describing the 
territory covered by the Russian leasehold the 
term "Liaotung peninsula," is used, instead of 
''Kwangtung peninsula," which correctly de- 
scribes the locality affected. But the chief reason 
for uneasiness rests in the limit placed upon the 
final consummation of the military evacuation, 
and the declaration of an intention on the part of 
both powers to indefinitely keep troops in the ter- 
ritory under the name of railway guards. On the 
part of Russia, she merely once more obligates 
herself, for about the fourth time I believe, to take 
her troops out of Manchuria except those neces- 
sary for policing the railway. The only difference 



204 THE NEW PAR EAST 

between this and former promises of like nature 
is in the limitation of the number of "guards." 
At fifteen men to a kilometer, the two powers re- 
serve to themselves the right to keep in Man- 
churia from 30,000 to 35,000 soldiers indefinitely, 
or permanently as may be. 

It is interesting and suggestive to recall here 
that at the time the peace conference was held 
China expressed a desire to be represented in so 
far as the negotiations affected her territory, and 
that she was promptly repulsed by Japan, the vic- 
torious belligerent. And since the peace treaty 
has been published China has ventured a feeble 
protest against certain of its terms regarding 
Manchuria. She has pointed out that eighteen 
months is a longer time than is needed to get the 
two armies away from Manchuria, that there is 
nothing in the state of the country to warrant so 
large a railway guard, and that while the contract- 
ing powers obligate themselves to restore the ad- 
ministration of Manchuria to China, no date for 
this promised restoration is fixed. In all these 
contentions she is clearly right, but no one ex- 
pects that she will be attended to. Eussia and 
Japan have, in so far as they have noticed China 's 
protests, let it be known that it is for them to 
decide these matters, and the tone of these state- 
ments conveys the impression that China is, or will 
be, lucky in getting Manchuria back under any 
terms. I cannot resist the desire to call attention 
to the wording of the second clause above quoted, 
in which Japan and Russia agree to restore to the 
administration of China the whole of Manchuria. 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 205 

Since we all know, through repeated diplomatic 
asseverations of both powers, that Chinese admin- 
istrative autonomy in Manchuria has never been 
interfered with, this clause somewhat illuminates 
the unreliability of diplomatic assurances. What 
concerns the world now is how the situation result- 
ing from the peace terms is going to work out. 

Their most striking immediate effect is the es- 
tablishment in Manchuria of a military frontier 
between Russia and Japan. This is now gener- 
ally regarded as a temporary condition, soon to 
be done away with by the removal of the two great 
armies now assembled. These armies will proba- 
bly be moved, it is true. Financial considerations, 
if other reasons were lacking, will probably com- 
pel the return of the larger part of the vast Jap- 
anese army to Japan as soon as circumstances will 
permit. But the ultimate withdrawal to the limit 
fixed is dependable upon certain possibilities. 
Russia has agreed to evacuate Manchuria, and 
there is a probability that she will at last do so, 
since to fail would be to invite a resumption of 
hostilities. But the terms do not obligate her to 
take her army back to Russia. In fact, to do so 
quickly would seem to entail a danger, owing to 
the state of Russia and the existence of revolu- 
tionary sentiments among the troops, and diffi- 
culties about transportation can always provide 
excuses for delay. So it is highly probable that 
much of the Russian army will for the time be 
withdrawn only to Russian soil, at places adjacent 
to the borders of Manchuria and Mongolia. It is 
reasonably certain that Japan will not consider it 



206 THE NEW FAB EAST 

prudent to reduce her forces to a total below those 
of Eussia; so the rate of withdrawal of troops 
from that part of the world will be the rate estab- 
lished by Eussia. 

Without entering further into details, it is 
probable that the military evacuation of Manchu- 
ria will take several years. Assuming, however, 
that this period is successfully got over without 
serious friction, under the peace terms the two 
powers are entitled to keep inside the borders 
of Manchurian railway guards aggregating some 
thirty thousand men, which, under the agreed 
division of the railroads, will be about equally 
divided between them. In other words, Japan and 
Eussia are each to be permitted to keep about fif- 
teen thousand troops in Manchuria, even after the 
transitory period is passed, and the administra- 
tion of the country has been restored to China. 
Nothing is said in the treaty as to how these troops 
are to be distributed, or how they are to be em- 
ployed. Naturally, they will be kept where they 
are more apt to be needed, and that means near 
the borders of the line of delineation between 
Eussia and Japan. Where this line is to be is 
already tentatively established by that part of the 
peace treaty by which Eussia cedes her railways 
south of a certain point to Japan. Apparently the 
point of contact on the railway is to be at or near 
Chang-tu, where it crosses the old palisade, or 
barrier. This is about where the front was at the 
time hostilities terminated, and it is reasonable to 
expect that the new frontier will extend east and 
west along the line of the then existing military 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 207 

front, although this may later be more accurately 
determined by explicit agreement between Russia 
and Japan. Vast fortifications already extend 
along this frontier, which could be easily made 
permanent. Here, in the immediate future, at any 
rate, Japan and Russia will continue to watch each 
other just as distrustfully and carefully as nations 
in Europe do under similar circumstances. 

In the light of the uses to which so-called rail- 
way guards have been put of late years in various 
parts of the Orient, particularly in Manchuria, it 
requires an incorruptible optimism to see in these 
conditions any great promise for the genuine res- 
toration of Chinese administration in Manchuria. 
No doubt for some years to come all the old and 
well-worn subterfuges will be kept up. China is 
not deceived. This is getting to be an old story 
with her, and her protest that she is willing to 
maintain order in Manchuria and protect the rail- 
road contains a note of pathos. The fact is that, 
notwithstanding pretences to the contrary, she 
now has both the power and disposition to govern 
her formerly turbulent provinces, but the chances 
of her being permitted to do so are slight if they 
depend solely upon the assurances of Japan and 
Russia ; which in my opinion are worth collectively 
just what they are worth separately, and we have 
only to go to the very recent course of events in 
Korea and Manchuria to compare promises to ful- 
filment in the case of both nations. Before the 
war Russia's ''railway guards" in Manchuria 
were the hete noire of other chancelleries, and 
many were the epithets levelled at them ; but now 



208 THE NEW FAR EAST 

they seem suddenly to have acquired international 
respectability. Russia's reason for having such 
** guards" in Manchuria is the same as it always 
was, no doubt. What, now, are Japan's reasons 
for copying Russian methods, to which she for- 
merly objected? 

This is worth probing a little, for it also illu- 
minates the purpose behind Japan's determina- 
tion to seize and retain Port Arthur. Had Japan 
no other interest in the future of Korea and 
China than a commercial and industrial oppor- 
tunity there equal to those enjoyed by other 
nations, why should she want a military and naval 
base in north China? The answer is that she 
needs one to protect her "territorial rights" and 
"special interests." She is undoubtedly prepar- 
ing for the time when she may have to defend her 
position in Manchuria. Port Arthur is not needed 
to enable Japan to defend Korea so long as it is 
not under the control of an adversary. But Port 
Arthur is essential to the defence of Manchuria 
by Japan. It secures the sea terminus of the rail- 
way and overlooks the mouth of the Yalu, which 
will soon be connected by rail with central Man- 
churia. There is much significance in the well- 
understood intention of the Japanese Govern- 
ment to fight to absolute exhaustion rather than 
to permit Port Arthur to be again wrested from 
her. 

A brief reference, in passing, to the "common 
interests" of Japan in China, in contradistinction 
to her "special interests" in eastern Asia, so 
sharply outlined in the preamble to the alliance 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 209 

with England, serves to emphasize the meaning 
of the two terms. Japan's "common interests" 
are the same as those of, for example, the United 
States; and will amount to whatever of commer- 
cial and industrial development the enterprise of 
her subjects, supported by the political and finan- 
cial energy of their government, can wring from 
conditions within the empire. No other nation has 
a moral right to object to any progress of this 
nature Japan may be able to make, provided the 
gain is not made at the expense of, or does not 
grow out of invidious detriment to that other 
nation's legitimate interests. But evidence that 
forces of invidious detriment, set in motion and 
stimulated by Japan, are already at work against 
some Western interests in China and Manchuria 
has been multiplying within the last few months, 
and they may be expected to gain force as time 
passes unless promptly checked. I know of an in- 
stance which occurred very recently, wherein the 
principle of a Japanese "sphere of influence" in 
Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsi was diplomatically 
invoked at Peking to obstruct an important Amer- 
ican business enterprise in those provinces. In 
fact, a conclusion forced upon one by a study of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance is that, while declar- 
ing for the "open door," its most significant im- 
mediate effect is the conversion of a hitherto 
nebulous position of Japan in Korea and Man- 
churia into a de facto condition of territorial 
appropriation supported, in effect, by the military 
and naval forces of England. In other words, 
the "sphere of influence" doctrine, to give a mod- 



210 THE NEW FAR EAST 

erate interpretation to the present situation, has 
been revived in a more concrete form than it ever 
had before. 

A consideration of the "sphere of influence" 
doctrine and its possible effects upon Far Eastern 
politics leads, naturally, to examination of the 
policies of the powers which have in the past 
seemed to favor it. Prominent among them is 
Germany. Of all the foreign powers which have 
or claim interests in China, the course of Germany 
has been in some respects the most remarkable. 
Less versed in such methods than some of her 
competitors, she has cut her path with such broad 
strokes that a novice can follow it in all its main 
turns. It is doubtful if contemporaneous history 
affords a parallel, in sheer unprincipled rapacity, 
to her seizure of Kiao-chou Bay. She did not 
go to the trouble to stalk her prey through the 
usual processes of evasive diplomacy, but sprang 
abruptly upon it without warning and established 
possession by pure audacity almost before other 
powers realized what was happening. Nor, her 
so-called lease once secured, did she hesitate to go 
forward along the same lines. What was possibly 
a misstep, in respect to some matter of mining 
machinery which she proposed to compel the Chi- 
nese in Shan-tung to purchase from German 
rather than American bidders, aroused Mr. Hay 
and brought about the Hay agreement respecting 
the principle of the *'open door." But, although 
compelled by circumstances outwardly to lower 
the colors of the "sphere of influence" doctrine, 
she never swerved from her purpose, which was 



FOEEIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 211 

undoubtedly shaped in expectation of, if not in 
deliberate effort to bring about the dismember- 
ment of China. The ''boxer" troubles gave her 
a new opportunity. North China will not soon 
forget the punitive expeditions undertaken by the 
Kaiser's picked regiments. In the readjustment 
of interests which followed the "boxer" war, or 
rather in the ensuing haste of most of the powers 
to grab what they could while unsettled condi- 
tions lasted, the German-Eussian entente had its 
origin. 

This entente, denied by both Eussia and Ger- 
many in the days of its influence and now reduced 
by recent events to temporary inanition, had un- 
doubtedly at one time a tangible existence. Its 
traces may be found in all the windings of Far 
Eastern diplomacy in the years between the 
"boxer" trouble and the war between Eussia and 
Japan, but I will not attempt to follow their 
intricacies here. Its fundamental basis rested 
upon a mutual understanding as to the division 
between the two powers of that part of the Chi- 
nese empire lying north of the Yiang-tse valley, 
and which geographically would translate into 
something like what I have previously outlined. 
During this period German diplomacy at Peking 
was characterized by an unparalleled aggressive- 
ness and insolence. The unfortunate death of 
the German minister just prior to the "boxer" 
outbreak, now generally considered to have been 
largely the result of his own imprudence, to give 
his conduct a mild name, was made the excuse for 
numerous exactions to which the humbled and 



212 THE NEW FAE EAST 

helpless CMnese Government was compelled to 
submit. 

Meanwhile, as a corollary to political and mili- 
tary energy, and calculated to give some appar- 
ently adequate foundation for both, extraordinary 
measures to advance German *' interests" in 
China were inaugurated. A minute elucidation 
of the details of this attempt to ' ' create interests 
to protect," which I have gathered in the course 
of two visits to the Shan-tung province since the 
German occupation, and elsewhere throughout the 
empire, would be very interesting and illumina- 
tive of what is getting to be a common method of 
indirect political aggression upon weaker nations ; 
but an indication or two must suffice. 

One cannot fail to be impressed with the ma- 
terial demonstrations of German ''interests" in 
China. At Tsing-tau she has built a modern city 
scarcely inferior to the one Russia constructed at 
Dalny; and so close is the relation between Ger- 
man and Russian method in the Far East that 
there is little doubt that the one is the replica, in 
political purpose, of the other. From Tsing-tau 
has been built a railway which already penetrates 
beyond the heart of the province, and will soon be 
connected with the Peking-Hankow road, and by a 
branch to the north will reach Tien-tsin. German 
subsidized steamships ply along the China coast 
and on the Yiang-tse, creating by a clever method 
of port registration a most exaggerated impres- 
sion of the extent of German shipping interests. 
At every important treaty port within the empire 
impressive and commodious consulates have been 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 213 

or are being built, while an elaborate commercial 
bureau, fully supplied with clerical aid, supple- 
ments the ordinary consular work. At Shanghai 
a magnificent post-office has been built to handle 
a comparatively small amount of German mail 
matter, while the Kaiser is said to have provided 
from his personal funds part of the money to build 
the splendid Concordia Club now being erected on 
the Shanghai bund, and which, with a small mem- 
bership to support it, will eclipse any similar 
building in the Orient. A press news service and 
a number of publications are maintained, and no 
means neglected to supply obvious indication of 
great and varied German ''interests" throughout 
the Far East. It is true that close scrutiny of 
these ''interests" will reveal that they are to a 
great extent fictitious, and really exist upon gov- 
ernment subsidies; which conveys definite assur- 
ance that, in their present state, they were insti- 
tuted and are maintained for political rather than 
commercial purposes. 

And here we touch the heart of the matter. Are 
we to assume that a power like Germany, after ten 
years of energetic striving and great expenditure 
of life and money, will see her prospects blighted 
and abandon her purpose without an effort to 
protect them? Whatever may be the possibilities 
of German commercial and industrial interests 
in the Far East under the "open door," the 
opinion in Berlin seems to be that they will ulti- 
mately be better promoted by predominance in 
a certain "sphere" than by equal opportunity 
throughout the whole of China. At any rate 



214 THE NEW FAR EAST 

there is no doubt that Germany's policy has up to 
now been shaped on this theory, be it mistaken 
or not. 

While there is no sound reason to warrant the 
belief that there has been a sincere alteration in 
the policy of Germany, there is no doubt that it has 
undergone an outward change within the last few 
months, or since it became certain that Japan was 
to be victorious in the struggle with Russia. I 
have it direct from a member of the Wai-wu-pu 
that, beginning soon after the battle of the Japan 
Sea, German diplomatic method at Peking under- 
went a transition which amounted to revolution. 
At that time Germany was pressing upon China a 
number of minor, though not unimportant, conces- 
sions in Shan-tung, which, if granted, would have 
almost certainly caused dissatisfaction to other 
powers, as well as being a relinquishment of Chi- 
nese autonomy. The Wai-wu-pu was resisting 
this pressure as well as it could, but might have 
been compelled to yield in the end had not the now 
famous naval battle demolished Russia's chances. 
The German change of front was so sudden as to 
be almost ludicrous; in fact, the Chinese official 
who gave me the details did laugh exceedingly in 
their narration. He had the wit to see the humor 
of the situation, while at the same time in his heart 
deploring the state of aifairs which made China 
the shuttlecock of fate. But, while outwardly 
acquiescing in the existing status quo, until she is 
able to determine upon what shall be the next 
move, Germany undoubtedly regards the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance with suspicion and alarm, and 



FOREIGN POLICIES IN CHINA 215 

only bides her time until conditions make the for- 
mulation of an opposition policy feasible. 

The other great powers who may be presumed 
from the logic of their situation to favor the 
''sphere of influence" doctrine are, of course, 
Eussia and France. France is not active in the 
advancement of any special policy, but her inclina- 
tion will be to support Russia under ordinary cir- 
cumstances, in order to prevent Eussia from flying 
to the arms of Germany. However, she will prob- 
ably not take a decided stand either way, having 
at stake neither so much to win or lose as to war- 
rant it. 

With Russia it is different. Although defeated, 
and for the time distracted by internal problems, 
she is certain to emerge from these temporary 
disabilities and resume her position among the 
powers. While, owing to her defeat at the hands 
of Japan, her prestige in the Orient must tem- 
porarily suffer, her position on the borders of 
China will always make her felt at Peking, and 
she can never be left out of any reasonable estima- 
tion of political probabilities in connection with 
the Far Eastern question. The fact that Russia 
still occupies four-fifths of Manchuria should not 
be forgotten; and her position in Mongolia is 
unshaken. In a few years she will have her pres- 
ent Siberian Railway double-tracked, and the new 
line via Tashkent and Kokand finished, which will 
vastly increase her military potency in Asia. Be- 
sides, it is idle to assume that she will abandon 
what is to her a permanent purpose, and her still 
great material interests on the Pacific. That 



216 THE NEW FAR EAST 

England and Japan fully recognize this is indi- 
cated by their alliance. Why, unless she still 
fears Russia, does England apparently sacrifice 
desires in other directions to assure the assistance 
of Japan should the Indian frontier be attacked? 
There is a logical foundation for the belief, enter- 
tained by some statesmen in Europe, that Eng- 
land was practically forced into the present alli- 
ance to prevent Japan from reaching a reciprocal 
agreement with Russia. And does not this as- 
sumption imply the existence of a certain harmony 
between the designs and intentions of Russia and 
Japan in eastern Asia, or, to speak more exactly, 
a disposition to compromise in advance a possible 
future collision? 

This leads, inevitably, when the whole situation 
is considered, to the question: Has England sac- 
rificed the ''open door," with its now doubtful 
advantages to her, to the more certain and definite 
benefit of the security of her Indian frontier and 
her ' ' sphere of influence ' ' in China 1 



CHAPTER XV 
THE NEW CHINA 

The Awakening of China — Forces Within the Empire 

— External Elements — The Balance of Power — 
Foreign Commercial Exploitation — Relation of Di- 
plomacy to Commercial and Industrial Enterprises 

— Foreign Concessions — Growth and Development 
of Railways in China — Conquest by Railway — 
Russia's Daring Scheme — The American Railway 
Concession — The Belgian Stalking Horse — Bene- 
ficial Forces — The Imperial Railways of North 
China — Influence of General Foreign Commerce — 
Great Opportunities. 

The evolution of any part of the human race, 
however obscure or humble, must always be an 
interesting spectacle. When such evolution em- 
braces one-third of the total population of the 
earth and involves the transformation of a com- 
plex and effete civilization into one in which mod- 
ern material progress, with its creation of new 
wants and the means to satisfy them, is the pre- 
dominating force, it becomes also very significant. 

Such is the spectacle now presented in China. 
The Western world has waited so long for China 
to rouse from her sleep of centuries that an im- 
pression has obtained that she would never awake. 
It is not surprising, then, that there should be a 
disposition to overlook the psychological moment 

217 



218 THE NEW FAR EAST 

(if under such circumstances it may ever be accu- 
rately determined) when the decisive change takes 
place. Yet I venture to suggest that, aided by the 
perspective of time, the future historian will fix 
this turning point for China somewhere among the 
years from 1900 to 1906. It is perhaps too much 
to say that China is already fully awake, but it is 
certain that she has opened her eyes and is taking 
notice of what is going on in the world about her. 

In attempting, with the hope of in a measure 
determining the course upon which this vast and 
unwieldy ship of state is setting, to analyze the 
forces now struggling for mastery, it becomes 
necessary to examine them somewhat in detail. 
These forces may be roughly classified as external 
and internal; the external forces being those ex- 
erted through foreign influence, and the internal 
forces those inherent and susceptible of develop- 
ment in China herself. Since the external forces 
are immediately responsible for the existing trans- 
formation, and certain to be very influential in 
shaping its course, they may well be considered 
first. 

It is not necessary, in this connection, to trace 
the course of foreign influence in China, from the 
advent of the first European along through the 
sometime disturbing episodes which have attended 
over zealous missionary labors and more or less 
grasping commercial exploitation. While the 
effect of these conditions has been subtle and far- 
reaching, external political pressure is the direct 
power that is forcing China into the path of mod- 
ern progress ; although its more obvious manif es- 



THE NEW CHINA 219 

tations are along commercial and industrial lines. 
This pressure, in its present form, is a develop- 
ment of the last decade, or since the demonstration 
of China's inability to defend herself. So persist- 
ent and determined has it been that it must have 
by this time accomplished the partition of the 
empire and its division into sections, each the 
scene of a system of special exploitation, had it 
not created, by calling into play the usual inter- 
national jealousies, its own check in what is gen- 
erally called a ''balance of power." Thus while 
China has as yet managed to preserve a sort of 
national equilibrium, she has not been able to 
escape the influences which have been planted 
deeply and ineradicably in the social and political 
life of the empire, and which are certain to bear 
revolutionary fruit. To get at the effect of these 
external influences, and the probable results upon 
the future of the Far East, it is necessary to 
scrutinize some of the principal elements and the 
methods employed to introduce and advance them. 
Americans, while they have not scrupled to 
make free use of governmental assistance in ma- 
nipulating their internal commercial and indus- 
trial affairs, are not accustomed to consider 
political forces in connection with the struggle 
for foreign trade. In the competition with sub- 
jects of other nations in the marts of the world 
they are disposed to regard it more as a matter 
between private enterprises than an international 
affair. And even where American business con- 
cerns have felt the pinch of political pressure, 
their efforts to secure like backing from their 



220 THE NEW FAR EAST 

government have not, as a rule, received much 
attention. Consequently, notwithstanding that 
appreciation of this question is growing with the 
expansion of America's foreign trade and the 
recognition of its importance to her internal in- 
dustrial situation, it is difficult for the average 
American to realize the extent to which the diplo- 
macy of other nations carries its efforts to ad- 
vance the private interests of their nationals. In 
no part of the world has this method been carried 
to such extremes as in the Far East. There it is 
the habit of diplomacy not only to assiduously 
urge the interests of its own nationals, but to re- 
sort to every device known to the profession to 
retard and defeat the similar efforts of other lega- 
tions. There an apparently innocent and legiti- 
mate business proposition may be, and frequently 
is a political design in disguise, while a mild and 
seemingly inoffensive diplomatic note or treaty 
may contain the genesis of some far-reaching 
scheme of commercial exploitation. In the Far 
East diplomacy stalks its political prey under 
cover of commercial and industrial enterprise, 
while commerce and industry strike at competi- 
tion through open or surreptitious diplomatic 
wire-pulling. So closely are the two interwoven 
that it is often very difficult to distinguish one 
from the other, if indeed they are ever entirely 
separated. 

Foreign enterprises in China, as well as in most 
Far Eastern countries, are conducted under the 
terms of what are called "concessions," which 
are practically analogous to public franchises in 



THE NEW CHINA 221 

America. Owing to the peculiar relations between 
the provincial and imperial administrations in 
China, the securing of a concession is almost inva- 
riably a difficult and complex matter, even when 
foreign diplomatic opposition is not encountered. 
The necessity of gaining the support or passive 
assent of a long line of provincial and petty local 
officials as well as that of the Imperial Government 
at Peking, creates innumerable places where an- 
tagonistic diplomacy may lurk in ambush to as- 
sassinate a project. As a consequence, it has 
become almost impossible to secure any important 
concession without gaining for it the passive sup- 
port of other foreign legations in Peking by a 
reciprocal arrangement of some kind. For in- 
stance, when Eussia, Germany and France were 
respectively endeavoring to carry through at Pe- 
king the concessions for the Manchurian, Shan- 
tung and Peking-Hankow railways, they only suc- 
ceeded by diplomatically pooling their issues. 
Neither would permit the others to progress un- 
less it, too, got what was wanted. Americans are 
familiar enough with this process at home; but 
American interests in the Far East have usually 
been compelled to make such headway as they 
could without much diplomatic assistance, even 
while encountering at every hand the hostile 
machinations of rival projects supported by all 
the influence their respective governments can 
exert. 

Of the foreign concessions which have been 
made to cover and advance far-reaching political 
designs in China, and have at the same time ex- 



222 THE NEW FAE EAST 



erted a tremendous and permanent influence upon 
the social, industrial and political life of the 
nation, the railways undoubtedly take first rank; 
and an examination of the origin and growth of 
railway construction will serve to illustrate the 
method and results of the system. It is probable 
that the first railways planned for China were 
conceived as purely commercial projects, as the 
art of conquest by railroads had not then reached 
its later stage of development. And the earlier 
opposition which was encountered sprang princi- 
pally from the forces of inherited conservatism. 
But it is now clear that, at least so far as popular 
feeling is concerned, the character and extent of 
such opposition was greatly exaggerated ; and was 
largely the result of, if not entirely created by the 
anti-foreign propaganda stimulated by reaction- 
ary official classes. At any rate, even under the 
generally adverse conditions which have pre- 
vailed, manifestations of popular hostility to rail- 
roads have almost entirely disappeared, and such 
opposition to railroad construction as still re- 
mains in China springs from an entirely different 
source and is the outgrowth of recent develop- 
ments. In fact, present opposition is entirely 
political, and any analysis of it must of necessity 
touch the mainsprings of the evolution which is 
creating the new China. 

< In attempting, by elimination of the trivial and 
non-essential, to get at the determining forces 
which developed the prevailing system of conquest 
by railway in the Far East, one is inevitably 
drawn to the time when the trans-Siberian rail- 



< 



THE NEW CHINA 223 

way began to press for an outlet through Man- 
churia. By what schemes, promises, threats and 
bribes this concession was secured by Eussia will 
probably never be fully known. It marked the 
beginning of the struggle for railway ''conces- 
sions" in the Far East. European chancelleries 
at once saw the true significance of the project, 
and promptly acted upon the hint. English, Ger- 
man, French and Belgian concessions were ener- 
getically urged upon the Chinese Government, and 
even an American concession entered the field. 
To follow the diplomatic intricacies involved in 
the introduction and urging of these various proj- 
ects, extremely interesting as it might be, is not 
necessary here. The Chinese Government, awak- 
ened by this time to a partial realization of the 
true import of some of the demands, exerted all 
the art of its devious diplomacy to retard and 
avert them. Under the circumstances, it had only 
one effective means of obstruction — to play the 
various powers against each other. This it did 
for a time with considerable success. But the 
pressure was too strong to be long resisted by a 
belligerently impotent nation. However, since 
they found themselves powerless to stave off the 
inevitable, Chinese statesmen displayed remark- 
able ingenuity in preserving among the foreign 
powers a balance of interest calculated to main- 
tain the political equilibrium of the Chinese Em- 
pire. It was not until Eussia, feeling the need of 
an outlet to Port Arthur after she had secured a 
lease of that port, and desiring to extend her rail- 
road south from Harbin, was compelled to make 



224 THE NEW FAR EAST 

common cause at Peking with G-ermany and 
France, that the Peking-Hankow, Shan-tung and 
Manchurian concessions were secured. Nor was 
this done without some diplomatic side-stepping, 
which injected Belgium as a joint mover with 
France in the Peking-Hankow project. The in- 
troduction of Belgium was a clever move, de- 
signed to allay the growing apprehension of 
China. It was pointed out that Belgium was not 
a military power and, consequently, could not be 
assumed to have aggressive political aspirations 
in China. Some of these concessions, too, took the 
form of a contract to build and operate the rail- 
ways under an agreement by which China could 
in time purchase them and take over control. This 
showed that China was becoming wary. And in 
this spirit, undoubtedly, the American concession 
was conceived and took root. 

The history of the so-called American railway 
concession in China is so varied in its ramifica- 
tions and phases, and touches so closely, from time 
to time, most of the powerful interests struggling 
for supremacy in the Far East, that it may be 
taken as an example to illustrate the purposes and 
methods brought to bear in shaping the course of 
events. This concession originated with an Amer- 
ican of considerable experience with political and 
commercial conditions in China, who saw in the 
struggle of Chinese statesmen to maintain a bal- 
ance of foreign interests within the empire an 
opportunity for American enterprise. Just how 
the matter was first broached is not material, but 
it was immediately encouraged by certain high 



THE NEW CHINA 225 

Chinese officials, who at once discerned in it a con- 
venient check upon demands in other directions. 
After a number of consultations it was decided 
that a petition for a concession to build a railway 
from Canton to Hankow be asked in behalf of an 
American corporation. Under any other circum- 
stances it is probable that this concession would 
have been stubbornly opposed on general princi- 
ples by injfluential Chinese officials at Peking and 
throughout the empire, as well as by other for- 
eign interests desiring a similar grant ; but coming 
when it did it was almost welcome to the Peking 
authorities as an offset to pressing demands in 
other quarters, while any competitive opposition 
it might have ordinarily encountered was prac- 
tically estopped by the fear of raising new antago- 
nism to other desires. So, after various vicissi- 
tudes and considerable delay, an agreement giving 
an American corporation the right to build and 
operate a railway between Canton and Hankow 
was signed in 1898. 

To enter exhaustively into the history of this 
concession would be deeply illustrative of certain 
methods of so-called high finance, which are being 
just now persistently thrust upon public atten- 
tion, and which may be passed over in the search 
for broader issues. I am inclined to think that 
it was originally conceived and promoted as a 
legitimate business enterprise. But as time 
passed it was destined to assume many shapes. 
The original promoters, after they had secured 
their concession, failed to raise the money to go 
ahead with it. Enough money was raised to 



226 THE NEW FAE EAST 

keep up, for a time, a pretence of going on with 
the work. A survey was made, and other prelim- 
inary work undertaken. However, the company 
conducted its affairs in a way to arouse the dis- 
trust of the Chinese Government, which had a 
right to exercise a supervisory authority under 
the terms of the agreement. Things came to a 
standstill, and something had to be done. The 
concession was too valuable, in more ways than 
one, to be permitted to collapse. Various plans 
for a reorganization were proposed, and while 
they were under consideration a new element was 
injected into the situation. 

This new element was nothing less than the 
Eussian Government, operating through the newly 
created Eusso-Chinese bank and its allied insti- 
tutions in Europe. By this time the concession 
for the Peking-Hankow railroad had been granted 
to a syndicate nominally composed jointly of 
French and Belgian capitalists. It is now known, 
however, that there was a private understanding 
that the project was to be financed by the Eusso- 
Chinese bank, and not by the Bank of Indo-China, 
which would have naturally undertaken to man- 
age a French and Belgian enterprise in China. 
About this time it became known that the Canton- 
Hankow scheme, usually spoken of as the "Amer- 
ican concession," was in financial difficulties. In 
fact, the situation was so bad at one time that one 
of the original promoters, who was cognizant of 
certain political designs in the Far East and knew 
the value of the Canton-Hankow concession in 
furthering them, went directly to Count Cassini 



THE NEW CHINA 227 

and opened negotiations with a view to turning 
over the concession to Eussia. Circumstances 
happened to be such that these negotiations were 
for the time dropped, but the scheme was taken 
up later in another and more subtle form. 

By this time the Chinese Government had 
awakened to a full realization of what Eussian 
railroads in Manchuria meant, and was deter- 
mined to prevent, if possible, their further ex- 
tension. This had been one of the chief reasons 
for granting the Peking-Hankow franchise to a 
Franco-Belgian syndicate, and the Hankow-Can- 
ton road to the American corporation. Now 
China discovered that the Peking-Hankow project 
was really backed by Eussia, and while this was 
strenuously denied by all the interested parties, 
the suspicion was too well founded to be easily 
eradicated. And there is little doubt that Eussia 
then entertained the idea of controlling, in connec- 
tion with her other Asiatic railways, the whole of 
the great trunk line which will, when completed, 
cut China through the middle, north and south. 
Hampered by the too well-grounded suspicions of 
China, and the jealous hostility of other powers, 
Eussia could not go openly after the Hankow- 
Canton concession held by the American company. 
But a little difficulty like this would not stop Eus- 
sia if she considered the object to be gained worth 
while; so she set about reaching her goal indi- 
rectly. There is evidence that the probability of 
the concession falling into the hands of Eussia did 
not escape the notice of British interests in China, 
and an effort was made to secure for the project 



228 THE new: FAR EAST 

financial backing in London, with at one time a 
good prospect for success. But England's atten- 
tion was then chiefly occupied in South Africa, and 
this deal eventually fell through. 

So it came about that in 1900 the American 
company owning the concession was reorganized. 
Under this reorganization the controlling interest 
was held by a Belgian syndicate, of which King 
Leopold was the nominal head. The stock neces- 
sary to control the company had been quietly pur- 
chased in New York by agents of the Belgian 
syndicate, one of whom was elected president of 
the reorganized concern. "While this transaction 
was conducted as quietly as possible, it was too 
important to escape the notice of persons directly 
interested. It created a feeling little short of con- 
sternation in Peking, Chinese diplomats suspect- 
ing at once the hand of Russia. And I may say 
that the circumstantial evidence to support this 
view is very strong. Every effort was made to 
preserve the legal status of the American corpo- 
ration. Most of the important offices were held by 
Americans, many of whom retained a small inter- 
est in the company. Three million dollars were 
provided to carry on the work, and this was even- 
tually expended after a fashion. At that time 
there was nothing to positively show that the 
reorganization transaction was not bona fide. But 
the later history of the concession strongly bears 
out the view entertained by Chinese officials, that 
the Belgian syndicate which secured nominal con- 
trol was only a stalking horse for Russia, which 
was the real agency behind the reorganization. 



THE NEW CHINA 229 

Chinese officials were alarmed, as they had good 
cause to be. In the north Eussia had already- 
made her railways the excuse to occupy Man- 
churia, while Germany was displaying a similar 
tendency in Shan-tung. And now came this spec- 
tre of a quasi-Eussian road through the heart of 
the empire. It should be remembered that, in the 
then existing situation in China, this was a real, 
not an imaginary peril. So naturally Chinese 
officials, seeing the American concession about to 
be turned to exactly opposite uses than what they 
had desired or intended, began to seek opportuni- 
ties to revoke or nullify it. 

A reasonable excuse to do this was soon pre- 
sented by the American company itself. Under a 
clause of the agreement which gave the Chinese 
Government the right, under certain terms and 
conditions, to purchase the road after it had been 
completed and put in operation, the government 
had reserved the privilege of inspecting and audit- 
ing the work and expenditure. The three million 
dollars raised when the Belgian syndicate took 
control was used in building some twenty-seven 
miles of road, with some additional grading work, 
and in completing the final surveys and estimates. 
To say that the results achieved were entirely out 
of proportion to the expense is to put the matter 
mildly. It is charity to pass by the details of this 
sample of American enterprise in China. At any 
rate, the Chinese objected to the accounts and the 
manner in which the work was being done; and 
they also objected to the transfer of the concession 
to the Belgian syndicate, claiming that it was a 



230 THE NEW FAE EAST 

vital part of the original agreement that only 
American capital should be employed, and that 
the road should not be transferred to any other 
nationality. While it is impracticable to enter 
here into the details of the original and supple- 
mentary agreements, it is certain that the Chinese 
Government had just grounds for many of its 
objections. It is unlikely, however, that it would 
have been able to enforce them had not the course 
of events prevented Eussia from carrying out 
her daring project. The war with Japan shat- 
tered many well-laid plans of Eussia in the Far 
East, and her scheme to control the railway 
system of China was among them. Of course, 
certain interests have always denied that Eus- 
sia ever had any designs to secure the Canton- 
Hankow concession, but it is significant that no 
sooner was Eussia compelled to concentrate her 
energies upon more pressing matters than the so- 
called Belgian syndicate collapsed, and the Amer- 
ican concession was again in financial difficulties. 
Moreover, the Chinese Government was threat- 
ening to rescind the concession, and the American 
Government and Minister, disgusted at the course 
of events, had little inclination to urge further the 
interests of the company at Peking. For political 
reasons a majority of the stock was transferred 
back to American representatives of the Belgian 
syndicate, in order to give the impression that a 
controlling interest was again held in America. 
Later it was reported that a new American syn- 
dicate, composed of men of high standing in the 
financial world, had taken the franchise up and 



THE NEW CHINA 231 

would begin at once a bona fide construction of 
the road as a genuine American enterprise. But 
the patience of the Chinese had been exhausted, 
and it soon became evident that the project, in its 
original shape, could only proceed under a con- 
stant succession of difficulties. Consequently, some 
months ago the franchise was given up on the pay- 
ment of something less than seven million dol- 
lars by the Chinese Government, for which sum 
it has received almost nothing. Thus ignomini- 
ously terminated the first important project ever 
launched under American auspices in China. 

Enough has probably been said, coupled with 
the now general knowledge of the uses to which 
the Eussian and German railways have been put, 
to demonstrate the peculiar significance to China 
of even the most innocent looking foreign com- 
mercial or industrial enterprise. Thanks to the 
history of the railway concession, even American 
projects are now regarded with suspicion and 
some distrust. But the law of compensation oper- 
ates here as elsewhere, and out of all this beneficial 
forces are gathering strength. No matter what 
reason led to their introduction, or the uses to 
which they have been put, the railroads have come 
to China and are there to stay. I think it probable 
that during the next twenty years more miles of 
railway will be built in China than in any other part 
of the world; and while foreigners may assist in 
providing the capital to finance this tremendous 
industrial evolution, the prime movers will be the 
Chinese themselves, who will insist, as far as they 
are able, upon retaining substantial control. This 



232 THE NEW FAR EAST 

disposition supplied one of the forces which led to 
the reclaiming of the Canton-Hankow road, and 
it is safe to say that hereafter no important com- 
mercial or industrial concession will be willingly 
granted by the Chinese Government in which Chi- 
nese capitalists are not interested, or in which the 
government does not reserve the right to take it 
over under equitable conditions, especially if pub- 
lic utilities are involved. The chief reason is that 
the Chinese have discovered that railroads are 
convenient and valuable in the development of the 
country. "* 

In bringing about this remarkable change in 
sentiment the Imperial Railways of North China 
has been largely responsible. Originally pro- 
jected by an Anglo-Chinese corporation as a 
means of communication between the sea and 
some coal fields, this railway has been gradually 
extended until it has attained important dimen- 
sions, with plans for great extensions well under 
way. While it employs foreign administrators in 
a majority of the more important positions, the 
road is principally owned and operated by Chi- 
nese. But the main thing which impresses the 
Chinese is that the road is extremely profitable. 
This was the one thing needed to give an enormous 
impetus to railroad building in China, and it has 
now been conclusively established. Wealthy Chi- 
nese in all parts of the empire are now willing, 
even anxious to invest in railroads. In fact, a dis- 
position to exclude foreigners from these enter- 
prises is growing, and would probably be put into 
effect did not internal conditions at present 



THE NEW CHINA 233 

make the foreigners a practical necessity. One 
of these conditions is the absence of native insti- 
tutions capable of financing undertakings of such 
magnitude. The financial system of the country 
is in a chaotic state, and while there is at present 
a feeble effort toward reform, no great progress 
need be expected for many years. But the more 
essential reason lies in the fact that as China is 
now governed there is no real legal security for 
the property of Chinese subjects, should it be- 
come the object of either the rapacity or enmity of 
high officials. Of course, a liberal application of 
bribes in the form of ' ' squeeze ' ' can usually com- 
mand protection ; but Chinese capitalists are com- 
ing to realize that the ''squeeze" method is too 
elastic and uncertain to be satisfactory when ap- 
plied to great interests, whose prosperity may de- 
pend upon the stability of their debentures in the 
financial markets of the world. So under existing 
conditions an enterprise composed almost exclu- 
sively of Chinese capitalists will organize as a 
foreign corporation for personal and business rea- 
sons, and in doing this it is wise and necessary to 
have the cooperation of foreigners. It will be 
some time yet before the new China will be able 
to dispense with the foreigner, with a strong prob- 
ability that by the time she is able to eliminate 
him she will not desire to do so. This conjecture, 
of course, applies to development along natural 
lines as distinguished from one directly or indi- 
rectly the result of external political and military 
pressure. 
Aside from railway, mining and other industrial 



234 THE NEW FAR EAST 

enterprises which have, by stepping outside the 
customary course of development of foreign com- 
merce in China, created a peculiar relation of their 
own, there is the great volume of foreign trade 
which cannot be overlooked in any estimation of 
external influence. In respect to her general for- 
eign commerce, China's position is now singular 
among the great nations. Foreigners can do busi- 
ness within the empire only at certain places, 
designated as ' ' treaty ports, ' ' which are adminis- 
tered under what are termed "extra territorial 
rights." While these ports seem to be compara- 
tively numerous, they are really very limited when 
the vast extent and population of the empire is 
considered. To-day in China a foreigner requires 
a passport to travel away from the treaty ports, 
and if he does so without one it is largely at his 
own risk. But even under these handicaps for- 
eign trade has grown to enormous proportions, 
and considerable foreign populations have settled 
in many of the treaty ports. The material growth 
of the foreign concessions at Shanghai, Tien-tsin, 
Hankow and other places is really astonishing, 
even to one who has kept touch with the Far 
East in recent years, and they must be a revelation 
to Westerners seeing the East for the first time. 
The influence exerted by the planting of these 
modem cities permanently in China is tremen- 
dous, incalculable and ineradicable. From them 
radiate to the remotest parts of the empire com- 
mercial and industrial connections inseparable 
from the life of the people and indispensable to 
the future progress of the country. 



THE NEW CHINA 235 

And, fortunately, the character of the foreign 
population is steadily changing for the better. 
There was a time, not so very remote, when the 
China coast was the dumping ground for the dere- 
licts of Europe and America; when even respect- 
able foreigners residing in China were animated 
by the chief purpose of getting all they could out 
of the country regardless of the effect of their 
methods upon the natives. But the day has al- 
ready come when such persons and methods will 
find their opportunities limited in China by the 
same forces that limit them elsewhere. The time 
has passed when unscrupulous agents can sell the 
Chinese Government defective rifles and cannon 
of one calibre and ammunition of another calibre 
for them; when worn-out machinery can be un- 
loaded upon the Chinese as the latest and best, 
and when dwarf locomotives discarded by the 
New York elevated railroad can be used to equip 
a Chinese trunk line. This is all finished. The 
China of to-day has no more use for such things 
than has the United States of America. The 
European or American with a bunco game on a 
big scale might as well stay at home. His chance 
of working it will be fully as good there as it 
is in China; perhaps a little better. But to the 
young Westerner who knows how to do something 
useful and is willing to do it, to the business con- 
cern which has something valuable to offer upon 
reasonable terms, this wonderful country beckons 
and will reward. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE NEW CHINA 
CONTINUED 

Quasi-foreign Forces Within the Empire — The Japanese 
Influence — Growth of the Native Press — Peculiar 
Conditions — Extra-territoriality — Growing Force 
of Publicity in China — Japanese Use of this Force 
— Anti-foreign Propaganda — Subtle Methods Em- 
ployed — The Boycott of American Goods — Origin 
of the Movement — Misconceptions Regarding it — 
The Real Forces at Work — Footprints of the Agita- 
tion — Injury to Chinese Merchants — Methods of 
Intimidation — Progress of the Movement — A Warn- 
ing to the West. 

One is somewhat at a loss, in turning from ex- 
ternal to internal forces in the transformation of 
China, in which class to place the Japanese influ- 
ence. That this is a vital factor may not be 
doubted. Technically, in the sense of nationality, 
it must be considered an external element ; but in 
its broader, more elementary aspects it already 
displays tendencies, at least to me, to become asso- 
ciated more with the internal forces at work within 
the Empire. Different as the two peoples are in 
many ways, they have and will retain character- 
istics which bring them in some respects nearer to 
each other in thought and incentive than either 
can approach any Western people. Personally, 

236 



THE NEW CHINA 237 

the Chinese, as a rule, do not like the Japanese, 
and vice versa. But, aside from the control of 
what has been Chinese territory, and which pro- 
vides a powerful political leverage, the founda- 
tions of Japanese influence are being too solidly; 
and carefully laid to fail to accomplish some of the 
purposes for which they are designed. 

Since it is evident that the Japanese can reach 
the Chinese in ways Western nations cannot, and 
by methods which Western nations cannot imitate 
in many of their phases, a study of some of these 
methods and purposes, in so far as they have pro- 
gressed, may develop something of significance. 
In this it will be better to leave out of considera- 
tion that part of China where Japanese military 
control has established peculiar conditions, and 
confine myself to that greater part of the empire 
where the interests and influence of Japan may be 
still assumed, hypothetically, to be analogous to 
those of other powers. 

The year 1905 provided a very significant dem- 
onstration of certain internal forces operating 
within the new China, which bear incidentally, 
even directly, upon some methods of the exten- 
sion and use of Japanese influence. I refer to 
the so-called boycott of American goods. I was in 
China from the time this extraordinary movement 
first attracted serious attention until, after many 
ostentatious diplomatic burials, it reached the 
end of its political utility and was permitted to 
dribble out so far as direct stimulation is con- 
cerned; and I took more than ordinary pains to 
follow its gradual developments. This incident 



238 THE NEW FAE EAST 

attracted widespread attention, particularly in 
America, where, if its true origin and import is 
but imperfectly understood, it has served to call 
attention to a matter of considerable importance — 
the treatment of Chinese who attempt to visit the 
United States. But the so-called boycott had a 
more far-reaching significance than the issue 
raised by this question, and deserves a more care- 
ful elucidation than it has yet received. 

An extremely interesting and important devel- 
opment of the last few years in China is the un- 
usual growth and change in character of the 
native press. Until recently the native news- 
papers have been little more than official gazettes, 
controlled by the court and the official classes, and 
have exerted small influence upon the political life 
of the nation. Now this is entirely altered, and the 
manner of the change is significant. In connection 
with this condition Japan has given another strik- 
ing exhibition of her adaptability by discovering 
and putting into operation a new and original ex- 
tension of her press propaganda. This is nothing 
less than its application to the native press in 
China. 

Peculiar conditions have made this compara- 
tively easy. I have mentioned the ** extra terri- 
torial rights ' ' under which the foreign concessions 
of all treaty ports are governed. Translated into 
practical administration, this means that China 
has no legal jurisdiction over foreigners, and only 
partial jurisdiction over Chinese who reside 
within the limits of such treaty ports or conces- 
sions. So a vernacular newspaper, operating 



THE NEW CHINA 239 

under a foreign charter, may be published in any 
treaty port subject only to the laws of the foreign 
nation where the charter is secured. This means, 
for instance, that a Chinese newspaper printed in 
Shanghai by a British or Japanese corporation is 
subject only to the publicity laws of those respect- 
ive countries ; and it is not possible for the Chinese 
Government to apply a censorship. So such 
papers, which of course circulate only among the 
Chinese, are as free to express opinion and criti- 
cise the acts of the Chinese Government and 
officials as is the press of New York, although cir- 
cumstances usually demand that this freedom be 
exercised with discretion. It is true that outside 
the foreign concessions the Chinese Government 
may exercise its authority to suppress the circula- 
tion of such papers, but attempts to do so have 
usually proven to be impracticable, resulting only 
in the punishment of a few coolies who sold the 
papers, while the publishers rested secure in extra 
territorial immunity. Thus we have a presumably 
despotic government which cannot control to any 
appreciable extent publicity within its domain, for 
treaty ports are scattered throughout the empire 
and new ones are being constantly created. It 
requires no argument to demonstrate to Ameri- 
cans the political and social possibilities involved 
in this situation. These newspapers are already a 
power, and are stirring latent forces among the 
people which have never before been touched. 

I do not think I shall be accused of exaggeration 
when I say that control of this tremendous force 
of publicity, in its primal application to the 



240 THE NEW FAR EAST 

mental processes of one-third of the inhabitants 
of the earth, hitherto cut off from and indifferent 
to its influence, is of extraordinary importance to 
the future of the Far East and to the whole world. 
And when I say that there is positive evidence of 
the existence of a systematic and well-developed 
plan of Japan to control and manipulate this 
force, or at least a predominating section of it, 
it will be seen that I broach a matter of some 
significance. While in China recently I was pre- 
sented by a person in close touch with the progress 
of events in the Far East with a list of twenty-six 
vernacular publications believed to be either 
directly or indirectly controlled in the Japanese 
interest. Not all of them are operating under 
Japanese charters, although the more important 
ones are. Several are printed in cities outside 
the extra territorial jurisdiction, which limits 
but by no means obviates their usefulness. While 
I have no means of accurately verifying this list, 
there is good reason to think it is substantially 
correct. It is likely that political considerations 
prevented a majority of these newspapers pub- 
lished in treaty ports from being chartered in 
Japan, for it could hardly be expected that rival 
interests would overlook such a coincidence, but 
the advantages of such charters to Japan are 
obvious. Take, for instance, a Chinese newspaper 
printed in the foreign settlement of Shanghai 
under a Japanese charter. This means that the 
publicity laws of Japan apply to its publication; 
ergo, the Japanese Government can exercise the 
same supervision over it as it does over news- 



THE NEW CHINA 241 

papers printed in Japan. This is, however, not 
an unmixed advantage. The methods adopted in 
controlling the poUcies of these newspapers are 
as varied, subtle and difficult to trace as are 
similar methods in England or America; and 
often the proof must depend upon mainly circum- 
stantial evidence not apparent to laymen, but 
easily discerned by the trained journalistic eye. 
But let us see what these papers have been doing. 
While this systematic effort to influence popu- 
lar opinion in China, and through it governmental 
action, preceded the beginning of the war between 
Japan and Russia, it did not receive its real im- 
petus until after the war had commenced. The 
issue was then drawn, the fight begun, the neces- 
sity urgent. Leaving out of consideration those 
questions which apply chiefly to the issues of the 
quarrel between Eussia and Japan, which con- 
sisted largely of a reproduction of special argu- 
ments amply published throughout the world, we 
may rather devote attention to matters concerning 
Western nations in general. Early in 1905 there 
began to appear in certain Chinese vernacular 
papers articles which may without exaggeration 
be termed anti-foreign in trend. These articles 
were so cleverly handled that for some time they 
attracted little attention. Indeed, their anti- 
foreign animus was usually carefully stowed away 
in the body of an article just enough in its main 
expressions. Germany was generally made the 
direct target for such attacks for two reasons: 
Germany's conduct in China has been such as to 
make her very vulnerable; and her policy is ex- 



242 THE NEW FAE EAST 

tremely unpopular with some other foreign pow- 
ers, a fact that not only tended to blind the West- 
ern press as to the fundamental import of the 
propaganda, but was calculated, in so far as out- 
side attention was attracted, to induce wide repro- 
duction of it. 

To illustrate what I mean, let me recall an 
incident which occurred in 1905. This happened 
before the shift of Germany's diplomatic attitude 
at Peking. A Chinese official of some impor- 
tance, while travelling on the German railway in 
Shan-tung, was insulted and subjected to indig- 
nities by a petty German railway employe. He 
complained to the central government at Peking, 
which made representations to the German Gov- 
ernment. The situation at the time, coupled with 
the fact that such complaints were becoming very 
numerous in Shan-tung, where the Germans had 
been carrying things with a high hand, practically 
compelled the German Government to take the 
matter up; with the result that the railway 
employe was dismissed and an apology made to 
the insulted Chinese. Naturally so unusual an 
incident did not escape notice in China, and was 
widely commented upon in both the foreign and 
native press. In this connection my attention 
was called to the character of comment which 
appeared in vernacular newspapers edited in the 
Japanese interest, and I secured a number of 
translations. Their general tone was so identical 
as to leave little doubt that the same mind con- 
ceived them. To reproduce one in full would be 
interesting, but a brief resume will suffice. The 



THE NEW CHINA 243 

details of the incident would be narrated in a, on 
the whole, fairly correct manner, although the 
critical mind could easily note an artful emphasis 
upon those passages dealing with the severe treat- 
ment of the Chinese official. The article would 
then proceed to draw certain inferences from the 
incident, pointing out the growing tendency to 
aggression of foreigners in China, and their 
habitual indifference to the rights of the Chinese 
in their own country, with a reference to and 
warning of what might be expected to happen in 
the future, unless the spirit of foreign aggression 
was checked. But the kernel would be cleverly 
ensconced in the concluding paragraphs, which 
would contain some incidental references to the 
unselfish efforts of Japan to free China from the 
foreign yoke, and the disposition of the Japanese 
to aid her in freeing herself. This cracker on the 
whip would be so cleverly appended as to be 
almost invisible to the casual foreign reader ; but 
would nevertheless, and was obviously designed 
so to do, leave the impression in the mind of the 
Chinese reader that China must look to Japan 
for relief from such oppressions. It should prob- 
ably be stated, in this connection, that I have 
information of the recent establishment of three 
Chinese newspapers in the Russian interest, two 
in the German and one in the French ; presumably 
with the design of counter-balancing the Japanese 
propaganda. Several have long been indirectly 
edited in the British interest. 

This subtle and insidious revival of the anti- 
foreign agitation had progressed for some time 



244 THE new: FAR EAST 

before the boycott of American goods cropped up. 
However, it had not escaped notice. Several of 
the more conservative British journals published 
in China had entered mild protests against the 
tenor of some articles which appeared in the 
native press, and cautioned moderation, in lan- 
guage which clearly showed the existence of a 
suspicion as to the real influence at work. Ger- 
many and Eussia were the chief targets for the 
attacks where some specific ground for complaint 
was needed, but other Western nations came in 
for a touch now and then, with the single excep- 
tion of England. It is the plain truth that, except 
in regard to its exclusion laws, the dealings of the 
United States Government with China have been 
marked by unusual equity and justice. This had 
been so often remarked upon that America had 
come to stand almost apart, in Chinese eyes, from 
the other powers in her relations to the Far East- 
ern question. 

This was the situation when the boycott showed 
its head. The exact origin of this peculiar move- 
ment is somewhat obscure. There are several 
well-defined theories, of which the one ascribing 
it to an effort on the part of a rival to discredit the 
Chinese minister in Washington has as much 
plausibility as any. Taking this or any similar 
view of its inception, it is certain that the move- 
ment was not expected by its promoters to get 
beyond an academic stage, sufficient to definitely 
accentuate it without producing any serious con- 
sequences. Then, at the proper moment, the 
thing would be patched up with a flourish of diplo- 



THE NEW CHINA 245 

matic trumpets, to the credit of certain high 
officials. Mr. Conger, formerly United States 
minister to China, brought considerable ridicule 
and criticism upon himself by early expressing 
the opinion that the boycott was simply a flash in 
the political pan and would amount to nothing. 
But Mr. Conger was entirely right in his judg- 
ment, estimated by ordinary experience and 
standards. He erred in failing to consider the 
new element internally operating in China, and 
which was quickly injected into the boycott move- 
ment. This element was the Japanese influence, 
chiefly operating through that part of the native 
press manipulated in the interests of Japan. 

I was able to discover no satisfactory evidence 
to show that the boycott movement, in its original 
form, was created by this influence. But the 
manipulators of the propaganda in the native 
press were apt to grasp the opportunity. Here 
was provided ready to their hand a two-edged 
sword, slashing at American interest and prestige 
on one side, while cutting directly into all white 
foreign influence on the other. To trace the move- 
ment minutely through its uneven course, its 
seeming lapses into inanition, its curious revivals 
in many places and many forms, its persistent, 
steady progress at all times under governmental 
ban and official condemnation is not necessary 
here. Passing through Shanghai on his way to 
take his post at Peking, Mr. Eockhill, the Amer- 
ican minister, was assured by the Shanghai gentry 
and guild leaders that the boycott was merely 
a sporadic affair and it was already abandoned. 



246 THE NEW FAE EAST 

At that very moment it was gathering force and 
taking, for the first time, tangible shape. High 
officials at Peking promptly disavowed the whole 
matter, and promised energetic measures to sup- 
press it ; but it somehow continued to make head- 
way. It is a great mistake to regard this boycott 
as a spontaneous expression of popular sentiment 
in China, called out by the American exclusion 
law. As a matter of fact, nobody in China except 
a few paid agitators, and perhaps certain foreign 
interests in a position to profit by detriment to 
American trade, wanted a boycott. The whole 
thing was carefully and systematically worked up 
by artificial stimulation and indirect political 
pressure of a kind entirely new to China, until it 
assumed the outward form of a popular move- 
ment. Nor is it impossible to detect the chief 
means employed, and trace them with reasonable 
assurance to their source. 

The chief agency employed in the extension of 
the boycott agitation was, naturally, publicity. 
Several channels were used — newspapers, pla- 
cards and cartoons being the principal ones. In 
the course of several months hundreds of thou- 
sands of placards, pamphlets and pictorial cari- 
catures were circulated throughout the empire. 
Their character and contents varied according to 
the locality in which they were distributed, but the 
intent of all was substantially the same. I saw a 
large number of these publications. Some were 
amusing, some interesting, and some alarming. 
The cartoons were sometimes particularly strik- 
ing. They usually represented a Chinese being 



THE NEW CHINA 247 

maltreated by a white man, presumably an Amer- 
ican, although no particular pains was taken to 
preserve national identities in many of them. 
How these posters were circulated was at first 
hard to discover. Naturally, the provincial and 
local officials were anxious to keep their skirts 
clear, fearing retribution in some form, and pre- 
tended to, and in many instances did, prohibit the 
distribution of boycott circulars and cartoons. 
But a convenient agency was found. 

Within the last few years thousands of Japan- 
ese, many of them Buddhist priests, have come to 
China and are now scattered to the remotest parts 
of the country, where other foreigners are seldom, 
if ever, seen. Some estimates place the number 
of these Japanese now in China as high as fifty 
thousand, although this is probably a mere guess. 
However, it is certain that thousands of Japanese 
tradesmen and commercial agents have settled in 
various remote parts of the empire, adopting the 
life of the people and often their dress. Since 
other foreigners are not permitted to live or en- 
gage in business outside the treaty ports, it will 
be perceived that considerable present and pros- 
pective commercial advantage promises to accrue 
through this condition, which will not be shared 
by other nations. Dismissing this phase of the 
matter, there is good reason to believe that these 
Japanese were instrumental in furthering the cir- 
culation of the boycott propaganda. In fact, 
many instances where they did so are positively 
known. As time passed, and reports of the 
spread of the movement in the interior began to 



248 THE NEW FAE EAST 

reach the foreign population centres, it became 
known that many of the placards and cartoons 
circulating outside the established sphere of for- 
eign contact were of an absolutely incendiary 
character, couched in the same general anti- 
foreign spirit that the ''boxer" movement took 
root in. Letters began to come to consular repre- 
sentatives from missionaries and other persons 
who reside in the interior, calling attention to this 
situation, and expressing some concern at the pos- 
sible effect of the agitation among the people. 
This, coupled with other disquieting manifesta- 
tions of the movement, brought on a climax, and 
led to international action which induced an out- 
ward relinquishment of the ''boycott" by causing 
the withdrawal of the support which fed it. 

A movement so widespread and sweeping could 
hardly fail to leave tangible traces, and this one 
planted some pretty deep footprints. To carry 
on such a systematic campaign required organiza- 
tion and central direction. It also required 
money. The printing bills alone ran into a large 
sum. While the agitation was at its height in 
Shanghai a reasonable estimate placed the ex- 
pense in that district alone at between one and two 
thousand dollars a day for printing, bill posting, 
renting of halls for meetings, speakers and other 
incidentals connected with publicity. Some one 
provided these funds; some one directed their 
application. A brief review of conditions in 
Shanghai, which was the centre of the agitation, 
may shed some light on the matter. 

The movement was ostensibly carried on by the 



THE NEW CHINA 249 

commercial guilds and presumably supported by 
the better class of Chinese merchants, who were 
supposed, through their guilds, to provide the 
money to keep up the agitation. But as the move- 
ment progressed it became evident that it did not 
have the support of the merchants, although they 
were constrained to outwardly array themselves 
with it. It soon became known that the agitation 
was backed by an element entirely out of real 
sympathy with the merchant guilds, and the 
human agency principally employed was a class 
of Chinese generally spoken of as the "Japanese 
students. ' ' This term requires explanation, since 
it does not mean Japanese, but Chinese who have 
been educated in Japan. "Within the last few 
years thousands of young Chinese have gone to 
Japan to be educated along certain lines, and 
many are now back in China in the employ, openly 
or surreptitiously, of the Japanese Government. 
They form a mobile and intelligent element, per- 
fectly adapted to certain political uses in China's 
present stage of development. They were the 
active agitators, and from their ranks the prin- 
cipal speakers were drafted, to address the 
numerous meetings that were held. I attended 
some of these meetings, and while I cannot under- 
stand Chinese, I was able with the assistance of 
an interpreter to follow what was done. These 
meetings were invariably "packed" by the agi- 
tators. On several occasions Chinese who had 
been educated in America and who desired to pre- 
sent fairly the American side of the matter, and 
point out the futility of such a movement, were 



250 THE NEW FAE EAST 

shouted down. Not only this, but surreptitious 
intimidation was resorted to. Chinese who dep- 
recated the movement — and this class embraced 
nearly all the prominent and influential mer- 
chants throughout the empire — received threat- 
ening letters, and in some cases were assaulted 
at night in their homes by ruffians employed by 
the agitators. When the boycott, by the '^ packed" 
action of some of the guilds, was put into effect 
in Shanghai, nearly all the big Chinese compra- 
dors and merchants went to their American asso- 
ciates and told them that while they were very 
much against the boycott they were compelled to 
obey the mandate of the guilds. Nor is there 
any sound reason to doubt that this attitude was 
sincere, for the longer the boycott continued the 
more it demonstrated that, although it might 
effect some casual detriment to American com- 
merce, it was wreaking great and immediate harm 
to Chinese interests. 

An illustration or two will make this clear. For 
instance, a large Chinese piece goods house which 
deals extensively in American cottons has for 
years put out certain ** chops," or brands, of its 
own. The goods are partly made in America, 
partly in England, while a considerable quantity 
is manufactured in a Shanghai cotton mill owned 
almost entirely by Chinese. All these goods are 
assembled in the go-downs of the firm, and put 
before the consumer under its special *'chop." 
Such commercial methods are common through- 
out the world. When the boycott was instituted 
this particular *'chop" was blacklisted, with the 



THE NEW CHINA 251 

result that it not only affected English made 
goods, but actually boycotted goods made in Chi- 
nese mills by Chinese workmen. Another instance 
is that of a great American corporation which has 
included a number of English and German fac- 
tories in its organization, retaining the English 
and German trade-marks. It happens that this 
concern, which does an enormous business in 
China, operates in the Orient under a British 
charter. It happens also that the brands of goods 
which are chiefly sold in China come from the 
British and German factories, having a large 
sale in this region at the time they were consoli- 
dated with the American firm. Of course all the 
goods sold by this corporation were boycotted, 
with the result that the real industrial loss fell 
upon England and Germany. Such cases might 
be multiplied ad infinitum. 

As the movement extended to the consumers it 
developed another unexpected tendency. Chinese 
purchasers found it difficult to distinguish Ameri- 
can from other foreign goods, so they evinced a 
disposition to eliminate the possibility of error 
by refusing to buy any foreign made goods. As 
thousands of Chinese merchants throughout the 
empire carried large stocks of foreign goods, this 
tendency threatened them with ruin. All of which 
merely again demonstrates the well-known fact 
that a general commercial boycott is a many- 
edged weapon and will cut the hand which at- 
tempts to wield it. So it was, and must have 
been, that such a movement as this boycott, under 
the conditions possible to apply it, could only be 



252 THE NEW FAR EAST 

detrimental to commercial classes in China; and 
the assumption that it was supported and encour- 
aged by this class is as destitute of fact as it is 
of rational incentive. 

This leads back to the original question : What 
was the force behind the boycott agitation? A 
process of mental elimination may narrow the 
field somewhat. Which of the foreign powers now 
struggling for political and commercial advantage 
in China is in a position to possibly profit by a 
recrudescence of the anti-foreign (which in this 
case means anti- white) sentiment! I can think 
of but one. Let us investigate further. 

Of the newspapers printed in Chinese under 
Japanese charters, the principal one is published 
in Shanghai under a title which translates into the 
Eastern Times. It is managed and edited by a 
Japanese brought over from Japan for the pur- 
pose, and there is scarcely any reason to doubt 
that its policy is directed from Tokyo ; or rather, 
as has been openly asserted in Shanghai, from the 
Japanese consulate. When the organized propa- 
ganda discovered a valuable asset in the "boy- 
cott," and set it on its feet again just as it was 
beginning to totter, its centre of operation appar- 
ently became the office of the Eastern Times. This 
paper actively took up the agitation, and other 
papers published in the same interest throughout 
the country promptly followed suit. This is no 
matter of deduction or conjecture. It had been 
officially announced, by the Shanghai guilds, that 
the boycott had been suspended until the Ameri- 
can Congress could meet to consider the matter, 



THE NEW CHINA 253 

and the American minister at Peking and the 
American Consul-General in Shanghai had re- 
ceived positive assurances to this effect. In other 
words, the movement, in its original form, was 
dead. But the new agitation quickly took root 
and was soon found to be making headway. 
Naturally, the policy of the Eastern Times did 
not escape notice. Its attitude became so flagrant 
and offensive that Mr. Eodgers, the American 
Consul-General, called the attention of the Japan- 
ese Consul-General to the matter. The fact that 
the paper was published under a Japanese char- 
ter lent diplomatic propriety to this step. The 
Japanese Consul-General politely replied, dis- 
claiming personal responsibility and expressing 
regret at the tone of the newspaper, and intimat- 
ing his intention to interpose an official check. It 
may be that he really intended to do this ; but a 
few days afterward he was recalled to Japan and 
a successor put in charge. Suffice to say that the 
Eastern Times did not alter its policy. On the 
contrary, it became more aggressive in urging it. 
It even went so far as to select a date, July 20th, 
when the boycott was to be carried into effect. 
For some time before July 20th, the Eastern Times 
printed daily in large type, ''Six Days Until the 
Boycott Begins," etc., altering the words from 
day to day to suit. Meetings were organized, and 
the city flooded with posters and placards con- 
taining the same reminder as the Eastern Times 
daily displayed. Suddenly, almost mysteriously, 
the agitation revived; and from then progressed 
steadily along the lines I have already outlined. 



254 THE NEW FAE EAST 

Prominent Chinese mercliants who had extensive 
dealings with foreigners began to receive further 
warnings and threatening letters, which they car- 
ried in alarm to their foreign friends. Although 
Mr. Eodgers exerted himself to the utmost he 
could get no satisfaction from the Chinese authori- 
ties, who appeared to be afraid to take any deci- 
sive measures. So things drifted for a few weeks. 
Signs presenting American goods and firms were 
defaced at night, while native newspapers refused 
to accept advertisements of American firms, or 
to print articles contributed by Chinese present- 
ing the affair in a sensible light. On the date 
announced by the Eastern Times the boycott went 
into effect. 

Up to this time the foreign newspapers printed 
in China had adopted various attitudes toward 
the boycott. Those indirectly subsidized by the 
Japanese Government, while not usually daring 
to openly advocate the boycott, gave it all the 
favorable publicity possible under cover of a 
mildly depreciatory tone. Some of the English 
and German papers were inclined to be a little 
jocular over it, and poke fun at the Americans in 
their dilemma. The French and Russian papers 
denounced it from the beginning, and pointed out 
that it would eventually affect all foreign interests 
alike. The principal British organ in the Far 
East had adopted the policy of quietly stimu- 
lating the agitation as far as it could with- 
out giving offence to Americans. Through it 
all Consul-General Eodgers and representative 
Americans behaved with dignity and propriety. 



THE NEW CHINA 255 

However, suddenly there came a change. Certain 
aspects the movement was assuming became too 
serious to longer dally with. A meeting of the 
foreign consular body in Shanghai was held, at 
which it was agreed to take joint action to sup- 
press the agitation. The shoe had begun to pinch 
other toes than American. The British organ 
switched its policy overnight, and roundly de- 
nounced the boycott and the influences (though 
not specifically) behind it. Not to go further into 
details, this action struck the knell of the move- 
ment so far as active agitation is concerned. It 
had made little practical headway away from 
Shanghai. Even the Eastern Times changed its 
attitude. Once the fire is well started the bellows 
may be laid aside. From then it was merely a 
question of how far the impetus it had received 
would carry the movement. 

This is undetermined as I write this; but its 
mutterings can still be heard in places. And it is 
generally admitted that the closing months of 1905 
and the beginning of 1906 brought a noticeable 
revival throughout the empire of the old anti- 
foreign sentiment, which led to serious rioting in 
Shanghai late in 1905, and minor disturbances 
elsewhere. It may be that we shall have to seek 
the ultimate results of this unusual incident in 
the future. The actual detriment to American 
commerce has so far been slight. But the fact 
that new forces exist in China with the power and 
will to injure American and European interests 
is a fact to which the Western world cannot afford 
to be indifferent. 



CHAPTEE XVII 

THE NEW CHINA 

CONCLUDED 

Internal Forces of the Empire — Evidences of an Awak- 
ening — Errors in Western Conceptions of the Chi- 
nese — Liberal Patronage of Railroads — Modern 
Industrial Development — Profits of Railway Lines 

— Political Forces — The Chinese National Spirit — 
Some Confusions of Thought Among Westerners — 
The Ambitions of Old China — Influence of Chinese 
Educated Abroad — The "Japanese Students" — 
The Reform Movement — Birth of a New Doctrine 

— Characteristics of the People — Ambitions of the 
New China. 

TuKNiNG to purely internal evidences of the 
awakening of China, they may be found on every 
side. And while foreign and quasi-foreign influ- 
ence will be deeply felt in the forthcoming trans- 
formation, the fundamental factors are to be 
found in the people and country; for whatever 
political manifestations attend the evolution, 
these will always remain the chief elements with 
which they must be worked out. 
' After several visits to China, and observation 
of and association with them in peace, internal 
disorder and war, I confess to a deep and sincere 
liking and admiration of the Chinese people. This 
is no sudden or sentimental impression; but 

256 



THE NEW CHINA 257 

rather one which has evolved gradually from an 
originally adverse predisposition. In so far as 
any general characteristics can be associated with 
a race, it seems to me that the Chinese are indus- 
trious, reliable, law-abiding, good-humored, capa- 
ble and tolerant. These are good qualities, and 
intelligently directed in the path of modern prog- 
ress cannot fail to accomplish great results. ^^ 

In the prevalent "Western conception of the Chi- 
nese there are, I think, several radical errors. 
One is that they are adverse to modern im- 
provements; another that they have no military 
capacity ; another that they are incapable of play- 
ing a significant part in the political regeneration 
of the nation owing to absence of a true national 
spirit. Passing for the moment a discussion of 
these propositions in detail, I will ask if all these 
things could not have been said, with a consider- 
able semblance to truth, about Japan half a cen- 
tury ago? And they were no more true of the 
Japanese people then than they are of the Chinese 
people to-day. The Chinese as a people have 
never been averse to modern progress, except as 
their government has incited them to be, and used 
its authority and influence to keep them as they 
were. And this is true, I think, of the history of 
all peoples. 

Take the matter of railroads in China. For 
many years, or so long as the official classes cir- 
culated among the people fantastic reports about 
the foreign steam monsters, so long as they were 
taught to believe that the passage of a railway 
would be a desecration of the graves of their an- 



A 



) 



258 THE NEW FAE EAST 

cestors, the people were bitterly hostile to the 
building of such roads, and were easily incited to 
attack surveying parties and the like. But no 
sooner had the railroads, in spite of these arti- 
ficial difficulties, been built and put into operation 
than the people literally swarmed to use them. 
Local railway passenger traffic upon fully estab- 
lished roads in China has to-day no parallel ex- 
cept in the daily rush in and out of great popula- 
tion centres in Europe or America; thus once 
more illustrating the eternal striving of the 
human race toward convenience. 

Not only this, but the Chinese are rapidly ar- 
riving at the point where they will be practically 
able to dispense with foreigners in the operation 
of their railroads. The entire northern division 
of the Imperial Eailways of North China had not, 
the last time I travelled over it, a single white 
employe. Station agents, train despatchers, con- 
ductors, guards, locomotive drivers, road in- 
spectors, etc., were all Chinese. It will be a reve- 
lation to many Westerners to make a stop at 
Tong-shan, where are the principal work-shops of 
this railroad, and where with Chinese workmen 
the company is building many of its own locomo- 
tives, all its own rolling stock, pump machinery 
and similar necessities. Here foreigners still 
superintend the more important branches of the 
work, and will probably do so for some years to 
come. But, as in Japan, even this is a transitory 
condition. 

The impulse acquired by modern industries in 
China within the past ten years is really remark- 



THE NEW CHINA 259 

able. At Wu-chang the Chinese are making mod- 
ern rifles and artillery for the new army, while the / > 
smoke-stacks of all kinds of factories are to be { / " 
seen from one end of the country to the other. And 
the general opinion among foreigners who have 
had experience with them is that the Chinese are 
naturally capable in all branches of skilled and 
unskilled labor, and learn readily and willingly 
to operate modern machinery. It no longer aston- 
ishes one in China to see a Chinese electrician 
come to fix the electric lights or the telephone, do 
his work quietly and quickly and go about his 
other business. The common thing now is to see 
wealthy Chinese going about the foreign conces- 
sions in their motor cars, driven by native chauf- 
feurs. Even the new woman has made her appear- 
ance. Eecently I saw the young daughter of a 
high official riding a bicycle through a street in a 
foreign concession, attended by a servant on an- 
other wheel. Nor are these superficial demon- 
strations, but signs of real import. I do not hesi- 
tate to express the opinion that among nationali- 
ties to-day none is more disposed to take up with 
new and improved methods than the Chinese. 

In scrutinizing the internal forces now operat- 
ing in China they fall, naturally, into separate, 
though closely related, classes. Thus the purely 
political forces stand, in a measure, apart. In 
regard to the state of national politics in China, 
what are, I think, fundamental misconceptions 
prevail in the West. Take, for example, the gen- 
erally accepted idea that the Chinese have no 
national spirit or ambition. The fact that 



260 THE NEW FAR EAST 

the Chinese language contains no exact trans- 
lation for the word *' patriotism" has been 
used in a thousand ways by a thousand writ- 
ers and speakers to show that this particular 
branch of the human race is devoid of what 
we have been taught to esteem as a virtue, in 
the absence of which no virile national life can 
be formulated. This opens a broad vista for dis- 
cussion, which I do not wish to penetrate far. But 
in the time I have spent in China I have seen 
much that has caused me to reflect upon this prop- 
osition, especially in its bearing upon the Chinese. 
"What, for instance, constitutes national virility? 
Many answers might be given to this question; 
but it is certain that one of the chief manifesta- 
tions of national virility is endurance. Can we 
assume that a nation which has retained its polit- 
ical and territorial entity, and preserved its civili- 
zation practically intact through a period of 
thousands of years is without some substantial 
elements of national virility? Is not the very 
existence of the Chinese Empire to-day an irrefu- 
table illustration of national endurance to which 
history can afford no parallel? 

Governments rise and fall, and are replaced by 
other governments. In these recurring changes 
the fundamental reason is always hinged upon a 
widespread endeavor toward betterment. No 
form of government can indefinitely endure that 
does not substantially satisfy a majority of the 
people living under its jurisdiction. In China we 
see a government which, with no fundamental 
alteration in its political theory or general 



THE NEW CHINA 261 

method, has managed to make itself tolerated for 
a great lapse of time by not a scarce or isolated 
people, but by one-third of the inhabitants of the 
earth. Here, clearly, is food for reflection; and 
with these facts in mind it may be possible to 
reach a better understanding of the political 
forces inherent in the Chinese people. 

One who has followed the current discussion in 
the Western world of the national situation of 
China can scarcely have failed to observe in much 
of it a certain confusion of thought. It is a com- 
mon thing to point to social conditions in the 
Orient as something which no people with a spark 
of intelligence and spirit would endure. But in 
this Westerners are estimating conditions by their 
own ideals, not those of the Orientals. To me, 
however, the starting point for many false con- 
clusions about China, entertained in America and 
Europe, appears to be a loosely conceived notion 
as to what constitutes national spirit or ambition. 
Surely there can be more than one kind of national 
spirit, many objectives of national ambition. Has 
not the average Westerner of to-day, when he 
thinks of national spirit, really in mind some pre- 
sentment of an impulse to have his nation gain 
some advantage over some other nation? When 
we speak of national ambitions does there not lurk 
somewhere in our minds the lust for conquest? 
When we talk about this or that nation or people 
having no national ambition do we not habitually 
accept as a justification for our opinion the fact 
that the nation or people in question shows no dis- 
position to push its interests at the expense of 



262 THE NEW FAR EAST 

other nations f And is not the prevailing impres- 
sion that the Chinese have no national spirit 
largely based upon such ideas ? 

It is true that this particular kind of national 
spirit and ambition has been, for a long time, 
apparently lacking in China. But it by no means 
follows that it may not be recreated. I say 
recreated, for the Chinese Empire was built 
through conquest, and the Chinese were once a 
warlike people. Even within the memory of men 
now living there have been wars in China of 
greater magnitude, estimated by loss of life and 
property, than the American civil war and the 
Russo-Japanese war combined. National spirit 
and ambition, in their belligerent manifestations, 
usually spring from one of two causes : a lust for 
conquest, or the necessity for defence. In the 
course of history the former condition has fre- 
quently followed the latter. Nations often arm 
for national defence, only to later turn their 
weapons against some weaker nation in a war of 
conquest. And the defensive belligerency of the 
Chinese people is already aroused, its direct mani- 
festation being the effort to create a new and 
modern army. Should this effort be successful, 
will the Western world like to witness in China the 
growth of a disposition to use its vast latent 
strength externally? In other words, do we of the 
West wish to see the Chinese develop the kind of 
national spirit and ambition we usually have in 
mind when thinking about our own, and like that 
which many Westerners now so highly and 
thoughtlessly praise in the Japanese? 



THE NEW CHINA 263 

Prominent among the new political forces in 
China is the influence of Chinese who have been 
educated abroad, and who are now coming home 
to live in considerable numbers. Those who were 
educated in Europe or America are, as a rule, 
while entertaining more advanced views about 
political principles than when they left home, com- 
paratively conservative and content to see a grad- 
ual evolution. Perhaps it is more accurate to say 
that these men, who usually are fairly practical in 
their ideas, realize the strength of the forces 
which oppose a too sudden change and recognize 
the necessity of proceeding cautiously along the 
path of reform. In this class belongs Wu-ting- 
fang, whose personality is widely known in 
America. However, there is another class of re- 
formers, who have received a foreign education, 
that is not so moderate. This class embraces a 
great majority of Chinese who have been educated 
in Japan. It is only in quite recent times that 
young Chinese whose parents desired them to re- 
ceive a foreign education have been sent to Japan. 
The reasons Japan is selected instead of Europe 
or America are almost invariably financial, it 
being possible for a student to take a course of 
several years in Japan on a sum that would not 
subsist him for a year in America. Within the 
last few years China has begun to receive back 
these young men, many of whom have imbibed 
little more than a smattering of Western learning, 
their accomplishments being usually limited to an 
imperfect knowledge of English, together with a 
brief course of instruction in some Western busi- 



264 THE NEW FAR EAST 

ness system. With these accomplishments, how- 
ever, they are able to secure employment in one 
of the foreign hongs or banks, or with one of the 
new Chinese corporations organized along mod- 
ern lines, and can pose before ordinary Chinese as 
men of advanced ideas. 

The present agitation for internal reform 
springs almost entirely from this class. In fact, 
many of them are paid political agitators, subsi- 
dized to promote by both subtle and direct means 
certain political and commercial interests. I have 
indicated the influence of this class upon the so- 
called American boycott. But its activity is by no 
means confined to measures such as that. They 
have nominated themselves (or perhaps the 
primary stimulation is from an external source) 
the prophets of a new dispensation for China; a 
political regeneration by which the old empire 
will shake off the political shackles now hamper- 
ing her progress, and take a foremost position in 
the world. In so far as these advocates of a new 
China have formulated a programme, by which 
the desired result is to be attained, it runs in the 
direction of a "The Orient for Orientals" doc- 
trine. In this agitation lies the germ of the 
swelling anti-foreign sentiment. And it is worth 
noting that nearly all the Chinese who have been 
educated in Japan return to China imbued with 
anti-foreign sentiments. This is a fact to reflect 
upon; that it is a fact I think no foreigner who 
has kept touch with recent events in the Far East 
will deny, unless he is totally blind to what is 
going on. 



THE NEW CHINA 265 

It is not easy to determine the future result of 
the agitation inaugurated by this element. Much 
depends upon the course of the Western powers. 
Should they display a disposition to ignore or 
condone this offensive and dangerous propaganda 
it may get beyond control, and lead to disturb- 
ances disastrous not only to Western interests in 
the Far East, but to China as well. However, I am 
unwilling to believe that the Western powers will 
pursue such a short-sighted policy; but will 
rather, by concerted action, assist the Chinese 
Government to keep this movement within bounds 
and permit the cause of reform to pursue an 
orderly and consistent course. 

However, it will be a mistake to judge this agi- 
tation by its would-be leaders, who either in their 
individual or collective capacity need not be taken 
too seriously. But the idea they proclaim has a 
vitality entirely outside of and beyond its advo- 
cates. This vitality lies in a general resentment 
against the treatment so long accorded by foreign- 
ers to Chinese in their own and other countries, 
and the humiliations to which the nation has so 
often, in the past and present, been subjected by 
foreign powers. It is a great error to regard the 
Chinese as a down-trodden and supine people, out 
of whom all spirit has long ago been crushed by 
an autocratic and tyrannical government. The 
Chinese Government, although an absolute mon- 
archy in form, is not at all autocratic in its work- 
ing method; in fact, quite the contrary is true. 
Real tyranny over any considerable part of the 
people is practically impossible, owing to the 



266 THE NEW FAE EAST 

official system of checks and counter-checks. If 
a local official seriously displeases his constituents 
they have ways of making him accede to their 
demands. I was recently in an interior city of 
China upon an occasion when an official had un- 
justly humiliated a respectable merchant. The 
friends of the offended man quickly assembled, 
marched in a body to the house of the offending 
magistrate and demanded that he apologize under 
pain of a general refusal on the part of the local 
guilds to pay their taxes. As the magistrate only 
held his position so long as his tax returns to the 
man-higher-up were kept to the required stand- 
ard, he was compelled promptly to disavow his 
action and make public apology to the man he had 
humiliated. 

The notion that the Chinese are supine is prob- 
ably due to misconceptions arising from their 
law-abiding disposition. A strong central govern- 
ment and a powerful military are the instruments 
of tyranny, and these have never existed, except 
at rare and brief periods, in China. Yet here is a 
nation which has continued on a comparatively 
even course for many centuries without a strong 
government or a military to coerce the people. 
Foreign powers, with a well-equipped military 
force, can browbeat defenceless Chinese, but their 
own government has never been able to do it suc- 
cessfully. And it is a queer commentary upon 
prevailing Western habit of thought that the 
average Westerner, in contemplating this singu- 
lar and striking evidence of their advanced civili- 
zation, should look upon this propensity of the 



THE NEW CHINA 267 

Chinese to follow the arts of peace with con- 
tempt. But they can be cured of even this long- 
established trait, and the outcropping of a bitter 
feeling toward foreigners is an indication that 
the new seed is taking root. It is probable that 
the effervescence of the younger reformers will 
be modified as time passes, under salutary treat- 
ment ; but they are a living force in the new China 
and will be felt in the coming transition. 

That this political transition is coming may not 
be doubted ; it is, indeed, already well under way. 
Indications of a forthcoming national rehabilita- 
tion, should China be permitted to retain her 
political entity, may be noticed everywhere. 
While some of the actual accomplishments of the 
reformers, such as Wu- ting-fang's recent revision 
of the code of punishments, by which the abolition 
of the ** thousand cuts" was wrung from timid 
conservatism, are often more likely to cause a 
smile than invoke serious belief in them as an 
indication of progress, there are many hopeful 
signs on the horizon. The new army now exists 
largely on paper, except in the north, where Yuan- 
shih-k'ai has created a corps of really excellent 
and well-equipped troops ; but it will come unless 
foreign prohibition intervenes. Personally, I see 
not the slightest reason to doubt that the Chinese 
will make excellent soldiers if they are properly 
armed and trained. They possess courage and 
capability in plenty. All they require is effi- 
ciency, and I have yet to see a people capable of 
absorbing instruction more rapidly. Entrenched 
conservatism is being hustled on all sides, and 



268 THE NEW FAR EAST 

cannot long withstand the new forces at work. 
The sending of commissions to study conditions 
and methods in foreign countries is a sign that 
the spirit of the new era has reached Peking. In 
fact, the political and social construction of China 
is peculiarly favorable for a comparatively rapid 
and easy transition. The old China will die hard, 
but it is doomed. 

I should take pleasure in dwelling upon the im- 
pressions created by the natural aspects of the 
land, as one travels for days through fields of 
waving grain and growing crops, by thousands of 
villages and numerous large cities, on one of the 
new trunk lines or along one of the great rivers. 
All this has been described many times, although 
it is only lately that Westerners have begun to 
look upon it all with eyes toned to appreciation of 
its inherent industrial and commercial possibili- 
ties. Here is indeed a marvelous country, with 
almost limitless capability for development. 

In the great, new future that is coming to this 
old country two elements will struggle for 
supremacy. One will be the forces inherent in the 
Chinese people coupled with such assimilative in- 
fluence as Japan will be able to exert. The other 
will be the more material, more advanced civiliza- 
tion of the West. Neither will entirely win the 
battle, but one or the other will finally point the 
way for the whole world. I am no very serious 
believer in what is called the "Yellow Peril"; not 
only because I have great faith that the star of 
destiny still hangs over the West, but because I 
believe that under any favorable circumstances 



THE NEW CHINA 269 

the good sense and sound character of the Chinese 
will vindicate themselves. In respect to the "Yel- 
low Peril" it is interesting to recall what a Chi- 
nese official of progressive tendency recently said 
to me: 

. ' ' The future contains no yellow peril for Eu- 
rope and America," he remarked; "but it does 
contain one for Europeans and Americans in Asia 
unless your nations and people learn to treat 
Asiatics with more consideration." 

This is the voice of the new China, and it is to 
be heard and considered, s 



CHAPTER XVIII 
JAPAN, CHINA AND THE WEST 

The " Yellow Peril" Possibility — Japan's Relation to 
the Question — China the Determining Factor — 
Creation of the New Chinese Army — Use of Jap- 
anese Military Instructors — Possible Restrictions 
upon China's Military Development — Progress of 
Education in China — Oriental Industrial Possibil- 
ities — Some Food for Reflection — Influence of 
Japan upon the Future of Commerce and Industry 
in the East — Logic of Japan's Position. 

It is clear that the so-called ** Yellow Peril," in 
its broader aspects, depends upon a possible de- 
velopment on the part of Oriental nations of an 
externally expressed belligerency. Such belliger- 
ency may take, in its possible effect upon Western 
civilization, either or both of two shapes — ^mili- 
tary and industrial. 

The first of these contingencies, while not to be 
dismissed as an impossibility, is now of remote 
practical interest to inhabitants of the "Western 
hemisphere, on account of the security afforded 
by geographical isolation. But European nations 
having possessions lying contiguous to Oriental 
countries may not, perhaps, feel able to dismiss 
the question so lightly. While it requires an im- 
pressionable imagination, at this period, to con- 

270 



JAPAN, CHINA AND THE WEST 271 

template seriously the possibility of an Oriental 
invasion of Europe, Oriental aggression upon 
European possessions and influence in Asia con- 
tains, in some ways of looking at it, a germ of 
probability. 

I cannot agree with those who, drawing mis- 
taken conclusions from her recent military suc- 
cess, profess to see in Japan a serious menace to 
Western civilization. While I am strongly dis- 
posed, basing my opinion upon past and present 
evidences of her true policy, to believe that Japan 
has both the desire and the will to bring about 
such a consummation, I feel confident that she has 
not in herself the strength to accomplish it. But 
China has the latent strength, united to that of 
Japan and other peoples susceptible of being in- 
cluded in a "The Orient for Orientals" policy, to 
make such a doctrine practically applicable to 
Asia; and it is this fact that embodies in the 
future of the Chinese Empire a significance to 
the West far beyond the possibilities involved 
in the development of industry and commerce, and 
admonishes it to look to its fences. 

Eeverting from theoretical to practical mani- 
festations of Oriental tendencies, it is interesting 
to consider the probabilities of China in a military 
way. While the creation of a new and modern 
army has only just begun, it has progressed far 
enough to permit some reasonable conclusions to 
be drawn. As yet little genuine progress has been 
made except in the north, where the recent ma- 
noeuvres showed a truly remarkable advance 
toward a high standard of efficiency and called 



272 THE NEW FAR EAST 

forth warm praise from foreign military attaches 
who were present. I regard the natural military- 
capability of the Chinese as equal to that of the 
Japanese, if not fundamentally superior. The 
Chinese are as intelligent, are physically larger 
and stronger, and few peoples can equal their 
endurance. This has been so often demonstrated 
that it is hardly a matter to be disputed. And 
that China is alive to the necessity of having an 
army is certain. Even the reactionary court has 
at last seen this writing on the wall. 

China realizes that she requires, as did Japan, 
external aid in organizing and instructing the new 
army. For many years a number of foreign mili- 
tary instructors have been employed, chiefly Ger- 
mans; but it seems probable that in the future 
Japanese officers will be used for this important 
work. This is not because the Chinese regard the 
Japanese as more efficient than white officers, or 
because they prefer them for racial reasons ; but is 
due to entirely practical considerations. The 
termination of the war will naturally result in a 
considerable reduction of the personnel of the 
Japanese army; thus releasing from active duty 
thousands of officers. These officers are being 
permitted, even encouraged by the Japanese Gov- 
ernment to seek employment as instructors to the 
Chinese army. The reasons for this policy should 
be obvious, since it will enable Japan to take the 
leading part in the forthcoming military reor- 
ganization of China, and is likely to result in an 
extension of Japanese influence. China's reason 
for employing Japanese instead of other foreign- 



JAPAN, CHINA AND THE WEST 273 

ers is that the Japanese can be secured for Half 
the pay it would be necessary to give Europeans 
or Americans, besides being available in larger 
numbers. And it may be assumed that the Japan- 
ese are quite competent to do the work. China 
will retain some other foreign instructors for 
political reasons, but the army that is to come will 
be largely the handiwork of Japan. 

It is by no means certain, however, that, before 
much time has elapsed, restrictions will not be 
placed by the Western powers upon China's mili- 
tary programme. In fact, such restrictions al- 
ready exist ; as the regulations in the international 
treaty prohibiting the importation of arms into 
China and the fortification of certain ports. 
These regulations were imposed by the powers 
after the "boxer" troubles, and were designed to 
prevent any anti-foreign uprising from becoming 
too formidable. During the last few years this 
regulation has been nominally enforced; but the 
Chinese Government is evading it by manufactur- 
ing arms and ammunition in its own arsenals. At 
Wu-chang they are turning out a fairly good 
magazine rifle of the Mauser pattern, and are 
also beginning to make field artillery of a modern 
type. This work is now carried on chiefly under 
Japanese supervision, and, while the facts are 
perfectly well known, is kept as quiet as possible. 
I had an example of this recently, when, through 
the agency of Japanese instructors, I was pre- 
vented from visiting the Wu-chang arsenal. It is 
probable that I could have overcome this opposi- 
tion by persistent effort, but I could not then 



274 THE NEW FAR EAST 

afford the necessary delay. Already are the Jap- 
anese in China, in all walks, beginning to display 
this disposition toward other foreigners; an evi- 
dence of a desire to be themselves the chief instru- 
ment in the transformation of the empire. This 
is a perfectly legitimate ambition from their 
standpoint, but it is a question whether the suc- 
cess of such an effort will be best for Western 
interests in China. 

A force that will have great effect in the evolu- 
tion of China is the present effort toward a more 
modern system of education. For many years the 
missionary schools, if seeming to accomplish little 
along spiritual lines, have done excellent and far- 
reaching educational work; as also have some of 
the native colleges, which employ foreign instruc- 
tors. But here, again, the Japanese influence is 
becoming a factor. The Japanese schoolmaster 
is filling the land ; and, aside from external polit- 
ical motive, from largely the same practical 
reasons that apply to the creation of the new 
army. Japanese who have, in their own country, 
or abroad, managed to gain a fair working com- 
plement of foreign educational knowledge, find an 
apparently profitable opening in China as teach- 
ers. As in the case of Japanese officers, and for 
the same general reason, they are encouraged and 
often assisted by their government to go to China. 
There they either secure employment to teach in 
one of the native colleges, or open little private 
schools in the interior, where foreign influence 
has never before penetrated. Along with these 
school teachers are a large number of Japanese 



JAPAN, CHINA AND THE WEST 275 

Buddhist priests, who are often able to exert 
an influence through their religious profession. 
Needless to say, this influence is not to the disad- 
vantage of Japan. I do not wish to excite racial 
prejudice or create undue alarm in the West, but 
the possible effects of these conditions are worthy 
of consideration. That there should be at pres- 
ent a flush of Japanese influence, perhaps out of 
proportion to its real carrying power, is only 
natural. 

On their own behalf the Chinese are making 
noticeable strides in educational matters. This 
movement is bitterly opposed, strange as it may 
seem to persons unacquainted with conditions in 
China, by the scholarly classes; but this opposi- 
tion will prove futile. Nothing can now stay the 
progress of the empire along modern lines. A 
number of industrial schools, designed to teach 
the youth of the nation useful trades — such as 
electricity, mechanical engineering, and the use 
of modern machinery and tools — ^have been estab- 
lished, and others are contemplated. These 
schools are comparable to American and Euro- 
pean manual training institutions. Courses in 
the higher scientific professions are now embodied 
in the curriculums of nearly all the colleges, and 
the land is being rapidly dotted with modern hos- 
pitals, which are being more and more supported 
by Chinese of all classes. 

The question as to whether the East will ever 
develop an industrial organization capable of 
being adversely applied, by direct competition, to 
the West opens a wide field for discussion, and 



276 THE NEW. FAE EAST 

one which I do not feel equipped to enter very 
far. But my observation of conditions in the 
Orient, and particularly in China, which is its real 
heart, have caused me to be impressed by some 
very interesting manifestations. That this is 
recognized in the West as a practical question is 
shown by devices upon the part of some nations 
to exclude Orientals in large numbers, of which 
the American exclusion law is an example. It 
seems to be taken for granted, in many arguments 
advanced in support of such laws, that wherever 
the Westerner comes in direct contact with the 
Oriental the eventual result will be a depreciation 
of the Westerner to the Easterner's standard of 
life and wages. 

With no intention to enter into a discussion of 
this question in its fundamental aspects, I may 
say that the actual results of such contact, wher- 
ever extensively expressed, are directly contrary 
to the logic of this familiar argument. For in- 
stance; for many years now thousands of West- 
erners have resided in various parts of the Orient, 
especially in China, and their number is con- 
stantly increasing. Instead of being reduced by 
this contact (which may be here assumed to apply 
in its greatest force) to a standard of life on a 
level with the Chinese, the result has been exactly 
opposite. Since I first visited China the cost of 
living for foreigners in any of the treaty ports, or 
elsewhere throughout the empire, has more than 
doubled. And this is not only true of foreigners 
living in China, but the standard of living and 
rate of wage of Chinese who have in any material 



JAPAN, CHINA AND THE WEST 277 

way been affected by contact with foreigners has 
correspondingly advanced. No person who is at 
all familiar with conditions in China will, I think, 
dispute the substantial accuracy of this statement. 
It is equally true of Japan, the Straits Settlements 
and other portions of the Far East. Also, that 
part of the United States where Chinese and Jap- 
anese have extensively gathered — the Pacific 
slope — always has been and continues to be the 
part of the country where wages are highest and 
where the standard of living is above the average. 
The tendency has not been for the wages of Amer- 
icans to fall to the level of wages in the Orient, 
but for the Orientals to demand, and in many in- 
stances obtain a wage equal to that earned by 
Westerners. I will attempt to draw no general 
conclusion from these well-known facts except 
that the common impulse and tendency of the 
human race is not downward, but toward better- 
ment. 

And in regard: to possible effects upon the West 
of the growth of modern industry in the Far 
East, some thoughts suggest themselves. It is 
possible for nations to interpose a check, by 
means of exclusion laws, upon the mobility of cer- 
tain classes of labor as expressed in human en- 
ergy ; but no way has yet been devised to seriously 
interfere with the mobility of capital or the me- 
chanical adjuncts of modern industry. To take 
the case of America as illustration, it may always 
be possible to exclude Chinese and Japanese from 
the national boundaries; but political principles 
and actual conditions will have to be extensively 



278 THE NEW FAR EAST 

altered before the United States, or any other 
nation, can prevent capital from going to China or 
Japan, and there establishing manufactories to 
be operated by Oriental labor. In fact, this is 
already taking place on a scale and with a success 
apparently not appreciated in the West. Hun- 
dreds of articles and products extensively pro- 
duced in Europe and America are now made in 
Japan and China, and new factories are being 
established continually. And at present a ma- 
jority of these enterprises are backed by Euro- 
pean or American capital, although there is a 
growing disposition on the part of wealthy Chi- 
nese to embark in them on a large scale. The 
notion, still entertained by people whose ideas of 
China are at best hazy and antiquated, that all 
Chinese are poor is really amusing. There is an 
immense amount of wealth in China, which, cou- 
pled with the undisputed commercial acumen and 
integrity of the Chinese, cannot fail to seek and to 
find new opportunities. A time may come when 
the products of Chinese factories will knock at the 
doors of American and European marts. 

A matter of immediate interest, in this connec- 
tion, is the influence Japan will be able to exert 
upon the future of commerce and industry in the 
Far East, and particularly in China. A disposi- 
tion is growing in the West to regard Japan as a 
determining factor in both the industrial and 
political future of the Far East. While this be- 
lief is not without legitimate foundation, I do not 
think it is entirely sound in many of its phases. It 
is clear that Japan may exert a decisive influence. 



JAPAN, CHINA AND THE WEST 279 

Should she be given a free hand in China she is 
undoubtedly in a position to enforce her will upon 
that now belligerently feeble nation; and should 
her political influence eventually predominate in 
Eastern Asia she may be able to use it to advance 
her interests in a way not possible under condi- 
tions which would compel her to progress purely 
on her merits. This merely recognizes the general 
rule that political authority can be used, at least 
temporarily, to advance national industrial and 
commercial interests. And whether Japan shall 
be given a free hand in China is a matter for the 
West to consider, in all its aspects. There is no 
doubt that she will go as far as she can. 

In some respects Japan has an advantage over 
other foreign nations in pushing a commercial 
policy in Eastern Asia. Her political and military 
control of Korea and southern Manchuria gives 
her, at present, the upper hand in those regions. 
Then, every Japanese immigrant to the continent 
carries the flag of the national ambition. Japan 
hopes and expects to make China and Korea reim- 
burse her for the expense of her long-calculated 
war; legitimately if she can, illegitimately if she 
must. Some elements of her commercial policy 
already betray themselves, and are attracting the 
notice, if not exciting the apprehension, of other 
foreign interests in the East. During the war the 
Japanese captured and confiscated a large num- 
ber of ships of various nationalities, owing to al- 
leged infraction of the laws of neutrality. These 
ships are now added to the already large Japanese 
merchant marine, and are to be distributed be- 



280 THE NEW FAR EAST 

tween the Japanese shipping lines to ply in Far 
Eastern or other commerce. As these shipping 
companies are subsidized by the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, and very cheaply operated by Japanese 
labor, they are able to offer severe competition to 
other foreign lines trading along the Chinese coast 
and rivers; while a regulation giving them a 
monopoly of Korean coast-wise trade is being 
seriously considered by the Japanese Government. 
Even before the war ended other shipping com- 
panies had anticipated the effects of this competi- 
tion, and the passing by several of them of the 
semi-annual dividend is regarded as a preliminary 
preparation for a shipping war with the Japanese. 
However, the other foreign and the Chinese com- 
panies, although they consider the prospect seri- 
ously, are by no means inclined to give up the 
fight in advance. 

It is clear that Japan has fundamental advan- 
tages in commerce with Eastern Asia which can 
never be overcome by Western nations, such as 
proximity, and cheap and quick transportation to 
the market. But these are by no means decisive 
matters. My own opinion is that Japan will not be 
able to make material commercial headway upon 
the continent, in competition with some of the 
Western industrial nations, except by what may 
be correctly termed illegitimate means, exerted 
through political manipulation or military au- 
thority. And since such a failure would mean 
also the ultimate failure of the budding modern 
industry of Japan, and the permanent lapse of the 
nation into a place of secondary importance, it is 



JAPAN, CHINA AND THE WES.T 281 

logical to presume that the Japanese Governmeiit 
will not neglect any available means to gain 
its end. 

There are two possible checks upon a Japanese 
policy of political aggression and unfair commer- 
cial manipulation in Eastern Asia. One is the 
opposition some of the Western powers may 
exert, and the other is inherent in China herself. 
In the beginning the former must be depended 
upon for tangible results ; but in the long run the 
latter, should China be permitted to pursue a nor- 
mal internal development, will be the decisive 
factor. It is difficult to conceive how Japan, with 
scanty natural resources, will be able to indus- 
trially and commercially overtop a country like 
China, upon which nature has lavished her favors, 
and where an intelligent, capable and industrious 
people are ever ready to apply their activities. 
Japan must, in any extensive industrial develop- 
ment, draw the greater part of her raw materials 
from abroad; and any hope for Japanese indus- 
trial supremacy in the Far East must be based 
on a presumption that she can excel her great 
continental neighbor in workmanship. There is, 
to my mind, little solid foundation for such a pre- 
sumption. I am inclined to think that the Chinese 
are not only quite equal to the Japanese in indus- 
trial cleverness, but in some respects are superior. 
What reason is there, then, to warrant the opinion 
that in a prolonged industrial and commercial 
struggle China, with a land of unsurpassed fer- 
tility and vast extent, with undeveloped mineral 
resources of incalculable variety and value, with 



282 THE NEW FAR EAST 

willing and efficient labor in any quantity, and 
with immense capital of her own will be distanced 
by a competitor like Japan? 

In searching for an answer to this question, one 
is led, inevitably, to the conclusion that only the 
application of political pressure in some form 
can bring about such a result. And here we find, 
in a nutshell, the theorem upon which a majority 
of foreign policies in the Far East are founded; 
and which supplies vitality to the *' Sphere of 
Influence" doctrine. What most foreign powers 
want in China is to exploit all or a part of her ter- 
ritory and people to the advantage of their own 
industry and commerce. I have no doubt that 
Japanese statesmen fully appreciate their coun- 
try's true position in comparison to China, and 
here is revealed the real import of Japan's past 
conduct and present policy on the continent. 

The instinct which draws Japan toward China 
is that of the leech. 



CHAPTER XIX 
AMERICA'S POSITION AND POLICY 

Coming Realignment of Policies in Asia — Foundations 
for Existing Impressions in America — Examination 
of Basic Propositions Involved — Foreigners and 
Foreign Commerce in Japan — Japanese Attitude 
Toward Foreign Enterprises — Effects upon Ameri- 
can Interests — Attitude of American Manufacturers 
Toward Japan — Japanese Feeling Toward America 
— Japanese Moral Standards — Has England Thrown 
America Over? — Problems for American Diplomacy. 

Since it seems possible, even probable, that out 
of the existing situation in Eastern Asia will come 
a realignment of policies in which the ' ' Sphere of 
Influence^' doctrine will be revived in a more spe- 
cific and formidable form, perhaps to the extent of 
reducing the "Open Door" to a meaningless 
phrase, the position of the United States of Amer- 
ica demands attention. Its national aims in the 
Far East are pretty well understood by Ameri- 
cans to be confined to commercial and industrial 
matters, with no desire or intention to acquire 
additional territory. There is no doubt that 
American statesmanship, skilfully directed by the 
late John Hay, has in recent years, as always, pur- 
sued this course consistently and with absolute 
sincerity. 

283 



284 THE NEW FAR EAST 

I advance no claim that America is more disin- 
terested than other nations. Her policy is based 
upon the belief that the **open door" will be best 
for her interests, jnst as some other powers con- 
sider the ** sphere of influence" doctrine as best 
calculated to advance theirs. All are purely sel- 
fish, in the sense that each nation is concerned 
most about its own advantage. In the case of 
America, there exists a sincere desire to advance 
the national interests as far as possible without 
injuring other nations; indeed, Americans would 
like to see others prosper as well as themselves. 
Unfortunately, all national policies are not built 
on this plan, but many are conceived in a school 
of statesmanship which seeks comparative ad- 
vancement through detriment to competitors. 
And this is the guiding spirit of most of the poli- 
cies now exerted in the Far East. With them all 
competition implies a fight. And in shaping the 
Far Eastern policy of the United States to meet 
the new conditions, this should not be lost sight of. 

In probing the sentimental sympathy for Japan 
that now sways public opinion in America, in an 
attempt to discover a tangible foundation for it, 
one finds that an impression prevails that some- 
how American interests in Asia are going to be 
advanced through a continuation of Japanese 
success. This is, in much commentary I have seen, 
taken as a foregone conclusion. A disposition on 
the part of a commercially acute people to accept 
practically without scrutiny a proposition which 
so clearly contains elements of doubt is a striking 
illustration of the hypnotic effects of the Japanese 



AMEEICA'S POSITION 285 

propaganda. For, at best, the suggestion that 
American trade will benefit by the success of 
Japan's aim in Asia is only a hypothesis, whose 
practical operation is yet to be fully demon- 
strated. 

Set to work to analyze this hypothesis, and one 
finds that its present acceptance is largely based 
upon a formula something like this: ''Japan is 
the most progressive nation in the Orient; ergo, 
the extension of her influence in Asia will result in 
a development along modern lines which will bene- 
fit the whole world. ' ' 

Thus stated, in general terms, the proposition 
contains a substantial element of truth. But 
would it not be equally true to say: ''England is 
one of the most advanced nations in the world; 
ergo, the extension of her commercial and polit- 
ical influence in Eastern Asia is sure to benefit the 
whole world"? Or could not we substitute Ger- 
many, France or America, with equal truth, for 
England, without depriving the proposition of 
any substantial accuracy that it may contain ? All 
this can be said of the Russian occupation of Man- 
churia. Yet would the American people grant, 
without argument, that the unrestricted extension 
of British, German or Russian influence in Asia 
would be likely to permanently advance American 
interests in that part of the world? Would not 
such a proposition, on its face, be more likely to 
encounter a smile of incredulity rather than un- 
conditional acceptance ? 

It follows, then, that the proposition that exten- 
sion of Japanese political and commercial influ- 



286 THE NEW FAR EAST 

ence in Asia will benefit America is not to be 
granted without examination. To keep on safe 
gromid, such examination will do well to look into 
the past and present for facts upon which to base 
opinion as to the future. One hears much like the 
following: "American trade in Japan is steadily 
growing; therefore its growth will naturally fol- 
low Japanese commerce wherever it goes." But 
American trade with England, Germany and Rus- 
sia is also growing ; yet Americans do not regard 
the extension of British, German or Russian in- 
fluence as specially calculated to advance Ameri- 
can commerce anywhere. The extension of Amer- 
ican trade in the Far East, outside of Japan, does 
not in any fundamental way depend upon the Jap- 
anese. If, by means of some fearful seismic dis- 
aster, Japan were to sink into the sea, America 
would still do business in Korea and China. The 
foothold American trade has secured in Eastern 
Asia is not due, even remotely, to the influence of 
Japan more than to that of England, Germany or 
Russia. In a way each of the foreign powers, in 
pushing their trade in the Far East, helps the 
others by creating new wants among the people. 
Such aid, however, is not usually intentional. 

In searching for some clues which may throw 
light on the probable effects of Japanese influ- 
ence upon American interests in Asia, a glance 
should be taken at the situation of foreign com- 
merce in Japan. Japan's foreign trade is steadily 
increasing. This is due to no desire on the part 
of Japanese statesmen to benefit other nations, 
but because Japan needs what she purchases 



AMERICA'S POSITION 287 

abroad to develop herself internally, and requires 
an outlet for her own products. Japan cannot 
continue to thrive, under modern conditions, with- 
out foreign trade, since she could only be self- 
sustaining by keeping her people to a very low 
standard of living. So the foreign commerce of 
the nation has developed along natural lines ex- 
cept in so far as it has been stimulated by govern- 
ment subsidies ; as will that of China if it is given 
an opportunity. Of this commerce America has 
so far obtained a fair share for obvious reasons, 
in no way due to any preferential attitude of the 
Japanese Government. In other words, Ameri- 
can trade in Japan has been compelled to make 
such headway as it could in competition with the 
commerce of other foreign nations. America got 
no more than she has been legitimately entitled 
to, nor will she in the future. This is set forth as 
a fact, not as a ground for complaint, for Ameri- 
cans are not disposed to ask any preferential 
treatment in Japan, or elsewhere in the East. 

The present development of the foreign com- 
merce of Japan is directly due to Western influ- 
ence, in which the part played by America is 
well known. In its early stages it was conducted 
largely under the management of foreigners, 
many of whom went to reside in Japan. This con- 
dition still obtains in a modified form, but there 
are indications that point to the elimination of the 
foreigner as a commercial and industrial factor in 
Japan. This does not mean that foreign trade will 
diminish; on the contrary, it will continue to 
grow ; but that the Japanese will largely dispense 



288 THE NEW FAR EAST 

with foreigners in its management and conduct, as 
they have already done in their military and naval 
affairs. It is not necessary to go very deeply into 
the special reasons underlying this change. Dis- 
cerning foreign residents note the trend of events. 
*'We shall have to go," they often say, in the 
seclusion of their homes or clubs ; *'in a few years 
a foreigner will not be able to make a living in 
Japan. ' ' I imply no reflection upon the Japanese 
in making this statement. This condition is the 
result of logical forces in the national life, and an 
outgrowth of the present ebullition of national 
spirit. It was, perhaps, inevitable. But foreign- 
ers and foreign houses doing business in Japan 
regard the prospect with anything but satisfac- 
tion. When foreign trade first began to make 
headway in the country, it was found to be abso- 
lutely necessary to have in all important positions 
in the large commercial and financial houses 
either Europeans or Chinese, because of the un- 
reliability of the Japanese in business matters, 
as well as for other reasons. This propensity of 
Japanese character, which I desire to pass over 
without special emphasis, since there seems to be 
a sincere desire and effort to correct it, has not yet 
been eliminated; and foreign business concerns 
regard with some uneasiness a condition which 
will practically transfer into Japanese hands en- 
terprises hitherto conducted under the supervi- 
sion of foreigners. 

Although it might be interesting to narrate, in 
detail, some specific manifestations of this dis- 
position of the Japanese to take over all profit- 



AMERICA'S POSITION 289 

able enterprises within the national boundaries, 
I will try to content the reader by a brief outline 
of the general situation. Wherever it is deemed 
advisable or desirable to cause an enterprise to 
revert to Japanese control, the courts are usually 
the chief instrument employed. I do not wish to 
bring any sweeping charge that the Japanese 
courts habitually and intentionally discriminate 
against foreigners, in the adjudication of causes, 
when they are at legal issue with Japanese sub- 
jects, or with the government; although this has 
often been openly and specifically alleged in for- 
mal complaints made to the Japanese and foreign 
governments by foreigners who have considered 
themselves wronged. But the impression is gen- 
eral among foreigners in Japan that it is better, 
by all means, to suffer any tolerable injury or 
detriment at the hands of Japanese rather than 
appeal to the courts. In discussing this matter 
with me recently, a foreigner who has long re- 
sided in Japan and practiced extensively in the 
Japanese courts, admitted the disposition of 
judges to lean toward their own nationals, but was 
disposed to think that this preferential mental at- 
titude was unconscious rather than calculated. 
Even accepting this charitable view, which is not 
entirely consistent with other well-known traits of 
Japanese character, the fact remains that a ma- 
jority of foreigners in Japan feel that they can 
enter a Japanese court in action against a Japan- 
ese only at a disadvantage. There is no doubt that 
in many instances foreign business enterprises 
have been involved in specious litigation, with the 



290 THE NEW FAR EAST 

design and result of compelling them to sell out 
to Japanese investors or competitors. Many laws 
have been recently passed, designed to place limi- 
tations upon the development of foreign vested 
interests in Japan. 

Even the Government, at times, resorts to pres- 
sure to compel foreign enterprises in Japan to 
turn over their business to Japanese control, 
either private or public. To illustrate the method 
of the Government in such matters I will briefly 
outline the conditions under which the tobacco 
monopoly was established. The extensive use of 
tobacco by the Japanese is a recently acquired 
habit, and is almost entirely the result of foreign 
influence. Some years ago the American Tobacco 
Company, in seeking to extend its trade in the 
Orient, decided to establish factories for the man- 
ufacture of certain products in Japan. In this it 
was encouraged by the Japanese Government, and 
the factories were built. As time passed the Jap- 
anese workmen, under the instruction of men sent 
from America, became fairly efficient, and the 
business developed in a promising way. When 
the war with Russia began the Japanese Govern- 
ment was confronted with the necessity of greatly 
increasing its revenue and, among other similar 
measures, decided to create a monopoly of the 
manufacture and sale of tobacco. On two months* 
notice the American Tobacco Company was re- 
quired to sell its factories in Japan to the Govern- 
ment, at a price fixed by the latter. This price 
was, on its face, a fair one, and about represented 
the appraised value of the property. But it by no 



AMERICA'S POSITION 291 

means recompensed the American company for 
being thus suddenly compelled to give its property 
up. The products of these factories had a large 
sale in China and Korea, as well as in Japan, and 
were chiefly depended upon to supply a steady 
demand in those quarters for certain brands. 
When, on short notice, the factories were taken 
over by the Japanese Government, the American 
concern found itself temporarily unable to fill 
orders for those brands, which were thus for the 
time put out of the market, where the Japanese 
Government was free to enter unopposed. Of 
course, the American company at once set to work 
to remedy this difficulty by establishing a large 
factory in Shanghai, and energetically pushing 
other of its products ; but it will be perhaps sev- 
eral years before it is in as good a position to sup- 
ply its trade as it was before being compelled to 
sell its factories in Japan. Meanwhile, the product 
of its old factories, which it established and taught 
the Japanese how to use, to say nothing of its en- 
ergy in creating a stable demand, is being pushed 
under cover of Japanese military control, in terri- 
tories where the American company has previ- 
ously enjoyed a large trade. In selecting this 
particular case to use as an illustration I shall not 
be accused of making a specious appeal to sym- 
pathy in America, for what is there known as the 
"Tobacco Trust" has, at present, much of the 
general unpopularity caused by some manifesta- 
tions of a modern phase of American internal 
development. The fact that the Japanese Govern- 
ment may, on one hypothesis, have been justified 



292 THE NEW FAR EAST 

by circumstances in thus abruptly throwing an 
American enterprise out of the country, and 
totally and permanently depriving it of its market 
in Japan, does not in any way alter the effect of its 
action upon the industry in question. 

My only reason for reciting this incident is to 
indicate a condition and a principle, which may 
both be reproduced many times in the forthcom- 
ing exploitation of Japanese industry and com- 
merce in the Far East. The American Tobacco 
Company is already experiencing adverse effects 
upon its trade through the Japanese occupation 
of Korea and Manchuria, and the same is true of 
many other lines of American products. While 
the boycott agitation was at its height in Shang- 
hai, the boycott propaganda was especially di- 
rected at the products of the British-American 
Tobacco Company, this being the name under 
which the trust does business in the Orient ; and it 
was openly charged that the Mitsu Bussan 
Kaisha, which is the selling agent of the Japanese 
tobacco monopoly in China and Korea, was con- 
tributing a percentage on sales of its products to 
the support of the boycott. 

As indicating how practical American manu- 
facturers, with some experience of Japanese busi- 
ness methods, look upon certain phases of Japan- 
ese industrial development, may be mentioned 
their general refusal to exhibit at the Osaka Ex- 
position, for fear their products would be copied 
and duplicated by Japanese manufacturers. It is 
well known in Western industrial circles that it is 
becoming the custom of American manufacturers 



AMERICA'S POSITION 293 

to decline to permit Japanese to visit their fac- 
tories; owing to the constant employment in the 
interests of Japan of ''commercial spies," whose 
occupation is to obtain models and plans to be 
nsed in reproducing foreign products in Japan, 
where they are not protected by patent or copy- 
right laws. It may be, however, that these are 
only temporary conditions, although indirect 
obstacles continue to be encountered in attempts 
to protect foreign products from this sort of com- 
petition in Japan. 

In late years, especially since the Far Eastern 
question began to assume its present shape, there 
has been a persistent attempt to impress Ameri- 
cans with the belief that the Japanese people re- 
gard America with a deep and lasting admiration 
and gratitude. There is some truth in all this, as 
such sentiments go, which is never very far in 
international affairs; but, nevertheless, a very 
exaggerated idea regarding it obtains in America. 
Flattery is one of the chief assets of the propa- 
ganda, and has been liberally applied in America 
and England. And, as a disposition grows to 
scrutinize more closely some of the actions and 
purposes of Japan, the Western world is informed 
by the propaganda that the qualities of Japan's 
statesmen and people are such that they will not 
be influenced in their impulses or ambitions by 
national glory. However, in order to keep this 
discussion on a rational basis, let me, for a mo- 
ment, project it, hypothetically, away from Japan. 
Assume a people long accustomed to regard a 
certain part of the world as representing the high- 



294 THE NEW FAR EAST 

est degree of potential power as expressed in mili- 
tary excellence. Let it be so well convinced of this 
that it copies the military methods of the other 
civilization, and bends its energies to acquire pro- 
ficiency therein. Let it then encounter a power 
long assumed by the world to be very formidable 
in a military way, and easily defeat it. Such a 
people might be expected to feel a little ' ' cocky, ' ' 
to entertain a perhaps exaggerated notion of their 
own prowess ; and if nearly the whole of the civil- 
ized world united in indiscriminate praise of them 
they would not be human if their heads were not 
somewhat turned by it all. 

With my mind a little cleared by this digres- 
sion, I will now venture to say that, upon my last 
visit to Japan, I could see that the people have 
been affected by their success in the war just as 
any other people would have been. It is true that 
Oriental suavity, too long inbred to be easily 
disturbed, enables the better classes to repress, es- 
pecially in the presence of foreigners, their exul- 
tation. Having visited Japan several times before 
the war, I was able to make my own comparisons, 
and I say without hesitation, omitting details, that 
the whole nation is feeling very "chesty," to use 
a slangy but expressive word which all Americans 
will understand. This feeling has not, so far, 
manifested itself in any disposition on the part of 
the better element to be offensive to foreigners, 
particularly Americans and British; but I could 
observe a subdued insolence in some of the meaner 
classes, such as waiters, 'ricksha coolies, et cetera, 
that was not formerly noticeable. Probably many 



AMERICA'S POSITION 295 

persons in the West noticed that, during the popu- 
lar demonstrations which followed the publication 
of the peace terms in Japan, the rabble showed a 
disposition to attack foreigners, and especially 
Americans; although this propensity may be 
attributed to the fact that the unpopular treaty 
was associated particularly, in Japanese minds, 
with America. 

The propaganda has conveyed the impression 
that Japan realizes that the eyes of the Western 
world are upon her, impelling her to be on her 
best behavior. But does not even this favorable 
representation of the national conduct in this 
crucial period seem to imply that there is a ten- 
dency to contrary action underlying it ; that there 
is something unreal, not genuine, perhaps hypo- 
critical in it all ? As to the ethical foundations of 
Japanese character, about which so much that I 
consider to be nonsense has been published, I can 
think of nothing more illustrative than the pro- 
posal of Marquis Ito, at the time when Japanese 
statesmen came to fully realize the necessity of 
cultivating a sympathy for Japan throughout the 
West, to adopt Christianity as the national relig- 
ion. Although this extraordinary suggestion was 
hailed in some quarters as an indication of 
Japan's yearning toward better things, it really 
demonstrated that the people entertain no ethical 
belief that will not be readily sacrificed to expe- 
diency. 

Turning to possible effects of Japan's political 
and commercial policy upon American interests in 
Asia, some few matters, besides those already con- 



296 THE NEW FAB EAST 

sidered, seem to be worthy of mention. There are, 
so far as I can see, only two theories by which 
American trade in China and Korea can presum- 
ably be advanced through the influence of Japan. 
One is that her occupation of certain territories 
will produce a general improvement of conditions 
therein, which will help all persons doing business 
there. I have already shown that this would prob- 
ably be true, in some degree, if any progressive 
power was substituted for Japan. In fact, the 
great impulse received by American trade in Man- 
churia in recent years is due almost entirely to 
some effects of the Eussian occupation. And 
Eussia still occupies the greater part of Man- 
churia. Any presumption, assuming that the Jap- 
anese occupation is indefinite or permanent, that 
American trade in Manchuria will prosper more 
under Japanese than Eussian control of the coun- 
try may or may not be true. 

Without entering into an exhaustive elucidation 
of the conditions and circumstances which apply 
to this proposition, I express my opinion that, if 
some foreign power must control Korea and Man- 
churia, it would be far better for American inter- 
ests if it was Eussia rather than Japan. Eussia 
is not at present a serious industrial competitor 
of America in the products that are chiefly sold in 
those localities, and is not likely to be for a long 
time ; while Japan is, or expects to be. Moreover, 
the Eussians in Manchuria use large quantities 
of American staple products themselves, which is 
not true, in the same degree, of the Japanese. As- 
suming, then, that American commerce will be 



AMEEiCA'S POSITION 297 

compelled, in the future, to do business in Man- 
cliuria and Korea under conditions controlled by 
some power other than China and Korea, Japan 
is the last nation I would like to see established 
there. And this opinion also applies to the vari- 
ous circumstances under which Japanese influence 
is likely to be applied in Eastern Asia. 

The other theory by which Japanese influence 
may be presumed to benefit American trade in 
Asia is that, in advancing her own commerce she 
will also advance that of other nations, including 
America. Here, again, we find a scintilla of truth, 
which may be applied almost universally. I have 
seen, in arguments along this line, comparisons 
between Japanese commercial methods in the Far 
East, in respect to their effect upon the trade of 
other nations, and the comprador system in 
China. Perhaps I should explain that a com- 
prador is a middleman, or selling agent, through 
whom transactions between the foreign and na- 
tive hongs are carried on, and who receives a per- 
centage in remuneration for his services. The 
real economic utility of the comprador is disputed 
by many, but efforts on the part of foreigners do- 
ing business in China to eliminate him have so 
far failed, as the system is deeply grafted into 
the commercial usage of the empire. Some per- 
sons in the West seem to entertain a notion that, 
in the coming development of American commerce 
in the farther Pacific, the Japanese will play the 
part of compradors in helping to push American 
trade. 

It appears to me that this assumption is falla- 



298 THE NEW FAR EAST 

cious on its face. In fact, there is no true basis 
for the comparison. In China the comprador is 
not a competitor of the business house whose 
goods he places before the retail merchant ; he has 
not got a little factory in a back street making 
a similar, or a counterfeit article which he is at- 
tempting to push into the market ; nor is he merely 
continuing his relations with his foreign house 
until he can, by using his connection to undermine 
its business, enter into direct competition with it. 
This, substantially, is the relation of Japanese 
industry and COTomerce to American trade in the 
Far East. It is true that a limited amount of 
American products are sent first to Japan, and 
then, through the operation of Japanese com- 
merce, are resold in various parts of Asia. So 
far, so good; but it is hardly reasonable to pre- 
sume that these American goods could not also be 
sold direct to the Chinese, Formosans or Koreans. 
For that matter, many American made articles 
reach the Far East through the channels of Brit- 
ish and German commerce, and still more did 
through Russian commerce before and during the 
war. 

But the point is this : Will it be to the ultimate 
advantage of American trade in the Orient to 
have established a condition where many of its 
products are and must be sold through the agency 
of a direct competitor? This question can 
scarcely be answered in the affirmative, unless 
Japanese commercial method reverses all ordi- 
nary processes; and I can discover nothing in 
Japanese commercial character upon which to 



AMERICA'S POSITION 299 

found such an expectation. This, it seems to me, 
disposes of the second theory. 

I have already pointed out how the peace terms 
between Russia and Japan and the new Anglo- 
Japanese alliance definitely concede to Japan 
what are practically spheres of influence in 
Korea and Manchuria never before claimed by 
her. In fact, "sphere of influence" is too weak 
a phrase to describe this new situation. "Terri- 
torial rights" is the term used in the alliance 
treaty. Now "sphere of influence" is somewhat 
intangible, and requires caution in manipulation ; 
but "territorial rights" is absolute, and carries 
with it the authority to control and regulate a 
country. ' ' Territorial rights ' ' imply sovereignty. 
Does any one in America suppose that the 
French, German and Russian foreign offices are 
deceived as to the real meaning of this term! 
And do Americans expect that those powers will 
quietly consent to have their own special interests 
and privileges in their tentative "spheres" cur- 
tailed by the declaration of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance in favor of the "open door," while the 
very next clause and the supplementary articles 
turn over to Japan a very large "sphere," where 
she is to have practically a free hand? European 
chancelleries have no delusions about the assur- 
ance that Japan will respect the "open door" in 
Korea and Manchuria. Will they not insist upon 
retaining special privileges in those regions where 
their influence predominates? What is sauce for 
the goose is sauce for the gander. 

And under any revival and application of the 



300 THE NEW FAR EAST 

' ' sphere of influence ' ' doctrine, where will Ameri- 
can interests land ? American commerce will be 
compelled to fight for a foothold in the Far East 
under any handicaps which other competitive na- 
tions may choose or be able to impose upon it. 
And it should be remembered that the logical out- 
come of the ' ' sphere of influence ' ' doctrine is dis- 
memberment of China. China will herself exert 
an influence upon the eventual settlement, but the 
foreign nations now hold the balance of power. 

This, then, is the situation American diplomacy 
is facing. It begins to look as if the United 
States, having once before rescued the "open 
door," will be compelled in her own interest to try 
to save it again. I cannot help feeling that there 
is something rather humiliating to the United 
States, whether intended or not, in the wording 
and spirit of the new Anglo- Japanese alliance; 
and the British people may yet come to regard it 
as one of the greatest blunders English diplomacy 
has ever made. Americans certainly are capable 
of determining what are their interests in the Far 
East, and if they are not capable of advancing and 
defending them it is pretty sure that no other na- 
tion will push or protect them for their benefit. 
Can Americans afford to intrust the care of their 
interests in the present and future of the Orient 
to what seem destined to be their most energetic 
and formidable competitors? And it is, perhaps, 
significant that American trade in Asia is at pres- 
ent of greatest importance in the regions which 
England so coolly turns over to her ally. 

It is clear that at present the United States 



AMEEICA'S POSITION 301 

could not protect, in an extreme issue, tlie inter- 
ests of its nationals in the Far East with any hope 
of success, owing to American military and naval 
weakness in the Pacific. Besides taking steps to 
alter this situation by maintaining a strength in 
the Pacific which, while threatening no one, will 
induce consideration of its reasonable wishes, the 
United States Government should lose no time in 
instituting more efficient measures to extend 
American interests by peaceful means. The 
United States needs a larger consular force in 
China; and should have there, by all means, a 
commercial and industrial bureau provided with 
a clerical force and funds to keep abreast of its 
competitors. America's position now, in respect 
to such matters, is almost ridiculous. The devel- 
opment of a spirit of resentment against America 
in China, of which the boycott is a superficial 
manifestation, has led to wide criticism of some 
phases of the exclusion laws maintained by the 
United States against Chinese. This is a question 
which concerns only America and China; and it 
has been so fully discussed that it need not be 
mentioned particularly, except to permit me to 
express the opinion that the treatment of some 
classes of Chinese who wish to pay a friendly visit 
to the United States would be more characteristic 
of barbarians than of a great and progressive 
republic, and should be corrected in the interest 
of American trade in the Orient if ethical consid- 
erations have no weight. 

There are indications that American diplomacy 
in China is not always awake to certain peculiar 



302 THE NEW FAE EAST 

aspects of commercial rivalries in that part of the 
world ; nor is public opinion in the United States. 
Especially since the collapse of the "American 
Eailway Concession, ' ' there is little disposition on 
the part of the State Department, or its accredited 
representatives in China, to actively aid prospec- 
tive American enterprises in establishing them- 
selves in the East. This attitude is probably 
based on the theory that for a diplomat of high 
rank to meddle with commercial affairs is undig- 
nified. This is very well in a way, and would be 
an excellent policy to pursue if the representatives 
of other nations would also abide by it. But in 
China the German, Eussian, British or Japanese 
ministers, however much dignity they may assume 
in public, do not hesitate to ' ' get out and hustle ' ' 
for any legitimate commercial project in which 
their nationals are interested; or, in an emer- 
gency, to knife an antagonistic or competitive 
project. In fact, that is a considerable part of 
their duty; and they all play the game as it is 
played in the East. Unless the American consu- 
lar and diplomatic representatives adopt similar 
methods the interests of their nationals will suffer. 
The Wai-wu-pu is always looking for excuses to 
retard foreign enterprises in China, and usually 
construes a backward or moderate attitude on the 
part of a foreign minister as evidence that his 
government is not heartily enlisted in the matter 
in question. It is a condition, not a theory, that 
confronts American diplomacy in the Far East. 

In these methods none are more assiduous than 
the Japanese, whose influence at Peking is mate- 



AMERICA'S POSITION 303 

rially enhanced by Japan's victory over Eussia. 
I know of two instances that occurred in 1905, 
where the Japanese minister at Peking and Jap- 
anese consuls in certain provinces exerted them- 
selves to the utmost to prevent, and did prevent, 
the consummation of important American proj- 
ects. In fact, Japanese efforts along this line have 
doubled of late, indicating, perhaps, that Japan- 
ese statesmen realize that the national ambitions 
cannot be accomplished under a free competition 
with Western nations. Thus is Japan's policy in 
China directed in a straight line, harmonizing 
with the logic of conditions, and past and present 
events. 

A number of new projects to establish and ex- 
tend Japanese commercial influence in China have 
already been broached; such as the plan of the 
Japanese Government, using a corporation in 
Shanghai as a cloak, to purchase all the cotton 
mills in China ; and the various Japanese railway 
schemes. A minor clause of the new China-Japan 
agreement provides that a Japanese railway ex- 
pert shall be employed by the Chinese Govern- 
ment, and it has been asserted that in the future 
of railway building in the empire this Japanese 
is to be consulted in regard to the purchase of 
all material. In this connection, it will interest 
Americans to know that the money used by the 
Chinese to buy back the Hankow-Canton railway 
is believed to have been furnished by Japanese 
banking concerns, through a British corporation; 
and that this and the money which will, if they 
are carried out, provide the capital to operate 



304 THE NEW FAE EAST 

other large Japanese projects in China, comes 
largely from the sale of Japanese bonds in Amer- 
ica and England. Thus American capitalists, who 
permitted the ''American Eailway Concession" 
to languish and die for lack of funds, readily 
assist in floating Japanese bonds, some of the 
proceeds of which are being used to fight the 
progress of American interests in China. The 
irony of this matter lies in the fact that while 
American financiers have generally refused to 
invest directly in purely American ventures in the 
Far East, they lend money to Japan to invest in 
such ventures in competition with America; and 
when the financial condition of Japan is such that 
should her national policy come to grief, as it 
clearly may, it is possible that the capital will be 
lost anyhow. 

Just a word to Americans who may sincerely 
hold the opinion that the United States should 
abandon its position in the Pacific and abstain 
from any positive or aggressive policy in the Far 
East. The possibilities of the Orient, in a com- 
mercial and industrial sense, have not yet been 
scratched, and that the present century will wit- 
ness a tremendous evolution there cannot be 
doubted. That the tendency of material discovery 
and its application to the wants and needs of 
mankind is to eliminate those conditions which 
for so long kept large segments of the human 
race in comparative isolation from each other, and 
to bring into direct contact and a more common 
channel what have, in man's narrow view of his 
own possibilities and destiny, appeared to be 



AMEEICA'S POSITION 305 

widely divergent forces is now generally recog- 
nized. To assume a future for civilization in 
which a majority of the earth's inhabitants will 
not be strongly, perhaps decisively influential, 
seems not only to contradict probability, but to 
negative political principles now widely accepted 
as the guiding and predominating force in human 
progress. It is roughly estimated that two-thirds 
of the human beings who now inhabit the earth 
live in that part of the world usually spoken of as 
the Orient. This constitutes, in sheer weight of 
human mind and matter, a decided, almost over- 
whelming majority, and should it eventually suc- 
ceed in making its desires felt in the councils of 
the nations it cannot fail to seriously affect the 
course of civilization. 

What will be the effect upon the Western world 
of the introduction of modern material progress 
into an element largely homogeneous and which 
holds, in physical preponderance, should means 
to apply it be found, the ultimate balance of 
power ? 

This is the Far Eastern question. Can Amer- 
icans conceive a future for their country in which 
it will not be brought seriously into contact with 
this question? I cannot. America must, whether 
she wishes or not, take part in its solution. 



THE EN"D 




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HlLIPPlNE \%^-%^,„ 



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APPENDIX 



APPENDIX A 

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE 

The following text of the existing alliance between 
England and Japan is that given out officially by the 
British Government, and published in various newspapers 
in England and America: 

"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being 
desirous of replacing the agreement concluded between 
them on Jan. 30, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed 
upon the following articles, which have for their object: 

"A — The consolidation and maintenance of general 
peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India. 

"B — The preservation of the common interests of all 
the powers in China by insuring the independence and 
integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal 
opportunities for the commerce and industry of all na- 
tions in China. 

"C — The maintenance of the territorial rights of the 
high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and 
of India and the defense of their special interests in the 
said regions. 

"Article I. — It is agreed that whenever in the opin- 
ion of either Great Britain or Japan any of the rights and 
interests referred to in the preamble to this agreement 
are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate 
with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in 
common the measures which should be taken to safe- 
guard those menaced rights or interests. 

"Article II. — Should either of the high contracting 
parties be involved in war in defence of its territorial 
rights or special interests, the other party will at once 
come to the assistance of its ally, and both parties will 
conduct a war in common and make peace in mutual 

309 



310 THE NEW FAE EAST 

agreement with any power or powers involved in such 
war. 

"Article III. — Japan, possessing paramount politi- 
cal, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great 
Britain recognizes Japan's right to take such measures 
for the guidance, control, and protection of Korea as she 
may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance 
those interests, providing the measures so taken are not 
contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the 
commerce and industry of all nations. 

"Article IV. — Great Britain having a special interest 
in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, 
Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the 
proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for 
safeguarding her Indian possessions. 

"Article V. — The high contracting parties agree that 
neither will without consulting the other enter into a 
separate arrangement with another power to the prejudice 
of the objects described in the preamble. 

"Article VI. — As regards the present war between 
Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to main- 
tain strict neutrality unless some other power or powers 
join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great 
Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, will conduct 
war in common, and will make peace in mutual agreement 
with Japan. 

"Article VII. — The conditions under which armed 
assistance shall be afforded by either power to the other 
in the circumstances mentioned in the present agreement 
and the means by which such assistance shall be made 
available will be arranged by the naval and military au- 
thorities of the contracting parties, who will from time 
to time consult one another fully and freely on all ques- 
tions of mutual interest. 

"Article VIII. — The present agreement shall be sub- 
ject to the provisions of Article VI and come into effect 
immediately after the date of signature and remain in 
force for ten years from that date. In case neither of 
the parties shall have been notified twelve months before 
the expiration of the said ten years of an intention of 
terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expira- 
tion of one year from the day on which either of the 
parties shall have renounced it, but if, when the date 



APPENDIX A 311 

for the expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged 
in war, the alliance shall i'pso facto continue until peace 
shall be concluded. " 

The treaty was signed August 12, 1905, by Lord 
Lansdowne, on behalf of Great Britain, and by Baron 
Hayashi, on behalf of Japan. 



APPENDIX B 

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE TREATY 

The following text of the treaty of peace between 
Japan and Russia, by which the war of 1904-05 was 
terminated, was given out officially by the plenipotentiaries 
of the two powers at Portsmouth, and published in the 
press of the world: 

" The Emperor of Japan on one part and the Emperor 
of All the Russias on the other part, animated by a desire 
to restore the blessings of peace to their countries, have 
resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and have for this 
purpose named their plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for 
his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro 
Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising 
Sun, his minister of foreign affairs, and his Excellency 
Takahira, Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 
his minister to the United States, and, for his Majesty 
the Emperor of All the Russias, his Excellency Serge 
Witte, his secretary of state and president of the Com- 
mittee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his 
Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial 
Court of Russia, his Majesty's ambassador to the United 
States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, 
which were found to be in good and due form, have con- 
cluded the following articles : 

" Article One. — There shall henceforth be peace and 
amity between their majesties the Emperor of Japan 
and the Emperor of All the Russias and between their 
respective States and subjects. 

" Article Two. — The Imperial Russian Government, 
acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount 
political military and economical interests, engages neither 
to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, pro- 
tection, and control which the imperial Government of 

312 



APPENDIX B 313 

Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is under- 
stood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in 
exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of 
other foreign Powers, that is to say they shall be placed 
on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the 
most favored nation. It is also agreed, in order to avoid 
causes of misunderstanding, that the two high contract- 
ing parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier 
from taking any military measure which may menace the 
security of Russian or Korean territory. 

" Article Three. — Japan and Russia mutually en- 
gage, 

"First — To evacuate completely and simultaneously 
Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of 
the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions 
of the additional Article One annexed to this treaty, and, 

"Second — To restore entirely and completely to the 
exclusive administration of China all the portions of Man- 
churia now in occupation or under the control of the 
Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the 
territory above mentioned. 

" The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they 
have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or pref- 
erential, or exclusive concessions in the impairment of 
Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of 
equal opportunity. 

" Article Four. — Japan and Russia reciprocally en- 
gage not to obstruct any general measures common to all 
countries which China may take for the development of 
the commerce or industry of Manchuria. 

"Article Five. — The Imperial Russian Government 
transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan, 
with the consent of the Government of China, the lease 
of Port Arthur, Talien, and the adjacent territory and 
territorial waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions 
connected with or forming part of such lease, and they 
also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of 
Japan all public works and properties in the territory 
affected by the above mentioned lease. The two con- 
tracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent 
of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing 
stipulation. The Imperial Government of Japan on their 
part undertake that the proprietary rights of Russian 



314 THE NEW FAR EAST 

subjects in the territory above referred to shall be per- 
fectly respected. 

"Article Six, — The Imperial Russian Government 
engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government 
of Japan without compensation and with the consent of 
the Chinese Government the railway between Chang- 
chun-fu and Kuan-chang-tsu and Port Arthur and all the 
branches, together with all the rights, privileges and prop- 
erties, appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all 
the coal mines in said region belonging to or worked for 
the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting 
parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Gov- 
ernment of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation. 

" Article Seven. — Japan and Russia engage to ex- 
ploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively 
for commercial and industrial purposes and in nowise for 
strategic purposes. It is understood that this restriction 
does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by 
the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula. 

" Article Eight. — The Imperial Governments of Ja- 
pan and Russia, with the view to promote and facilitate 
intercourse and traffic, will, as soon as possible, conclude 
separate convention for the regulation of their connecting 
railway services in Manchuria. 

"Article Nine. — The Imperial Russian Government 
cedes to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity 
and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of 
Saghalien, and all the islands adjacent thereto, and the pub- 
lic works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of 
north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the 
ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall 
be determined in accordance with the provisions of the addi- 
tional article eleven annexed to this treaty. Japan and 
Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective 
possessions on the Island of Saghalien, or the adjacent 
islands, any fortifications or other similar military works. 
They also respectively engage not to take any military 
measures which may impede the free navigation of the 
Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary. 

"Article Ten. — It is reserved to Russian subjects, 
inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their 
real property, and retire to their country, but if they pre- 
fer to remain in the ceded territory they will be main- 



APPENDIX B 315 

tained and protected in the full exercise of their industries 
and rights of property, on condition of submitting to the 
Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full 
liberty to withdraw the right of residence in, or to deport 
from such territory any inhabitants who labor under polit- 
ical or administrative disability. She engages, however, 
that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be 
fully respected. 

"Article Eleven. — Russia engages to arrange with 
Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery 
along the coasts of the Russian possessions in the Japan, 
Okhotsk, and Behring Seas. It is agreed that the fore- 
going engagement shall not affect rights already belonging 
to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions. 

"Article Twelve. — The treaty of commerce and nav- 
igation between Japan and Russia having been annulled 
by the war, the Imperial Governments of Japan and 
Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial 
relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of com- 
merce and navigation, the basis of the treaty which was 
in force previous to the present war, the system of recipro- 
cal treatment on the footing of the most favored nation, 
in which are included import and export duties, customs 
formalities, transit, and tonnage dues, and the admission 
and treatment of agents, subjects, and vessels of one coun- 
try in the territories of the other. 

"Article Thirteen. — So soon as possible after the 
present treaty comes in force all prisoners of war shall be 
reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of 
Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special commis- 
sioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in 
the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and 
received by the commissioner of the other Government or 
by his duly authorized representative in such convenient 
numbers and such convenient ports of the delivering state 
as such delivering state shall notify in advance to the 
commissioner of the receiving State. The Governments 
of Japan and Russia shall present each other so soon as 
possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed 
with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively 
incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the 
prisoners from the date of capture or surrender and up 
to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay 



316 THE NEW FAR EAST 

to Japan so soon as possible after the exchange of state- 
ments as above provided the difference between the actual 
amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount 
similarly disbursed by Russia. 

"Article Fourteen. — The present treaty shall be 
ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the 
Emperor of All the Russias. Such ratification shall be 
with as little delay as possible and in any case no later 
than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty, 
to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan 
and Russia respectively through the French minister at 
Tokyo and the ambassador of the United States at St. 
Petersburg and from the date of the later of such an- 
nouncements this treaty shall in all its parts come into 
full force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take 
place at Washington so soon as possible. 

"Article Fifteen. — The present treaty shall be signed 
in duplicate in both the English and French languages. 
The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of a 
discrepancy in the interpretation the French text shall 
prevail. 

"In conformity with the provisions of Articles Three 
and Nine of the treaty of peace between Japan and Russia 
of this date the undersigned plenipotentiaries have con- 
cluded the following additional articles: 

" Sub- Article to Article Three — The Imperial Govern- 
ments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence 
the withdrawal of their military forces from the Territory 
of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the 
treaty of peace comes into operation and within a period 
of eighteen months after that date the armies of the two 
countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria 
except from the leased territory of the Liaotung Penin- 
sula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front 
positions shall first be withdrawn. 

" The high contracting parties reserve to themselves 
the right to maintain guards to protect their respective 
railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards 
shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that 
maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and 
Russian armies shall by common accord fix the number 
of such guards to be employed as small as possible while 
having in view the actual requirements. 



APPENDIX B 317 

" The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces 
in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacua- 
tion in conformity with the above principles and shall 
take by common accord the measures necessary to carry 
out the evacuation so soon as possible and in any case 
no later than the period of eighteen months. 

" Sub-Article to Article Nine — So soon as possible after 
the present treaty comes into force, a commission of delim- 
itation composed of an equal number of members is to 
be appointed respectively by the two high contracting 
parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent 
manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and 
Russian possessions on the Island of Saghalien. The com- 
mission shall be bound so far as topographical considera- 
tions permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude 
as the boundary line, and, in case any deflections from 
that line at any points are found to be necessary, com- 
pensation will be made by correlative deflections at other 
points. It shall also be the duty of said commission to 
prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands 
included in the cession, and finally the commission shall 
prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the 
ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be 
subject to the approval of the high contracting parties. 

" The foregoing additional articles are to be considered 
ratified with the ratification of the treaty of peace to which 
they are annexed. 

" Portsmouth, the Fifth Day of the Ninth Month of the 
Thirty-eighth year of Mejei, corresponding to the Twenty- 
third of August, 1905. (September 5, 1905.) 

" In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries 
have signed and affixed seals to the present treaty of 
peace. 

" Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this Fifth Day 
of the Ninth Month of the Thirty-eighth Year of the Mejei, 
corresponding to the twenty-third day of August, One 
Thousand Nine Hundred and Five." 



APPENDIX C 

THE JAPAN-KOREA AGREEMENT 

Following is an official copy of the so-called "Su- 
zerainty Protocol" between Japan and Korea: 

" The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring to 
strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the 
two Empires, have with that object in view agreed upon 
and concluded the following stipulations to serve until the 
moment arrives when it is recognized that Korea has 
attained national strength. 

"Article I. — The Government of Japan, through the 
Department of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, will hereafter 
have control and direction of the external relations and 
affairs of Korea, and the Diplomatic and Consular Repre- 
sentatives of Japan will have the charge of the subjects 
and interests of Korea in foreign countries. 

"Article II. — The Government of Japan undertake to 
see to the execution of the treaties actually existing be- 
tween Korea and other powers, and the Government of 
Korea engage not to conclude hereafter any act or engage- 
ment having an international character, except through 
the medium of the Government of Japan. 

"Article III. — The Government of Japan shall be 
represented at the Court of His Majesty the Emperor of 
Korea by a Resident General who shall reside at Seoul 
primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and direct- 
ing the matters relating to diplomatic affairs. He shall 
have the right of private and personal audience of His 
Majesty the Emperor of Korea. The Japanese Govern- 
ment shall have the right to station residents at the sev- 
eral open ports and such other places in Korea as they 
may deem necessary. 

" Such residents shall, under the direction of the Resi- 
dent General, exercise the powers and functions hitherto 
appertaining to Japanese Consuls in Korea and shall per- 
form such duties as may be necessary in order to carry 
into full effect the provisions of this agreement. 

318 



APPENDIX C 319 

"Article IV. — The stipulations of all treaties and 
agreements existing between Japan and Korea, not in- 
consistent with the provisions of this agreement shall con- 
tinue in force. 

"Article V. — The Government of Japan undertake to 
maintain the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House 
of Korea. 

" In faith whereof the undersigned duly authorized by 
their Governments have signed this agreement and affixed 
their seals. 

" November 17, 1905. 

"(Signed) Hayashi Gonsuke, 
"i7. I. J. M.'s Envoy Extraordinary and 

"Minister Plenipotentiary. 
"(Signed) Pak Che Soon, 
"H. I. K. M.'s Minister for Foreign Affairs." 

The following letter is in response to an inquiry by 
the author as to the present status of diplomatic relations 
between the United States and Korea: 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 

January 31, 1906. 
Thomas F. Millard, Esquire, 
New York City. 
Sir: — In compliance with the request made in your 
letter of the 26th instant, I send you herewith enclosed 
a copy of the agreement signed on November 17, 1905, 
by the plenipotentiaries of Japan and Korea, by which 
Japan becomes the medium for conducting the foreign 
relations of Korea, and the subjects and interests of Korea 
in foreign countries are entrusted to the charge of the 
diplomatic and consular representatives of Japan. 

As a result of that agreement the American Legation to 
Korea has been withdrawn, and all correspondence concern- 
ing the relations of the United States and Korea will be 
carried on between this Government and that of Japan. 
I am. Sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

Alvey a. Adef 
Enclosure : Second Assistant Secretary. 

Agreement above described. 



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